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Borders are often described as “sensitive” areas—exceptional and dangerous 
spaces at once central to national imaginaries and at the limits of state control. Yet 
what does sensitivity mean for those who live in, and those who are in charge of 
regulating, such spaces? Why do these areas persist as spaces of conflict and 
confusion? This dissertation explores these questions in relation to a series of 
enclaves—sovereign pieces of India inside of Bangladesh and vice versa—clustered 
along the Northern India–Bangladesh border. In it, I develop the notion of 
“sensitivity” as an analytic for understanding spaces like the enclaves, showing how 
they are zones within which postcolonial fears about sovereignty, security, identity, 
and national survival become mapped onto territory. 
I outline the politics of sensitivity and the production of sensitive space 
through both historical and ethnographic research. First, I explore the ways that 
ambiguity and vague fears about security and citizenship emerge as forms of moral 
regulation within and in relation to the enclaves. Specifically, I interrogate the 
processes through which information about the enclaves is regulated and policed and 
the ambiguity, suspicion, and insecurity that emerge out of such practices. Second, I 
examine the historical production of the enclaves as sensitive spaces. I ask how the 
enclaves were transformed from one of many administrative complications related to 
the new and hastily drawn border between India and East Pakistan in 1947 to symbols 
that were appropriated by various nationalist groups in India and Bangladesh as 
markers of national obligation and territorial threat. Third, I explore the ways residents 
of these contentious spaces frame their own histories as claims to belonging (in 
community, nation, and state). I examine how such claims are often indexed to 
possessions (belongings) and the way these claims shape the contours of membership 
within the enclaves themselves. Finally, I interrogate ways that various competing 
projects of rule coalesce in the enclaves to reconfigure power, opportunity, and 
expropriation. In doing so, I examine the ways that projects of territorial definition, 
national incorporation, and monitoring and regulation are experienced similarly by 
residents as various forms of spatial corruptions. 
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PREFACE 
A Note on Naming 
There are two types of complications in writing the names of places involved in the 
history and politics of Bengal. The first of these is that some of these names have 
periodically changed with shifts in political administration. Of these, for purposes of 
this thesis, the following transformations are the most important to keep in mind: 
 In 1947, Greater Bengal was Partitioned into West Bengal and East Pakistan 
 In 1971, with the Liberation War, East Pakistan won independence from West 
Pakistan, becoming Bangladesh 
 In 1983, the district of Rangpur in Bangladesh was sub-divided into several 
smaller administrative districts. Many of areas under discussion in this thesis, 
formerly part of the district of Rangpur, now became part of the District of 
Lalmonirhat 
 The basic administrative subdivision in Bengal is the Thana (or police station). 
Under the Ershad administration in Bangladesh from 1981-1990, the name 
Thana was officially replaced with Upazilla. In contemporary Bangladesh, 
these terms are used almost synonymously in conversation and journalistic 
writing 
More confusing are the number of different spellings and transliterations from Bengali 
that appear in both colonial and contemporary documentation of places and names in 
North Bengal. I have chosen to preserve the spellings as they appear in specific 
documents as I refer to them throughout the dissertation. However, I have employed a 
standard spelling corresponding to the most common transliteration of place names in 
my own writing. Of the names that may appear to shift in spelling in this dissertation 
are the following: 
xii 
 Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, was typically referred to as Dacca in the 
colonial and early post-colonial period 
 The chhitmahals, also known and referred to in this dissertation as chhits, 
make various appearances in archival and newspaper reporting as 
“chitmahols,” “chhitmahols,” “chhittmahols,” “chhittmahals,” “chittmahols,” 
and “chits” 
 The sub-division of Cooch Behar in West Bengal was historically known as 
Kuch Behar, but also makes appearances in documentations as “Coch Behar,” 
“Koch Behar,” “Cooch-Behar,” “Cooch-Bihar,” and “Coochbehar” 
 Dahagram is also spelled “Dohogram” and “Dahogram” 
 The Tin Bigha Corridor is often referred to simply as “Tin Bigha” or 
“Tinbigha” 
 Mekhliganj Thana in India makes appearances as “Makhligan,” “Mekliganj,” 
and “Mekligong” 
 Haats, or markets, are occasionally simply written as “hats” 
xiii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is not the secret of the state, hidden because it is so obvious, to be found in space? The 
state and territory interact in such a way that they can be said to be mutually 
constitutive. This explains the deceptive activities and image of state officials 
(hommes de l’Etat). They seem to administer, to manage and to organize a natural 
space. In practice, however, they substitute another space for it. . . . . They believe 
they are obeying something in their heads—a representation (of the country, etc.). In 
fact, they are establishing an order—their own.   (Lefebvre 2003) 
 —Henri Lefebvre, “Space and the State” 
 
 
 
 
In fact we should not study the frontier in itself. We should study and analyse it in 
relation to the state. () 
—Lucien Febvre, “Frontière: The Word and the Concept” 
 
 
 
 
To make a claim on behalf of the fragment is also, not surprisingly, to produce a 
discourse that is itself fragmentary. It is redundant to make apologies for this. 
—Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments 
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INTRODUCTION: 
CHALLENGING INTERFACES 
In April of 2007, Army Chief of Staff Lt. General Moeen Ahmed1 gave a 
public seminar on the future of democracy in Bangladesh that firmly asserted the 
problem of national survival as one of sovereignty, territory, and control. The talk 
came four months into an extended period of Emergency rule in Bangladesh that 
would ultimately last for two years. This talk, tantalizingly titled “The Challenging 
Interface of Democracy and Security,” was largely meant to justify the openly 
military-backed Emergency government. Ahmed suggested that the country was “not 
ready” for democracy, at least as it had been practiced before the Emergency—called 
after months of chaos around the general election scheduled for January of 2007.2 The 
job of the Emergency administration was to fix this problem by engaging in projects 
that would simultaneously make Bangladesh right for democracy and make a 
democracy that was right for Bangladesh. 
To do this, the administration would need to accomplish two key goals: 
eliminate corruption and create a “secure” environment for democracy to thrive. The 
Emergency provided the perfect opportunity to confront these challenges. Under a 
state of emergency, the Bangladesh constitution was legally suspended, allowing the 
Emergency Administration to work around (and beyond) a range of inconvenient 
liberties—such as due process, the right to public assembly, and freedom of the 
press3—that had previously “stood in the way” of democratic progress. Indeed, a 
                                                 
1 As Army Chief of Staff, Ahmed was not the head of the Bangladesh government, however, he was the 
chief of the military that backed it (see below).  
2 See Sudworth, J, BBC, 2007 (July 11), “Bangladesh Emergency Six Months On.”  
3 See Odhikar, 2008, (March 12), Due Process of Law Must be Followed, at 
www.odhikar.org/documents/14monthsofstateofemergency.pdf and Freedom House, 2008 (April 29), 
Freedom of the Press 2008 - Bangladesh, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4871f5ee2.html.  
2 
number of programs to accomplish these goals were, by the time of Ahmed’s seminar, 
already under way. Among these were a massive reclamation of state land—which 
involved the “eviction” of slums and street vendors throughout Dhaka and a wholesale 
bulldozing of numerous stores and shop-fronts that had encroached on public/state 
space—and a widespread crackdown on corruption that targeted both high and mid-
level officials in Bangladesh’s two key political parties—the Awami League (AL) and 
the Bangladesh National Party (BNP).4 At the same time, Ahmed argued, steps needed 
to be taken to address Bangladesh’s position as a country surrounded by a hostile state 
(India) and at the crossroads of South and Southeast Asia. “As a moderate Muslim 
country and aspiring democracy, I emphatically express this to be a fortress country 
against any wave of terrorism on the southern hemisphere.”5 As such, the country 
needed to renew its commitments to maintaining a secure border and to engaging 
“constructively,” as Ahmed ambiguously put it, with other regional partners. The 
Emergency Administration thus firmly established its prerogative as safeguarding 
Bangladesh through regimes of policing and spatial control. At the same time, it 
grounded the question of rule and order in a fluid argument about territory, 
sovereignty, and rights. 
The story Ahmed told wove together several familiar narratives in Bangladesh. 
On the one hand, rampant corruption and bad governance crippled the country’s 
economy (reducing per capita income by as much as 50%, Ahmed claimed). On the 
other, the emergence of new forms of terrorism (“micro-terrorisms” in Ahmed words) 
and the porous border with India led to an insecure environment for economic—and 
                                                 
4 The anti-corruption crack-down was not solely limited to members of the AL and the BNP. Indeed, 
General Mohammed Ershad, head of the Jatiyo Party and a former President and military dictator of 
Bangladesh, fled the country several times during the Emergency to avoid rumored arrests. However, 
the main thrust of the anti-corruption drive appeared to be to cripple the oppositional political 
machinery of the AL and the BNP under the guise of purging those who had benefited at the expense of 
the nation. 
5 The complete text of Ahmed’s seminar appeared in The Daily Star, 2007 (April 14), “The Challenging 
Interface of Democracy and Security.” 
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hence democratic—growth. The Emergency, and the suspension of democratic norms 
it entailed, would allow the Emergency Government to tackle such challenges in a 
way other democratic ones could not. As Ahmed concluded, “Bangladesh is aware and 
prepared for the challenges posed by security concerns facing the region. In my 
opinion, the issues of security and democracy are inextricably linked.” 
Ahmed’s seminar drew on numerous tropes and paradoxes that are central to 
discourses over security and territory at the contemporary conjuncture as it wove 
together two seemingly competing narratives of nation and state. It asserted the 
national potential for progress as it claimed the need for an iron fist to guide it there. 
Bangladesh was a fledgling nation, emerging from the violence and turmoil of two 
anti-colonial struggles.6 In the period since, the country had struggled with a range of 
challenges—from military dictatorship, to development and economic liberalization. 
Ahmed’s narrative celebrated this nationalist history. Yet, it also played on the 
insecurities and instabilities of governance in Bangladesh since its independence. In 
Ahmed’s framing, the nation was off track. Its 36-year-old experiment with 
democracy was failing. It risked succumbing to a range of tacitly linked threats—the 
violation of national space through porous borders; the opportunistic appropriation of 
resources and land by corruption from within; the overindulgence of short-term 
“rights” at the expense of long-term growth, stability, and survival.7 
                                                 
6 Namely, the anti-colonial movement against British rule in India, culminating in the Partition of 
Bengal in 1947 (in which East Bengal became East Pakistan), and the movement against Pakistani rule 
culminating in the 1971 Liberation War and the creation of independent Bangladesh.  
7 Ahmed’s argument also invoked a range of tropes that seamlessly fit into a set of global dialogues and 
debates. The protection of democracy through its suspension, the preserving of freedom through an 
increase in securitization (particularly at national borders), and the addressing of issues of corruption 
and criminality through policing—as opposed to the exploration of incentives, needs, and practices—all 
are unsurprising, if no less troubling, aspects of much of the contemporary debate on security, terrorism, 
development, and growth (C.f., Collier 2007; 2009; Ghani and Lockhart 2008; Tschirgi, Lund, and 
Mancini 2009). Neither did Ahmed’s proposed strategies for addressing this “challenging interface”—
transparency, sustainable development, promoting the “rule of law,” building regional and global 
partnerships, and participating in global and regional security measures to counter terrorism—offer any 
departure from global developmentalist discourses that have gained currency against the backdrop of 
the international “War on Terror.”  
4 
Ahmed’s arguments, and the programs it justified, were, of course, as much or 
more about establishing rule, power, and control in Bangladesh’s unstable political 
landscape as about the restoration of democratic institutions. The Emergency provided 
seemingly durable legitimation for the extension of various forms of state power into a 
range of different arenas of life within Bangladesh. Many have critiqued similar 
rhetorics as cynical justification for eliminating rights, expanding state power, and—in 
its more global forms—reasserting empire.8 I do not dispute such interpretations. 
Indeed, in the case of the Emergency Administration in Bangladesh, they seem more 
than justified. Yet, I am concerned that such critiques often risk reproducing the same 
logic that unconsciously and uncomplicatedly ties a range of regulatory projects 
together in the name of a unified process of statemaking.9 From this standpoint, the 
dispute between those who enact and support such regulations and those who criticize 
them is reduced to a problem of intent (i.e. are such projects concerned with building 
or dismantling democratic institutions and do they preserve or curtail rights for 
citizens and others?). While this normative debate is critical to understanding and 
contesting initiatives that, at once, speak in the name of and hollow out democratic 
process, I wish to raise a different set of questions about the relationships embedded 
within Ahmed’s challenging interface. 
Specifically, I wish to question the mutual coherence and overlaps of projects 
of establishing security, sovereignty, territorial definition, criminal monitoring, and a 
range of other regulatory projects that fall under the umbrella of “Emergency” invoked 
in Ahmed’s speech. What seems striking to me in Ahmed’s presentation—and in 
countless similar articulations of this logic both within Bangladesh and beyond—are 
                                                 
8 See, for example, essays in Hershberg and Moore (2002). 
9 I borrow this term from Sivaramakrishnan, who argues, “Statemaking appears then to be a matter of 
organizing political subjection within a defined territory (the spatial form of power) and imbuing this 
subjection with legitimacy” (1999: 8). Sivaramakrishnan is particularly interested in emphasizing the 
articulation between the forms of centralized knowledge that are critical to such projects and the 
negotiated terrain upon which such projects are contested and carried out. 
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the common-sense quality of the claimed linkages between such processes. The self-
evident-ness of these linkages are, I suggest, ideological constructions—discourses 
that interpolate subjects and their understandings of events into a natural-seeming 
justification for force and the suspension, reduction, and regulation of rights 
(Althusser 1971; Corrigan and Sayer 1985). There is a coherence ascribed to such 
projects and their presumed overarching goals, a “natural” logic that conceals a range 
of fragmentations that shape and are shaped by people and spaces that are their 
presumed targets. Such fragmentations include, but are not limited to, incoherence of 
agendas and outcomes between different initiatives designed to secure territory; the 
reconfigurations of power and opportunity that emerge in the context of assertions of 
sovereign power; and lacunae in knowledge and ambiguities that both undermine and 
facilitate new forms of regulation and exploitation. These fragmentations are 
important, not just because they point to ways in which projects of rule are 
incomplete, but also because they offer ways to rethink and, potentially, reconfigure 
understandings of state-formation, security, and political power. 
This dissertation engages with these fragmentations, the fraught histories that 
shape and are shaped through them, and their entanglements with broader narratives of 
both nation and state. As importantly, it explores the daily lives and tactics10 of 
meaning making of those who live under tenuous and often violent conditions of rule. 
Such fragmentations, I argue, are more than incidental—chinks in the otherwise 
smooth armor of state security and power. They are central to the productions, 
experiences, and profound ambiguities of politically organized subjection (Abrams 
1988). 
                                                 
10 I use the word “tactics” in De Certeau’s (1984) sense of the word—as a set of practices employed by 
individuals to define space for themselves within environments shaped by “strategies” of institutions 
and other structure of power. Though I embrace this distinction—between broad projects and the 
quotidian negotiations of them (Scott 1992)—I question the ability to make easy and fast divisions 
between them in practice, and resist strains of critique that reduce the distinction between strategies and 
tactics to practices of “state” and practices of “society.” 
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Figure 1: Lalmonirhat District, Bangladesh. Fieldsites contained in the Red Box 
7 
My subject is not, or at least not directly, the recent Emergency in 
Bangladesh.11 Rather, I offer an in-depth study of one place in which these range of 
processes subsumed within commonsense linkages between democracy and security 
are, and over the last sixty years have been, articulated (see Figure 1). Specifically, I 
explore a series of enclaves—chhitmahals, as they are known in Bengali—along the 
northern border between Bangladesh and India. They are literally sovereign pieces of 
Bangladesh inside of India and vice-versa. Moreover, they are problematic spaces 
where the ambiguities and anxieties of security, criminality, territory, nation, and state 
have and continue to be shaped in conjuncture with local histories and politics of 
belonging. Many of the paradoxes of Emergency rule have long characterized the 
logics of regulation and control of the enclaves. Neither are the claim of suspension of 
democratic norms and rights in the service of their defense unfamiliar within these 
spaces. At the same time, the ambiguities and anxieties that emerge out of the 
tenuously linked projects of statemaking, claimed as tools of democratic progress by 
Ahmed, have also shaped the contours of daily life within them. 
The enclaves, and their peculiar and problematic histories, then, offer 
provocative vantage points to rethink projects such as the Emergency that represent, in 
Agamben’s suggestive phrasing, “the threshold of indeterminacy between democracy 
and absolutism” (2005: 3). The use of the term “threshold” in relation to the enclaves 
is apt.12 The chhitmahals, as I will show in this dissertation, rest at the limit of a range 
of different political imaginaries. They are zones within which claims to national 
identity, citizenship, territorial integrity, security, and belonging overlap and are 
reconfigured in often-problematic ways. They are places that lie literally and 
                                                 
11 Though this research was carried out during the Emergency, in 2006-2007.  
12 While I will have more to say on Agamben over the course of this dissertation, I should express, here, 
an initial difference. Agamben’s invocation of the word indeterminacy signals a grey area—a space of 
transition away from Parliamentary democracy and towards authoritarian rule. While similarly 
interested in this “grey area” identified by Agamben, I invoke indeterminacy as contingency, to 
highlight the overlaps, gaps, and reconfigurations that occur in historically constituted projects of rule. 
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figuratively on the threshold of state and nation. As such, they are spaces within which 
we may begin to reconfigure the meanings of liberal normative concepts deployed by 
Ahmed and others, and rethink them as unstable, fragile, and ambiguous claims, 
fraught with uncertainty and anxiety. 
I base my analysis on both historical and ethnographic fieldwork carried out in 
2006 and 2007. During this time, I conducted archival and historical research, 
primarily in Dhaka’s National Archives though to a more limited extent in other areas 
throughout Bangladesh and India. I also conducted fieldwork in both Indian 
chhitmahals in Bangladesh and Bangladeshi chhitmahals in India over a nine-month 
period beginning with the declaration of the Emergency in Bangladesh in January 
2007. From Patgram, a large market town in Northern Lalmonirhat district in 
Bangladesh, I traveled to numerous enclaves, gathering participant observations, oral 
histories, interviews, and discussions.13 Over countless cups of cha in local tea stalls, 
generous meals and snacks in enclave residents’ homes, and idle time spent under 
trees and in fields, I listened to local histories of and perspectives on these fraught and 
problematic zones. This dissertation seeks to share and reflect on these emic 
understandings of place, space, and rights; histories of suffering for territory (Moore 
2005); and local struggles over sovereignty, opportunity, and control. 
This project also engages with the bureaucratic processes through which these 
spaces are “made.”14 It does this through a reflexive perspective wherein I treat my 
                                                 
13 Prior to 1984, Lalmonirhat was part of Greater Rangpur District. 
14 My use of the term “made” builds on critiques framed by and emerging out of Lefebvre’s (1991) 
classic study of the production of space. As Lefebvre shows through his Marxian reading of the 
relationship between capitalism, states, and space, there is no such thing as a neutral space upon and 
within which states, economies, and societies interact. Rather, space is shaped by, and in turn shapes, 
political power. The production of space is a process of ordering—an active transformation of space 
into a recognizable, defined object called “place. “As Lefebvre also highlights, this process works in 
reverse. Political-spatial practices also seek to transform place into space—an ongoing 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization that, according to Lefebvre, is part of the spatial dynamic of 
capitalism. For more on Lefebvre’s critique of space, see Brenner (1997; 2001), Brenner and Elden 
(2009) and Goswami (2004). 
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own experiences conducting this research ethnographically. My research of these 
enclaves involved a range of encounters—many of them uncomfortable and 
unsettling—with representatives of both the Indian and Bangladeshi state system. 
These included struggles with securing visas and research clearance to conduct work 
in these areas;15 encounters and negotiations with various state officials in archives 
and administrative offices; and late night visits by security officials in charge of 
policing and securing the border. These challenges shaped access, possibilities, and 
research practices in my fieldwork.16 Yet they also provided clues to the various 
tensions embodied in the regulation of the chhitmahals that are complicit in shaping 
their space. 
Unquestionably, the attentions and restrictions paid to me, a foreign researcher, 
cannot be simply transposed or read as isomorphic with the experiences of enclave 
residents. Yet, as I will try to show, these uncomfortable encounters offer 
ethnographic insight to the antinomies of life for enclave residents and the tensions 
and fears that shape their governance. As I conducted this research, I tried to 
understand these experiences further through interviews, conversations, and more 
shared tea and snacks with government officials and with the soldiers and officers of 
Bangladesh and India’s border security forces. These experiences suggest ways in 
which the ambiguities and anxieties of the enclaves also pose challenges, 
complications, and dislocations for those who regulate and encounter these spaces on a 
daily basis. In this dissertation, then, I offer an ethnography of state and space that cuts 
across the problematic divide between state and society (Mitchell 1991b), looking 
                                                 
15 Indeed, I am still waiting on an Indian research visa applied for in late 2005.  
16 For example, my inability to secure a research visa in India, coupled with the Indian bureaucracy’s 
notorious reticence to allow research in border areas, prevented me from visiting most of the 
Bangladeshi enclaves situated in India. I was, however, able to visit and devote the bulk of my 
fieldwork to research in Dahagram, the largest Bangladeshi enclave in India. This enclave has special 
circumstances that make it more accessible from Bangladesh than any other Bangladeshi enclave (see 
below). However, and indeed because of this, it is in no way “representative” of other Bangladeshi 
enclaves in India. My observations and conclusions are thus limited in their geographic scope.  
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instead to understand the mutual constitutions, overlaps, and uncertainties of space and 
sovereign control.17 
Zones of Anomaly 
But what are the chhitmahals and why are they so ambiguous and problematic? 
The term “enclave” is a technical geographical term that refers to a piece of land 
territorially bounded by another state (Robinson 1959; Whyte 2002).18 Chhitmahal is 
often translated from Bengali as “enclave,” and indeed I use these terms often 
interchangeably in this dissertation. However, a more accurate translation, perhaps, 
would be “fragment.”19 They are territorial anomalies, posing a number of challenges 
and limitations to representatives of both India and Bangladesh who seek to administer 
them. The chhits, as they are locally known, are, to a greater or lesser extent, 
“unadministered” because, though they are nominally sovereign pieces of their home 
state, representatives of that state—such as police, military individuals or groups, 
bureaucrats petty or otherwise—cannot legally cross an international frontier to 
administer them. They have been the subjects of acrimonious political and legal 
struggles in both states. They are both persistent points of contention in arguments 
over crime, smuggling, and terrorism at the intermittently violent border; and 
flashpoints for local and broader conflict and obstacles in the peaceful resolution of 
disputes. Moreover, despite repeated diplomatic agreements that the chhitmahal issue 
be resolved by simply absorbing these spaces into their bounding states, they persist as 
                                                 
17 For more on “ethnographies of the state” see, in particular, essays in Hansen and Stepputat (2001b) 
and essays in Schatz (2009). 
18 The term has a complicated genealogy and is bound up in its terminological obverse, “exclave.” The 
two terms are similar and depend, largely on the positionality of the speaker (one might speak of an 
exclave as a piece of territory bounded by another state, or of an enclave as a piece of another country’s 
territory bounded by one’s own). In common parlance, the word “enclave” serves for both positions 
(Whyte 2002).  
19 From the Bengali words chita, meaning detached or separate, and mahal meaning self-contained 
building, portion of a building, or estate. 
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symbols of the inability of India and Bangladesh to address many basic, longstanding 
questions about their territorial boundaries. Yet, as I will show, the challenges posed 
by these enclaves cannot be reduced to questions of bureaucratic complexity or 
administrative failure. The enclaves are also zones of cartographic anxiety (Krishna 
1996): places where postcolonial fears about sovereignty, security, identity, and 
survival become mapped onto territory. They are marked symbols of an incomplete 
Partition and ongoing communal conflict and tension between India and Bangladesh. 
They are vivid, if intermittent, reminders of the violent instability of state, land, and 
nation in both countries. 
I. Postcolonial Spaces 
To provide a brief overview of their history:20 prior to Partition in 1947, the 
chhitmahals were discontinuous land-holdings dating back to the Mughal incursion 
north from Dacca (Dhaka in contemporary spelling) into the kingdom of Koch 
(Cooch) Behar in the late 17th century. According to Whyte (2002), author of one of 
the few in-depth accounts of these spaces,21 Mughals were unable to dislodge a 
number of powerful chieftains from the lands around Boda, Patgram and Purvabhag—
areas on the frontier between Koch and Mughal rule—that were granted to them by 
treaty in 1713. These lands remained officially part of the kingdom of Koch Behar 
while becoming enclaves within the Mughal empire. Similarly, Mughal soldiers had 
occupied lands inside of Koch Behar, lands that became a discontinuous part of 
Mughal territory. During the colonial period, many of these enclaves were spread 
                                                 
20 I address these histories in more detail in chapters 2 and 3.  
21 Other academic studies of the enclaves are mostly brief and primarily descriptive, such as Butalia 
(2003), Sen (2002), Chitkara (1997b) and Karan (1960; 1966). The exception to this rule is van 
Schendel’s (2002) “Stateless in South Asia.” Though also comparatively brief, van Schendel explores 
the chhitmahals’ simultaneous political, theoretical and social precariousness. Whyte’s thesis is the 
most exhaustive (and only full length) study. However, its goals are to assemble a documentary history 
and produce a set of reliable maps, not to produce a critical historical, sociological, or anthropological 
investigation of the enclaves.  
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along the border between Rangpur district, under direct colonial administration, and 
Koch Behar, an indirectly ruled “Princely State.”22  
 
Figure 2: Environs of Cooch Behar23 
Though the existence of such territorial ambiguities caused confusion for 
colonial administrators, projects and proposals to “solve” the chhitmahal issue either 
ran into administrative complications or simply came to no fruitful end. Roughly 200 
chhitmahals24 became state enclaves—in the sense of being completely bounded by 
                                                 
22 Princely States were districts that remained under nominal sovereign control of a Maharaja, Nawab, 
or other “native” ruler while remaining within the ambit of colonial rule. For an overview of the system 
of Princely States and direct and indirect rule, see Metcalf and Metcalf (2002).  
23 Map by Brendan Whyte. 
24 Numerous other enclaves, particularly those falling between the districts of Jalpaiguri and Cooch 
Behar—both districts within West Bengal, India—posed few administrative problems and were 
eventually simply absorbed into their bounding district. 
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another sovereign state—at and shortly after Partition in 1947 with the accession of 
Cooch Behar to India in 1949 (see Figure 2).25 
The enclave residents’ status as nominal citizens of one state living in a 
territorially bounded space within another, initially posed only minor problems, as, in 
the period immediately after Partition, the border was, to a greater or lesser extent, 
open (Chatterji 1999; Rahman and Van Schendel 2003; Van Schendel 2001b; 2005). 
Yet as tensions between India and East (and West) Pakistan increased, enclave 
residents, and border residents more generally, frequently found themselves in 
complicated and compromising situations that often led to disputes, violence, and 
arrest by border security and police forces. Passport and visa rules, officially 
established in October 1952, regulated, at least legally, travel into and out of the 
enclaves. This was further complicated by India and Pakistan’s tacit claim of 
citizenship status for populations both inside and outside their borders. Muslims living 
in India were nominally entitled to the same rights as East Pakistani citizens. India 
made a similar claim of “proxy-citizenship” for Hindus in East Pakistan (Van 
Schendel 2002). In the religiously diverse enclaves, this policy effectively offered dual 
citizenship to some, affording proxy-citizenship in their bounding state and legal 
citizenship in their “home” state. At the same time, it doubly alienated the rights of 
others, requiring that they illegally cross two national borders simply to obtain legal 
permission to go to market. The uneven enforcement and application of such policies 
in the chhitmahals meant that in some enclaves, life remained more or less “normal” 
while in others, residents were subject to multiple exploitations by their neighbors, 
local governmental officials, and members of border security forces. As these 
                                                 
25 Princely States were nominally given a choice as to which state—India or Pakistan—they wished to 
join at Independence. In practice, this choice often boiled down to territorial contiguity. These 
decisions, however, have been at the heart of many conflicts over territory in South Asia since 1947, 
especially in Kashmir, the Rann of Kuchchh, and, arguably, Cooch Behar. On the accession of Cooch 
Behar, see Ghosh (1993). 
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residents could not easily access officals from their “home” state, their claims to 
ownership of land, livestock, and crops were particularly tenuous. The precarious 
status of these residents meant that disputes over their belongings could quickly 
escalate and become deadly.26 
This seemingly untenable situation was to be officially rectified in 1958 with 
the Nehru-Noon Accords27 between India and Pakistan, which made provision for the 
absorption of the enclaves into their bounding states. Yet, this treaty met fierce 
opposition both in India and in Pakistan. Indeed, in India, the Accords were 
challenged both in the popular press and in the courts over the question of whether, 
under the Indian Constitution, a prime-minister could “give away” a piece of 
sovereign territory to another state. The question remained unresolved until the 
Liberation War in 1971, which marked the independence of Bangladesh and a sea-
change in political relations between India and the territory formerly known as East 
Pakistan.28 In 1974, the question of the enclaves was again raised in the Indira-Mujib 
Accords29 between India and Bangladesh. These Accords, also known as the “Land 
Boundary Agreement,” called for the exchange of all enclaves into their bounding 
states with the exception of Berubari, a large Bangladeshi enclave that was to be ceded 
to India, and Angoropota-Dahagram (henceforth Dahagram), two conjoined 
Bangladeshi enclaves that were to be linked to Bangladesh by a “land-bridge” known 
as the Tin Bigha Corridor. Bangladesh quickly ceded Berubari to India. However, the 
question of the Dahagram Corridor remained unresolved until 1992. While pundits in 
                                                 
26 Though this did not necessarily make the chhitmahals overtly different from much of the India/East 
Pakistan border in the years following partition. Indeed, addressing such crises was one of the principle 
tasks of the Home Political Offices of both states in the years following Partition. See Chapter 2 for 
more details.  
27 Named for Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon. 
28 Indira Gandhi, India’s prime minister during the Bangladesh Liberation War, initially supported the 
Liberation movement through financial and arms contributions, as well as opening India’s borders to 
millions of Bengali refugees. Later, on December 4, 1971, the Indian Army entered the Liberation War 
shortly before it ended twelve days later. 
29 For Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheik Mujibur Rahaman. 
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both countries frequently reference the unfulfilled promise of the Land Boundary 
Agreement, the state of all the chhitmahals, save Berubari and, to an extent, 
Dahagram, remain unresolved and largely unchanged. 
II. Territorial Fetishes 
The chhitmahals along the India-Bangladesh border are not the only territorial 
phenomena of their kind. Indeed, enclaves are more common than one might think. 
Opposing narratives and assumptions of territorial contiguity, enclaves stand in 
opposition to both bureaucratic (e.g., Curzon 1976 [1907]) and social science (e.g., 
Weber 1946) notions of the relationship between states, territories, and power. As 
Vinokurov (2005) points out, despite the fact that such spaces appear “abnormal,” 
their numbers, contrary to social science common sense about territory and state 
formation, are increasing. Many of these new enclaves were fall-outs of the post-
Soviet break-up and included the enclaves of Sokh, a Kyrgyzstani enclave in 
Uzbekistan with a population of roughly 40,000; Nakhichevan, an Azerbijani enclave 
in Armenia with a population of roughly 200,000; and Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave 
bounded by Poland and Lithuania with a population of over 430,000.30 
The emergence and persistence of enclaves, however, cannot be reduced to the 
chaos accompanying the ends of empires. As Van Schendel (2002) observes, such 
spaces were often the outcomes of decentralized forms of rule that could 
accommodate and tolerate discontinuous land holdings. While many enclaves have 
indeed disappeared or been resolved with the emergence of centralized state systems, 
enclaves cannot simply be dismissed as infrequent oddities. Indeed, a number of 
longstanding enclaves persist throughout the world, including the twenty-two Belgian 
                                                 
30 Kaliningrad is a seaport on the Baltic bounded by two states, a condition that would rule it out from 
inclusion in technocratic definitions of enclaves. However, Vinokurov (2005) argues for a more 
inclusive definition of enclaves that classifies like spaces together as subtypes within a general 
phenomenon of enclaves, as opposed to opting for an overly rigid and deterministic definition.  
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enclaves of Baarle-Hertog located in the Netherlands and the eight reciprocal 
Netherlands enclaves of Baarle-Nassau located in Belgium (see Whyte 2004); the 
Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco, intimately linked to the question of 
Gibraltar (see Driessen 1992; Gold 2001); and the Spanish enclave of Llívia on the 
French border in the Pyrenees (see Sahlins 1989; 1998). Indeed, perhaps the most well 
known enclave, West Berlin, was one of the central axes of Cold-War history and 
politics, starkly framing the contrasts between first and second world rule and 
highlighting the stakes of inclusion in one state versus another.31 Enclaves, the debates 
over what they are and how they should be handled, and the individuals living within 
them continue to shape both local and international conceptions of borders, movement, 
and international relations. 
Yet, even as enclaves, as territorial phenomena, are more prevalent than one 
might expect, they remain, somehow, aberrant. They are geographical and territorial 
oddities that run against the grain of territorial contiguity, sovereignty, and the modern 
state system. To the extent that they have been treated in academic studies of state 
formation they tend to be seen either as challenges to the valence of the territorial 
contiguous state (Van Schendel 2002) or as vestigial—historical spaces that were, at 
one point, important to the formation of a border (Sahlins 1989). Indeed, the 
Byzantine territorial configurations of the chhitmahals makes it easy to view them as 
anachronistic oddities. Not only do their tiny size and high number seem to defy logics 
of state borders. Some of the chhits offer even more strange spatial configurations, 
including several that contain tiny sub-enclaves—that is, Bangladeshi enclaves, 
territorially surrounded by an Indian enclave, territorially surrounded by Bangladesh. 
The improbability of such configurations, coupled with the practical impossibilities of 
                                                 
31 On West Berlin as an enclave/exclave, see Robinson (1953). 
17 
negotiating legal arrangements of such spaces, tends to encourage a view that both 
exoticizes, and in doing so naturalizes, the chhitmahals as territorial phenomena.32 
It is tempting to think of enclaves as fragmentary evidence of the incomplete 
historical transformation to a political and spatial modernity. Yet, such a viewpoint, I 
argue, both accepts a nation and state-centric view of territory and over-privileges 
enclaves’ geographical features. In doing so, it discounts problematic relations and 
complexities related to enclaves as either tied to their spatial oddity or epiphenomenal 
to it. I do not argue that we should ignore the territorial configuration of enclaves. 
Indeed, these spatial problematics are central to understanding the chhitmahals. 
Rather, I argue that it is critical to understand the ways in which these spaces are 
bound up in, reflect, and refract broader concerns over territory, state, and nation. In 
other words, it is not so much that the chhitmahals are sovereign pieces of one country 
bounded by another that makes them problematic. It is the way that these spaces are 
tied to a range of anxieties over the India-Bangadesh border, vague notions of security, 
nationalist and local politics of identity and belonging, and the legacies of and 
unfinished processes of Partition. Only through engaging these histories and politics 
can we move from a viewpoint of these spaces as territorial ephemera and towards an 
understanding the relationship between these fragments and the nations and states that 
claim and bound them. 
To provide a concrete example, Dahagram—a chhitmahal that I focus on in 
this dissertation—is particularly problematic among the other chhits. It is the largest of 
the enclaves (4600 square acres) with a population of approximately 16,000. It is 
situated roughly 170 meters from the Bangladeshi “mainland” and, on its south-
eastern shore, runs along the Tista river—a major waterway in North Bengal. Before 
                                                 
32 Indeed, there are numerous online communities and websites dedicated to the study and cataloging of 
territorial oddities such as enclaves. See http://geosite.jankrogh.com/exclaves.htm and 
http://www.vasa.abo.fi/users/rpalmber/enclaves.htm for just two examples. 
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the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971, the enclave’s size, strategic position, and 
religious diversity (roughly split between Hindus and Muslims) made it a frequent 
flashpoint for communal conflict. The agreement to open the Tin Bigha Corridor in 
the 1974 Land Boundary Agreement, the long political struggle over the Corridor 
(carried out both locally and nationally in both countries), and the eventual opening of 
the Corridor in 1992 continued to make Dahagram not just a territorial “problem” but 
a symbolic and material space of contestation over the meanings of belonging, state, 
and nation. Since the opening of the Tin Bigha Corridor, the chhit has become a highly 
militarized space, literally ringed with Indian Border Security Force (BSF) camps and 
watchtowers and hosting two Bangladesh Rifles (BDR, Bangladesh’s equivalent to the 
BSF) troop posts. The current status of the Corridor is far from the terms laid out in 
the 1974 Land Boundary Agreement. The Corridor is under full sovereign control of 
the BSF (as opposed to being leased in perpetuity to Bangladesh). Until recently, no 
electric lines were allowed to run through it. The Corridor is currently open for 12 
hours a day, from 6AM to 6PM Bangladesh time. During this time, enclave residents 
and outsiders can pass through the Corridor without presenting any proof of 
identification, passports, or document. At night, the gates to the Corridors are closed, 
preventing movement out of the enclave except under cover of darkness. Arguably, 
the complications of Dahagram have as much or more to do with the range of 
uncertainties and tensions between various different pieces of the India and 
Bangladesh state system, the communal politics of the border, and anxieties and 
ambiguities over security than they do with the inconveniences of Dahagram’s 
boundaries. 
As I was told by a rather imperious member of an Indian Border Survey team, 
because of the existence of the Tin Bigha Corridor, Dahagram was no longer “truly” 
an enclave (and thus, to his mind, not a valid subject for my study). Yet, if Dahagram 
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is not an enclave (at least during the day), it is most certainly a chhitmahal. Indeed, as 
I will show in chapter 2, the politics of nationality and access in Dahagram, the debate 
over its status, and the persistent legal and political questioning of the Tin Bigha 
Corridor have radically shaped the experiences, strategies, and arguments in other 
chhitmahals.33 At the same time, while geography is certainly central to the debate 
over Dahagram, neither does its territorial complication explain the bitter national 
conflict over its existence, the panoptic observation of its borders, or the ongoing 
failure to adhere to the full terms of the 1974 Treaty. 
Thinking Through Sensitive Space 
To appreciate and understand the complications of the chhitmahals one must 
understand them in the broader context of cartographic anxieties in both India and 
Bangladesh. Through this lens, they emerge as sites where instabilities and 
contradictions of projects of nation and statemaking reach crisis. They take on 
symbolic and strategic value that appears radically disproportionate to their concrete 
economic, spatial, or even security concerns. The practices of spatial regulation 
employed and deployed by those who seek to control and administer such spaces and 
the negotiated strategies that residents of them employ to carve out lives and 
livelihoods are inseparable from a range of broad, yet ill-defined, fears. These areas 
become, in a phrase that is often used descriptively and uncomplicatedly in academic 
writing, journalism, and political discourse, “sensitive spaces.” 
The word “sensitive,” a word that I heard repeatedly used to describe the 
chhitmahals throughout my fieldwork (see Chapter1), provides an apt way to think 
about such zones. With over 27 possible meanings or interpretations, according to the 
                                                 
33 For example, residents of several largely-Hindu Indian enclaves in Patgram Thana told me that they 
had initiated discussions and claims for establishing corridors like the Tin Bigha Corridor that would 
facilitate easy access to the Indian “mainland.” 
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Oxford English Dictionary (2000), the word itself is wonderfully ambiguous. It means, 
variously, having perception or being perceivable; causing pain, irritation, or intense 
emotion or feeling; being receptive to external influences; being involved with 
national security; and something likely to give offence if mishandled. It is a word that 
appears to have a concrete and urgent meaning when used, but, on reflection is much 
more plastic, vague, and subsumable. It conjures feelings of urgency, pain, and danger 
without defining them. It summons concerns over security without specifying the 
nature of threats. It appears to proscribe and prescribe courses of action without 
explicitly stating causes or strategies. Sensitive spaces appear to variously involve all 
of these meanings, giving them the quality of objects that everyone “understands” 
implicitly, but are simultaneously vague, mysterious, and dangerous. They are both 
instantly recognizable and unknowable. 
In this dissertation, I will disentangle some of the various meanings and 
processes that are bound up in the notion of sensitivity and sensitive space. I do not 
claim to offer a structural explanation of sensitivity, but rather argue that spaces such 
as the chhitmahols are strategic vantage points from which to think about a range of 
processes of state formation. It is my goal to work with, rather than to clarify, these 
ambiguities in order to move from an uncritically descriptive to an analytic 
understanding of sensitivity and sensitive space. As I will try to show, it is the very 
slippages that are involved in this term that both distinguish sensitivity as an analytic 
category and make sensitive spaces zones in need of urgent consideration. 
I. National Belongings 
At the heart of the anxieties called into focus [made sensitive] by the chhits are 
questions of national belonging. They problematize the notion of a national identity 
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bound to territorial space that, as many have noted,34 is central to both the discursive 
and concrete practices of defining and imagining the nation. They at once pose the 
challenge of being inaccessible territory—pieces of “our” land inside of another 
hostile state—and of being holes in the net of sovereign spatial control—pieces of 
“their” suspect land in the midst of “ours.” If the chhits, conceived of as abstract, 
symbolic space, are problematic, similar sets of dilemmas occupy imaginations of 
their residents. Across the communally defined border, these individuals and 
communities are, at once, beleaguered members of the nation hemmed in by a hostile 
populace and dangerous and criminal outsiders nestled within and amongst “us.” That 
such imaginations of the enclaves have little to do with either their social or 
demographic realities—or the ethnic and religious make up of Bangladesh or India 
(Van Schendel 2001a)—has little bearing on the chhits framings as spatial crises of 
both national belonging and sovereign control. As such, the question of security is 
particularly acute in relation to these sensitive spaces. In addition to posing “real” (or 
perceived) threats,35 they also pose symbolic ones. They are zones that reflect, 
produce, and amplify the politics of territorial instability, intermittent violence, and 
national symbolics of the border.36 They are potential points of insertion, areas 
populated by groups with suspect loyalties, and spaces through and within which 
corrupting forces flow. 
Regulatory power accrues in the translation of these symbolics into a range of 
projects that seek to define, regulate, and claim these spaces. Yet, these projects are 
                                                 
34 See for example Anderson (1991 [1983]), Goswami (1998; 2004), Malkki (1992), Taylor (1994), and 
Thongchai (1994). 
35 Much discourse around the chhits poses them as havens for criminals and bases for terrorists. See 
Chapter 2.  
36 For example, in 2001, in the midst of renewed debate over India’s plans to fence the border, the BDR 
occupied an Indian chhit in Bangladesh. In retaliation, the BSF attempted to storm a BDR outpost in 
another region of the border. This incident led to both bellicose discourse about war and security in both 
states and to the initiation of a new round of negotiations to “resolve” the problems of the border at 
large. See Chapter 2. 
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carried out in uneven ways.37 For example, Dahagram, largely because of the Tin 
Bigha Corridor, is a highly militarized space surrounded and regulated by two 
opposing paramilitary forces. More often than not these various forms of regulation, 
control, and assertion of sovereign power respond more to broad framings of anxiety 
over the territorial status of the chhits, the political allegiance of their residents, and 
the ways that they resonate with broader concerns and conflicts along the border—that 
is, responded to their sensitivity—than to concrete, lived-realities “on the ground.” 
Such projects tend to lead to both reconfigurations or bolsterings of power and 
influence within the enclaves. While such projects may have had a range of 
unintended consequences, they rarely contributed to “security” defined at either 
national or local levels. Rather they reinforce, concretely, the symbolic ambiguities 
and complexities of space in sensitive areas. The production of sensitive space, thus, 
cannot be reduced to a set of practices that are “performed on” sensitive space. As 
Sivaramkirishnan points out in his own study of zones of anomaly in colonial Bengal, 
statemaking occurs “within places even as it produces them” (35). In other words, in 
Dahagram, the anxieties of rule related to sensitive space are intimately linked to 
claims to rule and power within them. 
                                                 
37 In recent years, there has been a veritable explosion of critical studies exploring local productions of 
informal sovereignties (for a comprehensive review of this literature, see Hansen and Stepputat 2006)37 
and instantiations of spatial control. (c.f., Li 2001; Mitchell 2002; Moore 2005; Sivaramakrishnan 1999; 
Smith 1992; Tagliacozzo 2005; Tsing 2005). These studies have highlighted the ways that local 
conflicts over opportunity and control articulate with broader framings of the colonial and postcolonial 
state and nation. A central trope of many of these studies, particularly in South Asia, has been the ways 
that contradictory and exclusionary claims to shared national identity are worked out and reframed in 
place (Ali 2010; Baruah 2006; Ibrahim 2009; Jalais 2009; Mayaram 2003). What engagements with 
sensitive spaces such as the chhits highlight and add to these discussions are the articulation between 
ambiguous projects of rule, the ways such projects are navigated, and the opportunities for rule and 
power that they create “on the ground.” There is no lack of projects seeking to assert control over the 
enclave. What emerge from a grounded ethnographic engagement with the chhits are the ways in which 
these partial attempts to create control are, in-and-of themselves, complicit in the reconfiguration of 
power and opportunity within sensitive space. As such, my exploration of sensitive space also draws on 
and overlaps with ethnographies of development that have foregrounded the articulations between 
projects of rule and local reconfiguration of that rule (Da Costa 2010; Elyachar 2005; Ferguson 1994; 
Gupta 1998; Li 2007; Moore 1999; Mosse 2004). 
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If Dahagram is a constant focus of projects of regulation, other chhits are more 
intermittent subjects of violent claims to territorial control. On a day–to-day basis, 
residents of many of these enclaves lead their lives as though they were citizens of 
their bounding states, occasionally even standing for local elections or applying for 
and receiving passports from their bounding states.38 This was particularly true in 
Indian enclaves that had largely Muslim populations, suggesting that a tacit doctrine of 
proxy citizenship still applied along the Bengal border. At crisis moments, however, 
these spaces are often subject to violent instability, where land and possessions are 
expropriated and residents are driven from their homes or worse. The threat of such 
violence is a persistent concern for residents, even in “peaceful” times. While I was 
conducting my fieldwork, for example, word had come that the Bangladesh Army was 
going to prevent Indian chhit residents from voting in the upcoming Bangladeshi 
national elections. As a result, several Indian chhits that I visited in the early days of 
my fieldwork had virtually emptied, with residents seeking more “legitimate” 
addresses in surrounding areas. The evacuation did not reflect a patriotic or civic zeal 
on the part of enclave residents. Rather, exclusions from the voter lists, for at least 
some enclave residents, forecasted the immanent possibility of other hardships and 
insecurities. For residents of such spaces, life is always precariously bound to a range 
of politics beyond their borders. The amplification of broad sets of instabilities within 
and through the chhits thus has grave implications for their residents. 
The anxieties about belonging and national and state inclusion that drive 
projects, attitudes, and policies towards the enclaves thus find immediate and urgent 
resonance within them. As such, much of the history of the chhitmahols, from the 
perspective of their residents, might best be described as a history of elaborating and 
asserting various forms of belonging against, on the one hand, two nation-states with 
                                                 
38 Many of the wealthier residents of Indian chhits inside of Bangladesh maintain multiple addresses to 
negotiate any complications of land ownership and citizenship. 
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intermittently ambivalent and alarmed responses to their existence and, on the other, 
populations in surrounding areas attempting to assert their own particular national and 
communal identity on territory. As I will argue, the question of belonging frames the 
way history is remembered in the enclaves as well as the way politics within them are 
structured. For example, in Dahagram, the long struggle over political and territorial 
inclusion in East Pakistan/Bangladesh is, on the one hand, often framed as a history of 
suffering for territory that justifies both national inclusion and makes a case for 
increased access, resources, and rights. On the other, it also structures the notions of 
social and political inclusion within the enclave—who has the right to stand for local 
elections, speak for enclave residents, and claim access to various forms of aid, 
development, and relief. The tenuousness both of possessions and of rights has thus 
shaped the various processes through which enclave residents, particularly in 
Dahagram, have framed themselves as moral communities worthy and deserving of 
inclusion in the nation (Chatterjee 2004). The ways that these moral assertions of 
community are constructed and carried out, both by elites and non-elites within 
Dahagram, is more than just a claim. It has significant bearing on the ways belonging 
and membership are reframed at a community-level within the enclaves, producing a 
range of political rubrics of belonging and entitlement that are unevenly applied to 
various residents of the enclaves themselves—marking some as “outsiders” and others 
as legitimate members. 
Yet, if such claims to membership are calls for and attempts to resolve the 
ambiguities of the enclaves, they cannot be reduced to the simple assertion of a 
nationalist identity or demand for formal citizenship. The politics of belonging within 
the enclaves is significantly more confused. Indeed, particularly in Dahagram, the 
historical debate over framing and claiming national belonging involved communal 
claims for inclusion in both India and Bangladesh. Muslim residents mounted active 
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campaigns for the implementation of the 1974 Land Boundary Agreement and the 
opening of the Tin Bigha Corridor. Hindu residents were equally committed to 
asserting Dahagram’s belonging within India, positing the space as only “accidentally” 
not part of their bounding state. This debate over national membership cannot even be 
drawn purely along communal grounds. Enclave residents have actively engaged in 
debates and considerations over the relative advantages of inclusion in either state. 
Many of the residents of Dahagram that I spoke with over the course of my fieldwork 
hinted at moments when the decision of national belonging, even for Muslim 
residents, was far from clear. Moreover, assertions of identity and belonging are often 
opportunistically deployed. In other words, the ambiguities of belonging in sensitive 
spaces such as the enclaves create opportunities for a range of different kinds of 
negotiations. The confusion and anxiety over the status of enclave residents is thus 
something that is not simply refuted by residents. At particular moments and in 
particular circumstances, this ambiguity can and is actively traded upon. 
II. Fragmented Knowledges 
The question of sensitive space is a dilemma of national belonging—a question 
of anxieties and ambiguities. Yet, these concerns themselves emerge out of and 
through concrete, historically specific practices of and assumptions about their status. 
In other words, the “sensitivity” of sensitive spaces is constantly reproduced both by 
state officials who administer and control information about the enclaves and by their 
residents. Critical to understanding the ambiguity and anxiety of such zones, then, are 
the ways they are bound up in broader and equally vague discourses of national 
security and practices of secrecy. In and in regard to sensitive space, there is a 
persistent feeling that, somewhere, there exists quantities of knowledge and 
expertise—information that could clarify the hazy picture of these zones. Yet the 
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belief in such knowledge seems coupled to a commitment or acceptance that it must 
be vigilantly protected and kept secret—that elaboration could expose the sensitive 
nerve endings of such zones and simultaneously pose threats to state security. 
Simmel’s (1906) classic study of the sociology of secrecy defines secrecy largely in 
economic terms—as both the expression and creation of value around ideas. In 
Simmel’s sense, the fundamental sociological “purpose” of secrecy is in defining 
reciprocal relationships of power between groups. As he argues, “Secrecy is a 
universal sociological form which, as such, has nothing to do with the moral 
valuations of its content” (463). It is thus an eminently social form of control. Secrecy 
is a practice that in and of itself creates import around that which is being protected as 
a secret. It also reinforces this import to those who are “protecting” it. 
Building on Simmel’s critique, sensitive space might be thought of as having a 
reflexive relationship with both the practice of secrecy and the limits of knowledge 
around it. This relationship embodies a sense that knowledge about sensitive space 
should be kept secret for purposes of national and state security. In other words, the 
notion of sensitive space encourages the social practice of secrecy—particularly, but 
not exclusively, among government officials—without specifying its content.39 As 
Simmel points out, the definition and formation of secret societies is intimately linked 
to the import (or perceived import) of the secret that they keep. Though reducing state 
security purely to a question of secrecy is dangerously reductive, understanding the 
relation of government officials to sensitive space as a secret society in Simmel’s 
sense is suggestive. The import of secrecy related to such zones is unbounded, 
precisely because of the very ambiguity of its content. On the one hand, difficult 
questions about such zones can be explained by the invocation of sensitivity. On the 
                                                 
39 The social practices of secrecy have, perhaps, been most directly studied in the anthropology and 
sociology of science, particularly in the context of the link between national security and scientific 
research. See, in particular, Gusterson (1998). 
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other, all information related to such spaces is, potentially, sensitive and thus in need 
of guarding. Information even potentially related to sensitive space is always already a 
security threat, because its relative significance is not easily assessed. Thus, and in 
part because, such spaces may not have “official” designation as “secret,” there is 
constant informal policing and protection of knowledge related to them. 
Yet, there is a further element to the practice of secrecy in relation to sensitive 
space. Not only are such zones the subjects of secrecy, they are also, I argue, areas that 
represent genuine gaps in official knowledge in part precisely because of social 
practices of and assumptions about their sensitivity. They are spaces that are less 
legible (Scott 1998; Sivaramakrishnan 1999) than those around them. This is not to 
say that bureaucratic knowledge about such spaces does not exist. Rather, it is to 
suggest that such knowledge itself is fragmentary and unevenly distributed throughout 
various branches of the state system involved in their administration. I would 
hypothesize (though can never be “sure”) that there is no “central file” on the 
chhitmahals, in which the range of questions and inconsistencies in their 
administration are explained. Rather, there appear to be incomplete sets of experiential 
and empirical data held by various officials with various different administrative 
responsibilities. The administration and history of these zones appear marked by 
disjunctures, lapses, and reinventions of strategies of rule and regulation that speak to 
such gaps in knowledge. And indeed, the persistent emergence of such gaps 
themselves increases the anxiety around the chhits, their residents, and their 
governance. 
III. Exceptional Inclusions and Exclusions 
The history of the enclaves suggests that such gaps in knowledge afford 
moments and practices of violence and repression as well as opportunities for 
28 
negotiation and reconfiguration. They manifest in mutually incoherent projects of 
regulation and partially understood assertions of bureaucratic and diplomatic control. 
These overlaps become exceptionally complicated in enclaves such as Dahagram, 
where the question of sovereign control is balanced between the Indian BSF’s 
attempts to regulate movement and manage the enclave’s borders and the Bangladesh 
Rifles’ attempts to secure the space as Bangladeshi territory and prevent India from 
violating its frontiers (Febvre 1973). At any given moment, these projects are shaped 
by: the local relationship between the BSF and the BDR and the whims of officers “on 
the spot,” the responses of enclave residents to such projects, broader conflicts and 
tensions along the border, and the diplomatic relationship between India and 
Bangladesh. Yet, the complications of belonging, rule, and control in Dahagram are 
not only determined by state and paramilitary projects and local reactions to them. 
They are further shaped by national symbolics and projects that assert and celebrate 
their inclusion or exclusion from nation and state. As important to Dahagram’s 
contemporary political moment, for example, are external projects that seek to 
capitalize on the symbolic import of the enclave through development and other forms 
of “aid” that are seemingly disproportionate to the chhit’s size, geography, and 
political economy (see chapter 4). 
Sensitive spaces are thus “exceptional” spaces. Yet, equally, their history—
read from outside the enclaves looking in and from inside looking out—is a story of 
the constant negotiation of what such a term might mean. As such, sensitive spaces are 
also places from which we might rethink the concept of “the exception,” particularly 
its articulation in Schmidt’s (2005 (1932)) theory of sovereign power—wherein 
sovereignty is conceived of as the power to decide on what is an “exception” to the 
rule of law—or Agamben’s (1998) more Foucauldian reworking of the term—where 
exception is conceived as a state of exclusion from the polis and a biopolitical 
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reduction of lived existence to a condition of “bare life” (see Chapter 1). For Agamben 
and Schmidt, sovereign exceptions frame a dialectical tension of exclusion and 
inclusion. Through the act of excepting, not only is the exception excluded from 
broader society, but the contours of social life are defined. The enclaves are spaces 
that are certainly in dialectical tensions of belonging with the areas around them, but 
this tension is as much the result of the ambiguous status of the enclaves and their 
residents as it is a “decision” about their status—legal, discursive, military or 
otherwise. Indeed, the chhits’ postcolonial history appears to be as much about failures 
to decide and inabilities to reach sovereign decisions as they are about the range of 
exclusions of the spaces by those who live in and around them. Neither can this 
exceptionality be wholly explained through the frame of exclusion. Dahagram is 
marked as exceptional through projects of both exclusion and inclusion. To 
understand these spaces, we must historically and ethnographically engage both the 
way these contradictory processes of inclusion and exclusion are constituted in 
sensitive space, and the ways that residents themselves navigate such claims; duck 
around processes that mark these spaces as both marginal and central; and selectively 
draw on, comply with, and defy a range of projects of rule. 
While sensitive spaces are exceptional, they are by no means stateless zones or 
spaces where residents passively accept a range of expropriations and exploitations. In 
other words, sensitive spaces, and all of their attendant ambiguities and anxieties, are 
not simply places within which people live. Their meanings are something that 
residents are constantly engaged in negotiating, redefining, and shaping. In other 
words, to paraphrase E. P. Thompson (1966), chhiter lok—residents of the chhits—did 
not rise like the sun at Partition and fall victim to the historical vagaries of life in 
sensitive space. They were very much present at its making. 
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Thinking with Sensitivity 
For all of the complexity, confusion, and richness of the chhitmahals, they are, 
after all, tiny spaces on the border between India and Bangladesh, occupying small 
amounts of land with a relatively modest total population. Why, then, devote time to 
studying them sociologically? This question, as I hope will be apparent throughout this 
dissertation, can be answered in a number of different ways. However, before 
beginning, let me offer an initial two reasons—one grounded in academic debates and 
one grounded in politics—why understanding sensitive space is important. 
In the past twenty years, borders and boundaries have both become the subject 
of historical inquiry, ethnographic research and theoretical modeling.40 Much new 
literature explicitly reverses the gaze of older research by directly interrogating state, 
identity, and nation formation at borders. Writers approaching borders, frontiers, and 
boundaries from this perspective employ various historiographical strategies and 
theoretical approaches, but all seek to understand borders not as the naturalized limits 
of state space, but as zones of complex interactions between people, things, and state 
institutions. Such studies reframe the debate not as a problem of understanding “the” 
border but rather as understanding borderlands.41 These new studies have critically 
reformulated the border as “a privileged site for assessing the power and limitations of 
the nation state” (Aggarwal and Bhan 2009: 521). 
                                                 
40 This emerging literature is vast and varied. For historical studies, see for example, Sahlins (1989), 
Tagliacozzo (2005), White (1991); for ethnographic studies, see, Aggarwal (2004), Aggarwal and Bhan 
(2009), essays in Donnan and Wilson (1999), essays in Kumar Rajaram and Grundy-Warr (2007), 
Reeves (2005; 2009), and essays in Wilson and Donnan (1998a); and for theoretical studies see 
Anderson (1997) and Prescott (1997). 
41 As Baud and van Schendel put it, this entails a “cross-border perspective in which the region on both 
sides of the border is taken as the unit of analysis” (italics in original, 1997: 216). Sharing much with 
sociological approaches to understanding state territorialization (Scott 1998; Vandergeest and Peluso 
1995) and anthropological studies of marginality (essays in Das and Poole 2004), they undermine 
evolutionary models of boundary formation and call attention to the ways that boundaries are mutually 
formed and maintained both in metropoles and at peripheries.  
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Yet, there is a tendency in some of these studies to allow the border to over-
determine historical inquiry. Indeed, viewing the border as a structuring phenomenon 
has become a central, though not exclusive, tendency in the emerging comparative 
historical analysis of borderlands. This has three potential critical consequences. First, 
it subordinates other social and spatial processes at work in borderlands, tending to see 
them as produced by, as opposed to producing or mutually constituting, borders. 
Second, such a view tends to reify borders, constructing them as actors in and of 
themselves—things that “produce” borderlands. Third, this perspective carries with it 
an assumption that borders constitute a priori empirically similar categories suitable 
for comparison across time and space. This ascribes universal characteristics to 
borders that foreground their, primarily, repressive and oppressive characteristics, 
regulatory features, and the generalized tension and exclusion of populations in 
borderlands. While many borders and borderlands may share such features, the 
historical differences and contingencies of their formation are subordinated to general 
models of their behavior.42 As such, comparative studies of borderlands often presume 
a shared empirical focus embodied in the border itself, rather than exploring the 
resonances and constructions of particular processes in particular spaces. 
In this sense, studies of borderlands risk falling into a “methodological 
stateism:” a reliance on, as opposed to an unpacking of, a set of concepts that emerge 
out of and are defined through the modern state system. As several authors have 
pointed out, this analytic and linguistic trap both limits and directs social scientific 
inquiry towards a set of prescribed questions and answers (Goswami 1998; 
Wallerstein 1991). I wish to make a modest suggestion that exploring the anxieties and 
ambiguities around sensitive space might provide one possibility, among many, for 
                                                 
42 Andrew Walker’s (1999) ethnography of border economies on Laos, Thai, Chinese, and Burmese 
borders is a notable exception to views of borders as spaces of pure oppression. It demonstrates how the 
presence of complicated border configurations facilitates a range of advantageous economic 
relationship for residents of the Mekong hinterland. 
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moving beyond this impasse. In what follows, I will attend to a range of processes of 
state and nation formation that might productively speak across a range of areas that 
are “sensitive” to ongoing processes of state formation in South Asia and, perhaps, 
beyond. In so doing, I hope to rethink or unthink the notion that borders and 
borderlands, in and of themselves, are limit concepts of the nation state, and rather 
refocus attention on anxiety, ambiguity, and belonging as contested processes that 
shape the postcolonial state in critical ways. Cartographic anxieties are mutually 
constituted with sensitive space. These areas thus offer strategic spaces to engage in 
incorporated comparative explorations of the processes of state and space making.43 
By reengaging with the empirical fragmentations of sensitive space—that is, by 
focusing on its tensions, anxieties, and ambiguities—we might imagine productive 
comparisons with other regions where questions of legibility and governance are 
problematic.44 
This is not to propose an equally ahistorical comparative project of identifying 
and cataloging the existence of sensitive spaces throughout history and across the 
globe. It is rather to suggest a different project. By learning to recognize the tensions 
and uncertainties that accumulate in sensitive spaces, and engaging in historical and 
ethnographic analyses of the various productions of such spaces, we stand to learn 
about more about various processes of state and nation formation and the ways such 
processes buckle under a range of contradictory claims, administrative failures, and 
resistances. Sensitive spaces are mutually constituted with their various nations and 
states. Yet, they also embody the frayed and fraying ends of concepts that are central 
to legitimacy and rule at the heart of politically organized subjection. By 
understanding further how such spaces do or do not articulate with one another, we 
                                                 
43 On incorporated comparison, see McMichael (1990; 1992). 
44 For example, the tensions described in “zomia” by James Scott (2009) suggest ways in which 
physical geography might be as central to the productions and complications of sensitive space in 
upland South East Asia.  
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might begin to move from comparative studies that focus on the empirical trappings of 
the modern state and towards a historically grounded, comparative understanding of 
the conceptual limits of the state idea (Abrams 1988). 
This brings me to my second point about the politics of studying sensitive 
space and also returns me to Ahmed’s challenging interface of democracy and 
security. Ahmed’s propositions, as I earlier argued, casually roll together a range of 
projects of rule that are neither “naturally linked” nor, necessarily even mutually 
coherent. As Agamben (2005) forcefully argues, states of emergency, such as those 
declared in Bangladesh, are increasingly part of the landscape of parliamentary (and 
other) democracies in the contemporary moment. States of exception are zones and 
moments within which the rule of law is selectively and opportunistically removed 
and deployed in the service of the expansion of state power. Yet, they are also 
moments in which such projects are fused together in ways that are presented as 
natural, logical, and critical to the survival of state and nation. Sensitive spaces, I 
would argue, are places within which these combinations are forged, tried out, 
reworked, and contested. They are spaces within which states of exception—both 
inclusionary and exclusionary—are intimately linked to history, landscape, and the 
politics of belonging. If, as Agamben argues, the “exception” is rapidly becoming the 
rule, sensitive spaces provide opportunities to rethink the histories of nation and state 
in ways that provide more contextual and processual understandings of the selective 
suspension of rights in the name of national and political survival. They are spaces 
where the contradictions and lapses between various projects of rule might be seen 
more clearly as the outcomes of historical projects of spatial regulation and nation 
building. What is more, when viewing states such as Bangladesh and India from 
within them, states of exception and emergency stop looking like emerging 
phenomena and rather appear as ambiguous but crucial and longstanding aspects of 
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their postcolonial history. While the enclaves and other sensitive space do not offer 
models to explain broad political crises, they do offer locations from which to view 
them and to disentangle their justifications, claims, and projects. 
In this sense, this project’s title, The Fragments and Their Nation(s), does 
more than take the name of Chatterjee’s (1993) well-known treatise on nationalism in 
vain. The Nation and Its Fragments offers an exploration of the fragmentary creation 
of an anti-colonial nationalism, a framing of a national identity that engaged, however 
tenuously, in a series of incorporations and resolutions. As Chatterjee argues, “Now 
the task is to trace in [subaltern and elite’s] mutually constituted historicities the 
specific forms that have appeared, on the one hand, in the domain defined by the 
hegemonic project of nationalist modernity, and on the other, in the numerous 
fragmented resistances to that normalizing project” (13). This project pursues that 
goal, though, perhaps, not from the perspective that Chatterjee had in mind. It seeks to 
avoid and unpack totalizing explanations of territory, nation, and state through 
attending to the inseparability of nationalist projects from fragmentary and troubling 
space. It engages the projects of making national and state space in zones where such 
projects are called into crisis. And, perhaps most importantly, it shows how the local 
framings and experiences of struggles over these fragmentary identities and concepts 
are more than merely incidental to the postcolonial histories of India and Bangladesh. 
Chapter Outline 
This dissertation is organized into four chapters, each exploring different issues 
related to the production of sensitive space at the India-Bangladesh border. These 
chapters are as follows: 
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Chapter 1: Sensitive Spaces? Rethinking Exception Along the India-Bangladesh 
Border 
I frame my exploration of sensitivity through an examination of how the term 
became central to my research and what it means to live in sensitive space. I ask what 
makes spaces such as Dahagram “sensitive” areas in need of scrutiny and subject to 
suspicious governing? I examine how discourses of sensitivity manifest in daily-life 
and how they produce, rather than merely describe, sensitive spaces. Sensitive spaces 
are exceptional spaces, where questions of law, sovereignty, and security are unsettled 
and unsettling. Understanding them requires attention to threats, uncertainties, and 
vaguely defined fears articulated through practices and performances of sensitivity 
(Corrigan and Sayer 1985). Attending to such tensions and performances helps 
complicate notions of “the sovereign exception” that have come to dominate recent 
studies of borders and frontiers. I examine questions related to land disputes, access, to 
health care, and movement through the Tin Bigha Corridor. For enclave residents, 
these issues are intimately linked to ambiguities of rule, the intense regulation of 
“official” knowledge, and the persistent circulation of rumors and constant feeling of 
threat that produce a space that is rife with insecurity. Finally, I return to the vexed 
question of loyalties within the enclave to ask how the tensions of belonging emerge 
in often-painful ways within sensitive spaces. 
Chapter 2: Histories of Sensitivity: The Production of Sensitive Space 
Interrogating the ways the enclaves both surface in and disappear from broader 
debates over the border, territory, and nation, I develop a reading of the historical 
processes through which sensitivity emerges as a category of rule. Drawing on 
archival and newspaper data and public records of parliamentary debates, I examine 
the transition from the enclaves as an administrative complication—a set of local 
36 
problems that can be rationally dealt with through diplomatic negotiation—to sensitive 
issues that are indexed to, on the one hand, tensions over fear, security, and national 
territory and, on the other, claims to citizenship and national protection. I focus on the 
public debates around the opening of the Corridor in 1992, the 1974 Indira-Mujib 
Accords, and the earlier 1954 Nehru-Noon Accords to show how the enclaves became 
bound up in various projects of asserting national space. In doing so, I examine the 
ways in which the enclaves as empirical spaces “on the ground” are effectively erased 
by the enclaves as symbols of territorial conflict between India and Bangladesh. I 
conclude by looking at how the enclaves are deployed in ongoing discussions over 
issues such as illegal migration, smuggling, and the border fence constructed around 
Bangladesh by India. My examination raises the question of why the enclave “issue” 
appears insurmountable. Unlike other authors who have suggested that this is largely 
an administrative problem (Ahmed 2007; Jacques 2000), I answer this question 
through a cross-border historical interrogation of the various insecurities, 
uncertainties, and anxieties that are bound up in nationalist discourses around 
territorial integrity. As such, I explore the particular historical contexts out of which 
the enclaves emerge and structure political and administrative possibilities at the limits 
of state control. 
Chapter 3: Histories of Belonging(s): Narrating Territory, Possession, and 
Dispossession in Dahagram 
In this chapter, I explore the various histories of belonging historically 
sedimented (Moore 2005) in the landscape of Dahagram. Exploring these histories 
provides a strategy for understanding how people frame particular claims to 
membership—in communities, in nations, in states—and how they seek to actualize 
tenuous rights. In Dahagram, citizenship, displacement, security (national and 
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personal), and rights are all subsumed within a range of grounded notions of belonging 
as well as belongings (material goods). Movement and the ability to hold and dispose 
of possessions—land, clothing, houses, crops, livestock—are central to this 
exploration. Yet, belonging is more than purely an issue of possession. It is also a 
question of community and identity: who has the right to belong and why. I explore 
the intertwined political economies and cultural politics of belonging(s) in Dahagram 
through oral-history accounts of its residents. 
My use of “belongings” is intended to draw attention to the ways that the 
politics of membership within the enclave are inseparable from debates over and 
claims of ownership. In contrast to more narrowly defined problematics such as 
“statelessness” or “citizenship,” I argue that exploring ways that membership and 
property are linked is a productive way to understand the enclave’s contested history. I 
explore a 1965 refugee crisis in Dahagram, the daily negotiation of security forces that 
characterized life in Dahagram before 1992, the long struggle over the opening of the 
Tin Bigha Corridor, and the politics of membership in Dahagram since the Corridor’s 
opening. By focusing on this historical junction between possession and membership, 
I examine the histories and “politics of the governed” that undergird ongoing struggles 
to establish rights for enclave residents. 
Chapter 4: Spatial Corruptions: Crime, Security, and Development in Dahagram 
My final chapter analyzes the simultaneous definition and erosion of space in 
Dahagram. In South Asia, it is fairly common to casually draw connections between 
projects seeking to “define” the border, increase security, and reduce corruption. 
However, it is significantly rarer for scholars, politicians, or journalists to explore the 
various—and far from obvious—overlap between these processes and the ways that 
they interact with representatives of local government, tensions between border 
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security forces, and individuals who live in the fraught areas along the India-
Bangladesh border. This chapter explores the entanglements between border definition 
and security; development projects seeking to incorporate the enclaves into nation and 
state; and crime, corruption, and opportunity within Dahagram. I argue that these 
implementations, negotiations, and contingent overlaps are both a constituent part and 
a product of the politics of sensitivity that structure life within it. Such entanglements 
are most often experienced as expropriations and dispossessions as well as political 
favoritism, clientelism, and cronyism by residents of Dahagram. In such contexts, neat 
divisions between legal and non-legal, law enforcement and transgression, and spatial 
definition and corruption are far from clear. 
I chart the micropolitics of space, security, and crime in Dahagram through a 
range of ethnographic explorations. First, I examine processes and local contestations 
of a project seeking to demarcate the enclave’s border. Second, I examine the politics 
and contradictions of development in Dahagram as exemplary of tensions between the 
enclave’s symbolic status within national imaginaries and perceptions of it as a 
marginal and, presumed, dangerous place. I explore how this tension produces graft, 
power, and opportunity for both of border security forces and Dahagram’s political 
elite. Third, through an exploration of a project mounted by the BSF to stem cattle 
smuggling, I explore the overlapping sovereignties at play in the regulation of 
criminality and definition of border security. Through each of these case studies, I ask 
how configurations of sovereign power in the enclave often re-enforce and create new 
opportunities for those engaged both in “criminal” and regulatory practices. 
Conclusion 
In the conclusion, I revisit the enclaves, examining developments in them since 
I concluded my fieldwork. I draw out the methodological question of sensitive space 
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as a comparative optic, reflecting on the particularities and generalities of sensitivity. 
Finally, I return to the challenging interface of democracy and security, reflect on the 
possibilities of transforming the enclaves administrative “status,” and ask what role 
enclave residents themselves might play in forwarding and shifting debates over their 
futures. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
“SENSITIVE SPACES”: RETHINKING EXCEPTION ALONG THE INDIA-
BANGLADESH BORDER 
Let me take you into a “sensitive” space along the India-Bangladesh border. 
Traveling to the Bangladeshi enclave Dahagram45 from Patgram—the closest market 
town in Bangladesh, roughly 11 km away—you must take a long and winding bicycle-
rickshaw journey that lasts between one and 1.5 hours depending on the driver, the 
repair of his vehicle, and the weight of the load. Patgram is a busy and dusty town. In 
addition to hosting a large bi-weekly haat [market], Patgram is notable as a stop-over 
for truckers traveling to and from India through the nearby Burimari border crossing. 
On haat days, Patgram becomes a traffic jam of rickshaws, rickshaw vans, 
pedestrians, local farmers selling their crops, and regional buyers purchasing bulk 
goods for shipping to Dhaka. Yet, leaving Patgram’s bustle, you quickly enter a 
sparsely populated—for Bangladesh— countryside. You travel through an expansive 
patchwork landscape of rice, maize, tobacco, and vegetables, passing only an 
occasional hamlet or tea stall. From the elevated roadway—built on a dike running 
above the fields—one can see for miles across this flat and strikingly beautiful 
landscape, characteristic of much of Northern Bangladesh. 
As you ride, your driver might point out seeming randomly placed border 
posts, rising incongruously out of fields. Look, there is India, and on that side, 
Bangladesh. These mark the borders of small chhitmahols, or enclaves, many of which 
are no more than fields (see Figure 3). Despite the oddities of the border pillars, and 
the precarious legal and territorial position of the lands that they demarcate, there is 
                                                 
45 Dahagram is actually two conjoined Bangladeshi enclaves—Angorpota and Dahagram—situated just 
over the border in India in the district of Cooch Behar. For simplicity sake in this paper I follow local 
custom and refer to them simply as “Dahagram.”  
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Figure 4: Patgram Thana, Dahagram, and the Tin Bigha Corridor46 
As you enter the Corridor, on the immediate right is the first BSF camp, where 
a senior officer and armed jawans take scrupulous note (and notes) of all who pass. 
Mid-way between the Corridor’s gates is a cross-roads, where the North-South 
running “Dahagram” road is bisected by the East-West road that links two different 
neighborhoods of Mekhliganj Thana in India. A uniformed member of the West 
Bengal Traffic police stands near a monument to two Indian activists, killed when the 
BSF fired into a crowd protesting the opening of the Corridor in 1988. He guards the 
intersection, lathi in hand, ensuring that no passers-by make either right or left turns, 
veering from one country into another. Beyond the intersection, you pass by yet 
another BSF station on the left, also staffed with armed jawans and note-taking 
officers. This BSF station has a counterpoint BDR post on the right as soon as you 
                                                 
46 Map by Brendan Whyte. 
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pass over the border into Dahagram. This is also staffed with armed guards, also 
taking scrupulous note of who and what enter and leave the enclave. Moving through 
the Corridor it is impossible not to feel the suspicious scrutiny: Who are you? What 
are you doing here? Where do you belong? 
 
Figure 5: Tin Bigha Corridor, Detail47 
Dahagram is clearly exceptional in the way it is scrutinized and “secured.” 
Monitoring, regulation by a hostile force, and precarious status are part of the fabric of 
daily life in Dahagram. Yet they also do not tell the whole story of Dahagram’s, or any 
of the other chhitmahol’s, exceptionality. Equally critical to understanding the chhits 
is an appreciation of the enormous ambiguity, confusion, uncertainty, and insecurity 
that are part of the ways chhits are understood by those outside of them and, crucially, 
                                                 
47 Map by Brendan Whyte. 
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part of life within them. The status of these spaces within competing notions of nation 
and state is highly unstable. Knowledge about them is difficult, or impossible, to 
access. And projects that seek to establish order and rule within and in relation to the 
enclaves often serve to produce new and confused configurations of power, 
exploitation, and oppression. Indeed, much of the instability that characterizes life 
within Dahagram emerges out the tension between this ambiguity and intense scrutiny 
by security forces. In this chapter, I explore this link by outlining what I call a politics 
of sensitivity that structures political possibility in relation to the enclaves. 
Understanding the process of producing sensitive spaces, I suggest, requires as much 
attention to slippages, uncertainties, and vaguely defined fears and threats as it does to 
overt force, regulation, and practices of maintaining “security” along the border. 
The Corridor is not an “official” border crossing. Indeed, though all traffic 
going into and out of the enclave passes through sovereign Indian territory, no 
passports are needed for this movement. As such, unlike other chhits, Dahagram is 
administratively, as well as theoretically, part of Bangladesh. It is an official Union 
Parishad under Patgram Upazilla in Lalmonirhat district.48 The government imposes 
taxes and distributes aid through food-for-work schemes and VGD/VGF programs.49 
Yet it is unmistakably a zone apart, an exceptional space where the practice of 
movement falls under intense scrutiny. The long struggle to open the Corridor and 
ongoing tensions around it are part of what continue to make Dahagram a contentious 
and exceptional space within and between India and Bangladesh.50 Within the 
Corridor, the BSF has authority to implement random inspections, create often 
arbitrary-seeming conditions for passage, and generally to scrutinize and, as many 
enclave residents have it, intimidate passers through. Tin Bigha is a militarized space, 
                                                 
48 Part of Rangpur District before 1983. 
49 Vulnerable Group Feeding/Vulnerable Group Development programs that are nation wide, largely 
locally administered, and notoriously corrupt. 
50 I attend to this history in Chapter 2. 
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of a largely Hindu security force.51 At six PM, these gates are shut, effectively locking 
residents into the enclave for the night.52 Enclave residents are fond of describing 
themselves as like chickens. They let us roam about during the day before locking us 
into the coop at night [amra holam murgir moto. Amaderke shokale chere dai, abar 
shondha bela, kachay firte hoi]. 
Yet why is this border space in need of such regulation? What makes it such a 
“sensitive” area, in need of such scrutiny and subject to such suspicious governing? 
My use of the term “sensitive” in describing this space is not arbitrary. The term arose 
regularly during the course of my research. Often, it was employed by state officials—
always in English—as a means to explain why information was unavailable, why 
particular things were or were not possible, and why these areas were markedly 
different or beyond the norm. As I worked, this seemingly descriptive term began to 
take shape as a process that marked spaces as exceptional in both discursive and 
concrete ways. While the term “sensitive” is often casually deployed by both state 
officials and academics to describe self-evidently “problematic” areas and topics, I 
argue that sensitivity is better understood as a political process that both regulates 
knowledge about sensitive spaces and structures actions, behaviors, and possibilities 
within them. I strive to understand what the production and negotiation of sensitive 
space means in practice for those who live within the enclave and for those that seek 
to govern it. 
I am further concerned with the way that discourses of sensitivity produce, 
rather than merely describe, sensitive spaces. Sensitive spaces are exceptional spaces, 
where questions of law and sovereignty are unsettled and unsettling. Understanding 
                                                 
51 The communal dynamics of these border politics are accentuated by the BSF’s policy of staffing non-
Muslim and non-Bengali speaking staff along the Bangladesh border. On the often communal character 
of border regulation along the India-Bangladesh border, see Samaddar (1999), Van Schendel (2005), 
Banerjee (2001), and Jones (2009a).  
52 The gates are open from six AM to six PM Indian time, 6:30 AM- 6:30 PM Bangladeshi time. 
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them, therefore, requires attention to threats, ambiguities, and vaguely defined fears 
articulated through practices and performances of sensitivity. Attending to these 
spaces, and the confused terrain which often characterizes them, helps complicate 
notions of “the sovereign exception” (Agamben 1998) that have come to dominate 
recent studies of borders and frontiers.53 It also highlights the tensions and insecurities 
of life and unsettles discrete framings of state and society in borderlands (Baud and 
Van Schendel 1997). 
I will examine these dynamics through an ethnographic engagement that brings 
together my experiences conducting research in and on Dahagram in 2006 and 2007 
with everyday experiences of enclave residents. First, I interrogate the notion of 
“sensitivity” through a series of experiences from my archival and ethnographic 
fieldwork and ask how this concept is complicit in structuring actions and behaviors in 
relation to, and subsequently complicit in producing, “sensitive spaces” such as 
Dahagram. I then ask what it means to live in a sensitive space for residents of 
Dahagram. The ambiguities of sensitivity, the intense regulation of “official” 
knowledge, and the persistent circulation of rumors and constant feeling of threat 
produce a space that is rife with insecurities and uncertainties. They also create 
opportunities for individuals, institutions, and organizations to exploit the ambiguous 
terrain of sensitivity to various ends. Finally, I return to the vexed question of loyalties 
within the enclave to ask how tensions of belonging emerge in often-painful ways 
within sensitive spaces. 
                                                 
53 C.f., Doty (2007), Basaran (2008), and essays in Kumar Rajaram and Grundy-Warr (2007). 
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Taking “Exception” 
The project of denaturalizing the state in the historical social sciences54 has 
yielded numerous studies that undermine the notion of the state as a uniform, 
monolithic institution existing and operating with an internally coherent logic. Further, 
it has problematized the assumption that state, economy, and society exist as 
independent and discrete spheres that act on and in relation to each other.55 These 
studies emphasize the historical and contingent formation of states through specific 
practices of consent, conditioning, and force, as well as the ideological construction of 
states as things that exist “out there.” Yet in destabilizing the notion of “The State,” 
these studies have complicated, and occasionally undermined, analytic language for 
discussing the differential political treatments of space and the relationship between 
official “norms” and “exceptions.”56 Such work importantly focuses attention on the 
ways things that are presumed to be “exceptional” are often particular manifestations 
of everyday forms of rule and examples of broader patterns of regulation and control. 
While this essay seeks to contribute to this growing literature, I also wish to preserve 
and explore a critical language for understanding exceptional spaces that attends to 
both the specific dynamics of producing “zones of exception” and provides an analytic 
strategy for seeing such spaces in relation to one another. 
My exploration of sensitivity is, as such, formed in dialogue with and in 
response to Giorgio Agamben’s (1998; 2005) now famous elaboration of the 
“exception” as the central category of contemporary political life.57 Grounding my 
                                                 
54 This project is perhaps most directly linked to the writing of Philip Abrams (1988), Corrigan and 
Sayer (1985), and Timothy Mitchell (1991b; 1999). 
55 A limited list of such studies include Hansen and Steputat (2001b), Steinmetz (1999), Sharma and 
Gupta (2006 ), Joseph and Nugent (1994), Artexaga (2003), Comaroff (1988), and Stoler (1992). 
56 Textured exceptions to this are Sivaramakrishnan’s (1999) discussion of “forested zones of anomaly” 
in colonial Bengal and Moore’s (2005) analysis of the sedimented terrain of struggle in upland 
Zimbabwe. 
57 Agamben’s work has become a theoretical centerpiece in a vast number of publications since Homo 
Sacer’s translation into English in 1998. An extremely limited list of such works includes: Onge (2006), 
Diken (2005), Chowdhury (2007), essays in Das and Poole (2004), and essays in Hansen and Steputat 
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reading of Agamben in critical studies of state formation, I take “exception” to his 
notion of the exception. The idea of the exception—or at least Agamben’s articulation 
of it—draws its political and legal formulation from Schmitt’s dictum that “the 
sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (Schmitt 2005 (1932): 5). The 
sovereign exception, for Schmitt, is the primary axiom of state power—the ability to 
dictate who and what falls outside of the bounds of legal practice, and, as such, 
membership within the polis. Through the exception, sovereign power is 
conceptualized as the ability to banish—to place a space, an individual, or group of 
people beyond the protection of law. Banishment, as Agamben is at pains to explain, 
exposes the banished to a series of violences that are at once beyond the bounds of 
legal practice and unpunishable within “normal” legal frameworks. 
Agamben extends Schmitt’s conceptualization to rethink the sovereign ban, as 
Andrew Norris has it, as “not just a historically specific form of political authority that 
arises with modern nation-states . . . , but rather the essence of the political” (Norris 
2003: 6). The political, for Agamben, is re-conceived as fundamentally biopolitical—
that is, a question of authority over life and death. To suffer the sovereign ban—to 
become an exception—is to be reduced to “bare life,” where the banned individual is 
beyond rights (in terms of recourse to a legal system that might uphold them). At the 
same time, others (citizens) are exempted from legal repercussions for crimes or 
violence committed against the banned individual. Equally critical to Agamben’s 
analysis, however, is the point that the exception and norm are inexorably linked in a 
dialectic of inclusion and exclusion. Through marking a “beyond” to the rule of law, 
the sovereign, in effect, defines the boundaries of political, and indeed, social 
membership.58 The exception is thus inexorably linked to the whole from which it is 
                                                                                                                                            
(2005). This is not to say that all of these studies either adopt Agamben wholesale or fail to offer their 
own readings and critiques. 
58 For a radically different reading of the political that sees political society as precisely the ground on 
which negotiation between the “excluded” and the “excluding” takes place, see Chatterjee (2004). 
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banned. Forcibly included through the act of exclusion, the exception “cannot be 
included in the whole of which it is a member and cannot be a member of the whole in 
which it is always already a part” (1998: 25, italics in original).59 
Agamben’s writing has received enormous attention within the social sciences, 
in part, because his work is particularly salient in, as it is a reflection on, the 
contemporary political moment. Whether thinking about the various corrosions and 
eliminations of legal rights in the US’s “War on Terror,” or the suspension of 
democracy in Bangladesh from January 2007 to December 2008 during the “state of 
emergency,” the exception, as several have noted (c.f., Mbembe 2003; Mitchell 2006), 
appears to be fast becoming the rule.60 At the same time, this attention to the role of 
emergencies and exceptions has refocused scrutiny on margins and zones where states 
of exception appear to have long characterize everyday practices of rule. Agamben’s 
notions of sovereignty and exception have become central heuristics in explaining why 
and how spaces like enclaves, borders, upland regions, and contentious zones are both 
different from, yet increasingly like, other places.61 
Yet his writing is also limiting in understanding the complexities of such 
exceptions and the nuanced and myriad ways in which they are historically constituted 
through, manifest in, and deployed as categories of rule. Agamben’s construction of 
                                                 
59 It is not my intent to fully rehearse Agamben’s argument here. For excellent discussions, critical and 
appreciative, of Agamben’s writing see the volumes Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life (Calarco 
and DeCaroli 2007) and Politics, Metaphysics, and Death: Essays on Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer 
(Norris 2005). For critical summaries of his argument see Gregory (2004), Sanchez (2004), Norris 
(2003), and Mitchell (2006). 
60 Indeed, the central argument of State of Exception (2005), Agamben’s companion piece to Homo 
Sacer, is that the state of exception has become both the paradigm for modern liberal democratic 
government and the vehicle through which parliamentary democracies transform themselves into 
totalitarian states. Yet, as this assumption provides a framework for thinking about the thin line between 
democracy and totalitarianism, it also entails a flight from the empirical for Agamben that allows for an 
often careless conflation of radically particular and dissimilar forms of exceptionality. 
61 Indeed, prior to the publication and widespread circulation of Homo Sacer, many studies of borders 
struggled to articulate what made borders “different” from everywhere else (c.f., Wilson and Donnan 
1998b). Exceptions to this pattern are studies that are grounded in detailed historical explorations of 
border formation that focus on the way patterns of rule unevenly emerge and are produced through 
constructing and contesting borders and frontiers (c.f., Febvre 1973; Sahlins 1989; Sivaramakrishnan 
1999; Tagliacozzo 2005).  
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the exception has been—justly—critiqued and criticized for providing little scope to 
imagine a politics of the excluded themselves as central to defining the terms of their 
own exceptionality (c.f., Rancière 2004); for limiting our ability to more fully imagine 
and describe conditions of destitution and exceptionality beyond the stark and 
reductive conception of homo sacer (c.f., Butler and Spivak 2007); and for a failure to 
attend to, or even acknowledge, the gendered nature of exceptionality that undergirds 
a more nuanced reading of the difference between “displacement” and “exclusion” 
(Sanchez 2004). Indeed, many of these critiques point to ways that Agamben’s 
reduction of the political to the purely biopolitical brackets a range of critical factors 
that constitute the politics of exceptionality and, indeed, the concept of the “political” 
itself. 
For my purposes, I would like to raise an additional concern about Agamben’s 
articulations of exception and sovereign power. Even the act of simply passing 
through the Tin Bigha Corridor reveals Dahagram’s exceptionality. Yet the 
experiences and ambiguities of power and knowledge that I will outline here point to a 
more unstable terrain of exception than that articulated by Agamben. Indeed, my 
experiences working in and on Dahagram point to ways that Agamben and Schmitt’s 
notion of the sovereign exception lead to a misapprehension of state power. Schmitt’s 
critique is grounded in a unitary notion of “state,” “sovereign,” and “exception.” 
Schmitt’s axiom that the sovereign is the entity that decides the exception is built on 
the premise that there is a singular supreme state power, principally in charge of the 
legal apparatus of governance, that might declare such a “thing” as “an exception.” 
Agamben’s modification of Schmitt adopts a more Foucauldian understanding of 
sovereign power—as an uneven field of power relations with and through which rule 
and exceptional states becomes marked, structured, and accomplished. If sovereign 
power in Agamben’s reading is more dispersed, it is still imagined as accomplishing a 
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similar end—the sovereign decision on the exception. Further, it suggests a 
functionalist understanding of exception that radically collapses diverse, historically 
constituted conditions into a unitary dialectic with state power. Within Dahagram, 
exception is anything but static. It is a process that unfolds differentially and 
contradictorily in space and time. 
My experience in the chhits, then, suggests a significantly different vision of 
exception that demands attention to the way different sovereign powers overlap, 
combine, and contest one another on ambiguous terrain. Dahagram is an exceptional 
space and one in which the dialectic of inclusion and exclusion is central to daily life, 
but not because a singular sovereign power decreed it beyond the boundaries of law, 
or even within a different category of law. Rather, it is repeatedly and, crucially, 
differently marked as exceptional by numerous institutions and actors. Neither are 
these markings uniform or even mutually or collectively coherent. Indeed, part of the 
very day-to-day nature of the enclaves’ (in general) and Dahagram’s (in particular) 
exceptionality is a broad confusion and disagreement, rather than consensus, about 
what they are, how they should be treated, and what rights and privileges their 
residents are, or are not, entitled to. 
Exception, in such contexts, cannot be reduced to a thing that, once declared, 
operates in particular ways. Rather, exception and sensitive spaces are made and 
remade on a daily basis through a myriad of social and historically grounded 
processes. The conditions of exceptionality are enacted in different ways by different 
people, often as much out of confusion as out of clear intent. The decisions and 
strategies of security forces, local government officials, and residents are all part of 
what makes Dahagram exceptional. Yet these decisions and strategies are made on 
extremely unstable terrain. They are grounded in rumor, suspicion, ambiguity, and 
uncertainty. Their outcomes are fragmented and fragmentary, producing new and 
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often surprising reconfigurations. Exceptionality in Dahagram manifests as much in 
the concealment and fetishization of official documents as it does in attempts to 
regulate space and manage “criminal” activities. To understand places such as the 
chhitmahols, I argue, it is critical to be attentive both to these enactments and the ways 
the ambiguous terrain on which they are performed emerge. 
To understand sensitivity and exception in Dahagram, I first examine the 
process by which knowledge is, or is not, produced about the enclaves and the 
unstable ground such practices produce. I will start, then, by thinking through several 
experiences from my own research. These experiences will be familiar, or at least 
unsurprising, to anyone who has worked on “sensitive” areas or issues. My goal is to 
understand the conditions under which knowledge about the enclaves, and sensitive 
spaces more generally, is linked broadly to concepts of state security and national 
survival. In short, I am concerned with the ways sensitivity emerges as a form of 
governmental rationality and the ways this rationality is complicit in the production of 
sensitive space. 
Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the Bangladeshi State 
Philip Abrams begins his classic essay “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the 
State” (1988), by offering an observation about the relationship between states and 
information. “Any attempt to examine politically institutionalized power at close 
quarters,” he writes, “is, in short, liable to bring to light the fact that an integral 
element of such power is the quite straightforward ability to withhold information, 
deny observation and dictate the terms of knowledge” (62). Navigating the artifices of 
this protection (both successfully and unsuccessfully) tends to occupy an inordinate 
amount of time for anyone interested in understanding the workings of the state. “It 
seems only reasonable in the face of such elaborate efforts at concealment to assume 
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that something really important is being concealed” (62). Yet, Abrams asks, how 
reasonable is such a suggestion? 
So often when the gaff is blown the official secrets turn out to be both trivial 
and theoretically predictable. More often still when the state papers are opened 
and the definitive scholarly work is done it only serves to affirm or add detail 
to the interpretations read from the surface of events by sharp-eyed and 
theoretically informed observers thirty years earlier (62). 
Abrams’ point in calling attention to such projects of concealment is not to 
highlight their futility, but rather to raise questions about the nature of “the state.” 
Abrams suggest that we move beyond a vision of states as uniform, concrete entities 
that operate at a perceived distance from “society” to govern political, social, and 
economic life. As he argues, “the state is not the reality that stands behind the mask of 
political practice. It is itself the mask that prevent our seeing political practice as it is” 
(82). For Abrams, the state is better understood in a double sense, both as a system—a 
group of more or less connected institutions and practices that have historically 
specific relations and connections—and as an idea or ideological edifice that produces 
a unified vision of “stateness,” a sense that there is such a coherent entity as “the state” 
that operates with a reasonably unified logic and institutional legitimacy. In such a 
vision, projects of obfuscating and obscuring information that may, or may not, be of 
political “significance,” are part and parcel of the production of the state idea. The 
point is not that the various organs of state power, information, and security work to 
diligently protect secret information vital to national security, but rather that they serve 
to develop the illusion that something truly critical to “security” lies underneath the 
veil of official secrecy. In other words, their main purpose is to forge the veil itself. 
Abrams’ observations are particularly relevant to understanding sensitivity in 
relation to the enclaves. The enclaves seem to exemplify the kind of space around 
which the apparatus of state security works to conceal information. Take, for example, 
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the experience of Brendan Whyte, an Australian geographer who also conducted 
extended research on the enclaves in both India and Bangladesh. Whyte faced 
numerous difficulties in accessing information about the enclaves including the 
inability to get a research visa in India, difficulty in setting up meetings with officials, 
confusion in archives, and general harassment by officials while he conducted his 
work. Of his archive experience, he writes: 
One of the greatest problems for this researcher was political sensitivity. . . . 
While in theory bona fide researchers can seek permission from the Home 
Ministry to view closed files, the approval process takes several months. . . . 
Other files are on restricted access. They can be read, but all notes taken from 
them must be submitted via the archive authorities to the Home Department for 
censorship. This was the case with a file located in the West Bengal State 
Archives. After five months a letter was received admitting to delays in 
censorship because the submitted notes ‘appear to be illegible and could not be 
read in full due to frequent use of abbreviation. Coupled with the political 
sensitivity of the research topic, even requests for innocuous information 
became endless labyrinthine missions to secure the necessary permissions from 
the superiors of the bureaucrats approached (2002: 20-22). 
The notion of “political sensitivity” appears to be a self-evident characteristic of 
research on topics such as “enclaves.” Yet the meanings that are embedded in the 
complications of research seem complex and ambiguous, not simply to Whyte, but 
also to those that he encountered in his work. The question of “censoring notes” 
appears, on the surface to be a bizarre and Kafka-esque strategy. After all, if truly 
“sensitive” information was embedded in them, is it not likely that the note-taker 
would remember such data? Is sensitive information a slippery and indefinable thing 
that a researcher—or indeed a bureaucrat—might not identify at first inspection? Why 
would a bureaucracy wish to censor notes taken on a “sensitive” document, rather than 
simply denying access to it? What seems most suggestive, in reflecting on these 
questions, is the ambiguity of the notion of “political sensitivity” itself. There are a 
number of possible interpretations of the challenges faced by Whyte in his research. Is 
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it not plausible to assume that, for example, the concern with “abbreviations” in 
Whyte’s notes suggests a genuine ambiguity and fear that sensitive information might 
be contained within the notes themselves in a way that would evade notice by petty 
bureaucrats? Whatever the interpretation, there appears to be more at stake in such 
active or passive strategies to complicate research and restrict information. Part of the 
confusion appears to be inability to readily identify what is sensitive and what is not. 
Abrams’ observation and Whyte’s experiences resonates with my own 
research, which was hampered by any number of ‘official’ barriers, including 
impenetrable bureaucratic processes, visa woes, subtle and not so subtle obstructions 
by archival and other officials, paper-shuffling games in regional and national archives 
(where the physical location of things from maps to land records were mysteries), and 
‘official’ inquiries. Again and again, I was told, often by mournfully apologetic 
officials that these difficulties were because I worked on a “sensitive” topic. Over the 
course of my research, the term began to develop a tangible, if still elusive, shape. 
Sensitivity seemed to signal vague, indefinite, and undefined threats to national 
security. Indeed, its power seemed to lie specifically in this vague implication, not in 
concrete links between the information I was seeking and “real” threats to the state. 
As I argue in the introduction, sensitivity is intimately linked to a range of 
cartographic anxieties in contemporary South Asia.62 Such cartographic anxiety means 
that research on areas such as the enclaves is, by definition, “sensitive,” not just 
because it takes as its focus unstable border regions where often violent projects of 
state-building are manifest, but also because the results of such research threaten to 
pose challenging questions to notions of national identity, territorial integrity, and state 
                                                 
62 As Van Schendel poses the problem, “The capacity of the enclaves to arouse intense emotions in their 
mainlands is directly related to the fact that they puncture putatively contiguous national spaces. They 
are an affront to the nation’s imagination. However, they appear as ‘foreign’ bodies within the nation’s 
territory, each nation is able by means of its own enclaves to penetrate the other’s territory” (2002: 
141). As such, the enclaves are a simultaneous injury to national pride and a salve to that injury.  
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legitimacy. In other words, information on such regions posses potential threats to a 
range of national symbolics. At the same time, the notion of these sensitive areas as 
simultaneously security issues and tenuous parts of the nation raises fraught questions 
both about those living within them (and their status as citizens) and about those 
seeking to learn more about them. 
Yet sensitivity is not a “thing” that exists and acts in particular ways. It is 
produced through a range of interactions and processes. When I first began work in the 
National Archives in Dhaka, I was assured by one of the head archivists that I was 
unlikely to find anything of use there or anywhere else on the chhitmahols. When I 
asked why not, he replied, “Because they are very [pause], sensitive areas.” Several 
weeks later, I pursued permission to photocopy documents from the same archivist. 
“How many pages do you need to copy?” he asked me. I told him that I wanted to 
copy perhaps as many as 100-200 pages that day. “Oh, well, that’s a problem. You are 
only allowed to copy 20 pages per day.” Frustrated to hear this unwritten and 
seemingly arbitrary rule, I asked for clarification on archival procedures. The archivist 
told me, “You see, we always try to help foreign researchers. But, you do research on 
a sensitive topic. I am an archivist, but a citizen of Bangladesh first. I cannot provide 
you with access to anything that would threaten my country’s security.” When I 
countered that records of fifty year old post-Partition border incidents—the subject of 
the series that I was reading—did not seem ‘sensitive,’ he merely shrugged and said, 
“They are border areas.” Discouraged, I again asked about additional restrictions. 
“There are no restrictions,” he replied, “You may copy 20 pages a day. As long as they 
are not secret.” “How do I determine if a document is secret?” I asked. He solemnly 
responded, “I will decide.” 
What I would like to call attention to in this encounter are the multiple 
meanings bound up in the ties between sensitivity and citizenship. The politics of 
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sensitivity in the archive serve to obfuscate and misdirect, veiling documents and data 
that might not even be there. Such documents may or may not contain sensitive 
information on a sensitive topic. The concept of sensitivity draws power from this very 
ambiguity. Its ties to equally vague concepts of national “security,” however, forge 
implicit links with more concrete notions of citizenship, national pride, and, job 
security. These in turn structure relationships between, among others, archivists and 
researchers. Sensitivity is a self-policing and structuring concept based not only on 
tangible security threats, but equally, if not more, on the possibility that they may 
exist. The suggestion embedded within the archivist’s statement is not so much that he 
is holding sensitive, secret, or “secure” documents, but rather that all topics related to 
borders may fall into such a category. Indeed, the request for information from 
someone working on a “sensitive” topic is a suggestive indication that information, 
unthreatening in other contexts, may indeed be sensitive. Sensitivity, as such, is a kind 
of infectious suspicion that is more rooted in ambiguity than in the concrete. 
Yet sensitivity implies more than dangerous ambiguity. If sensitivity is an 
implicit, yet vague, indication of official secrecy, then it carries with it a set of 
responsibilities. It is the duty of citizens, and particularly of state employees, to protect 
its unknowability. Sensitivity is linked to a question of national survival, not simply 
state security. Yet this obligation is more than an impulse towards patriotism. The 
invocation of sensitivity is also a strategy of deferral and control, whereby government 
officials avoid accepting the ability or responsibility for revealing potentially 
compromising material. At the same time, by assuming control of regulating such 
information through restriction—“I will decide”—officials also assume responsibility 
for state protection. As sensitivity is linked to duty and citizenship, it is thus also 
linked to professional reputation, prestige, and the threat of loss of employment or 
worse. 
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Sensitivity, then, is a form of moral regulation, or, in the words of Corrigan 
and Sayer, “a project of normalizing, rendering natural, taken for granted, in a word 
‘obvious,’ what are in fact ontological and epistemological premises of a particular 
and historical form of social order” (1985: 4).63 The “obviousness” of sensitivity is an 
embodiment of the suggestion of ambiguity, obligation, prestige, and threat.64 Yet if 
sensitivity is a form of moral regulation, a governmental rationale that creates a silent 
internal logic of behaviour, it is equally an enactment of state security. Such 
enactments themselves are complicit in producing sensitive spaces, topics and issues. 
Sensitivity is a self-fulfilling prophecy that relies as much on the treatment of topics as 
“sensitive” as it does on the conviction that their content truly poses threats to state or 
nation. Sayer observes that “individuals live in the lie that is ‘the state’ and it lives 
through their performance. Their beliefs are neither here nor there. What is demanded 
of them is only—but precisely—performances” (1994: 37). These performances are 
the heart of the production of sensitive space, zones that come to embody the very 
ambiguities and suspicions inherent in the concept of sensitivity itself. 
                                                 
63 There is a close affinity between Corrigan and Sayer’s (1985) notion of moral regulation and 
Foucault’s (1991) much-employed concept of governmentality. Both imply an internalization of 
imperatives of rule to “naturalize” unnatural forms of political regulation. Both terms are useful 
analytics in examining how “practices of rule articulate elements of government, sovereignty, and 
discipline” (Li 2007: 12). There are several analytical advantages to Corrigan and Sayer’s articulation 
of moral regulation. Particularly, as many critiques of Foucauldian governmentality point out (e.g., 
Mitchell 2000; Moore 2005; Sivaramakrishnan 1999) Foucault’s discussion is grounded in an 
Eurocentric idiom that tends towards generalizing governmentality as a universal logic of political 
modernity rather than attending to the empirical specificities and disjunctures of particular cases. In 
contrast, Corrigan and Sayer insist on an empirically and historically grounded understanding of 
specific forms of moral regulation. These two different perspectives harbor significantly distinct 
epistemological perspectives. Rather than trying to resolve this tension, I argue, following Hansen and 
Steputat’s (2001a) critique of the links between Foucault and Gramsci, that “keeping these two 
perspectives in a productive tension with one another affords a somewhat broader perspective on the 
ambiguities of the state: as both illusory as well as a set of concrete institutions; as both distant and 
impersonal ideas as well as localized and personified institutions; as both violent and destructive as well 
as benevolent and productive” (4-5). 
64 I argue, following Corrigan and Sayer, that sensitivity is a historically and contextually specific form 
of moral regulation. I develop this history in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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Performing Sensitivity at the Border 
If the politics of sensitivity produce obfuscations, elisions, and deferrals when 
viewing the enclaves from Dhaka, at the border they also produce bizarre information 
loops, discontinuities, and paths through which information is transformed in 
fascinating, albeit frequently disturbing, ways. One day, as my research assistant, 
Sayeed, and I passed through the Tin Bigha Corridor, we spotted a BSF jawan with 
whom we had chatted a few days earlier. He flagged us down and with a scowl said, 
“Why did you lie to me?” Puzzled, we assured him that we had not, to our knowledge, 
conveyed any untruths. He replied, “You told me that you are here to do research, but 
our informants inside the enclave tell us that you are here to buy eight bighas of land.” 
Surprised, we did our best to reassure him of our intentions. He angrily dismissed our 
protests. “What is there to research here? Living by the border there are only thieves, 
smugglers, and dacoits.” Refraining from asking him the obvious question of why, in 
that case, we would want to purchase land there, we proceeded into the enclave and 
continued with our work. 
It is not uncommon for researchers to become the subject of local speculation 
and gossip. But this particular rumour, which spread through Dahagram and infiltrated 
the BSF and BDR camps, continued to have alarming results. The following day, a 
plainclothes BDR liaison arrived at our guest-house in Patgram. He informed us that I, 
as a foreigner, was required to check-in with the BDR before venturing into 
“sensitive” border areas. Sayeed and I assured him that we weren’t aware of this 
procedure, but that we had spoken to numerous individual BDR members at various 
checkposts in and outside of Dahagram. Indeed, several of them had already taken our 
names and, we presumed, communicated our information back through official 
channels. He took our particulars and left. 
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But that night a fully uniformed and armed contingent of BDR jawans and the 
Patgram BDR commander showed up, accompanied by the plainclothes ‘security 
official,’ to learn more. Four of them crowded into my tiny room, where we had been 
recording the day’s fieldnotes. The commander, a large man with scars on both cheeks 
and a menacing glare sat in one of the two chairs in the room, while two other 
uniformed officers and the plain-clothed security official stood around him, 
conspicuously blocking the only exit. Two jawans took up position outside the door in 
the hallway. The commander remained silent, while one of the other officers began 
rapidly asking questions. I did my best to explain myself. After my halting attempts, 
the officer turned to Sayeed and told a long story about another Bangladeshi who had 
befriended a foreign gentleman. The gist of the story was that the Bangladeshi found 
himself in a great deal of trouble when the foreigner was found dead in his hotel room. 
What would happen to Sayeed if I was found dead? Did we imagine that we were, 
even now, safe? Now truly alarmed, I launched into an extended explanation of my 
work, my university affiliation, my non-affiliation with any government body, and my 
desire only to write academic works about these interesting areas. We apologized 
profusely for not having been aware of the policy of “checking in” and promised to do 
so in the future. After a few minutes, the tension eased. The Commander, for the first 
time since arriving, spoke. He complimented me on my Bengali and asked several 
curious questions about how I had become interested in Bangladesh. We chatted for 
several minutes and, assuring the Commander that from here-on-out we would visit 
the Patgram command-post every time we came to and left the area, we eventually 
parted amicably. 
Sayeed and I, breathing sighs of relief, began to try to account for the incident. 
Why was the late night visit necessary when, at any moment, the BDR could have 
simply demanded that we leave the area? Why had they seemingly relented and 
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departed on friendly terms after an interrogation that was so clearly designed to 
intimidate and frighten us? A late night arrival by armed security forces is certainly a 
dramatic performance of state power. Indeed, everything about the visit seemed 
carefully calculated to communicate the instability of our position in relation to a 
paramilitary force in a sensitive and unstable zone. The sheer display of power 
involved in the number of men who attended the meeting, the not-so-subtle threat and 
menace of the story conveyed to Sayeed, and the carefully performed roles throughout 
the incident—from the silence of the commander to the rapid questioning of the 
inquisitor—all spoke to their ability to not merely conceal information but to a 
preparedness to inflict harm. 
The Commander’s role was particularly suggestive. His own performance of 
state power conveyed a clear message. Though the story we conveyed to him that 
night was no different from the one we had shared with countless other BDR officers 
and jawans, we had now told it to him. The rapid move from silent menace to collegial 
conversation emphasize that our presence in the region was contingent on his decision 
and judgement. The Commander’s performance also interpolated us into the roles of 
both audience to and performers of subjectivity to state power. In effect, our own 
ability to move freely within the region was being decided by the quality of our own 
performances and our submission to proper channels of information, deference, and 
command. 
Such ruses of state power and elaborate stagings of rule call to mind both a 
Schmittian notion of sovereign power and Sayer’s observation that “it is the exercise 
of power pure and simple that itself authorizes and legitimates; and it does this less by 
the manipulation of beliefs than by defining the boundaries of the possible” (1994: 
375). Yet despite such clear cut exercises of force, an ambiguity permeated the event 
.Why had we suddenly become “visible” to the BDR? What was the relationship 
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between the rumour about our intentions that had made its way to the Indian BSF and 
the sudden interest in our movements by the Bangladesh Intelligence Services? An 
interplay of multiple demands, unstable knowledges, rumours, anxieties, and claims to 
rule seemed to undergird the event. Naked displays of power appeared to both obscure 
and emerge out of the uncertainties and instabilities of these relationships. 
If interpretations of such events within sensitive space remain highly unstable 
and speculative, they do offer clues to the ways that spaces like Dahagram are 
produced. The dynamics of ‘sensitivity’ and ‘security’ that undergird the production of 
knowledge about sensitive areas also structure the lives of their inhabitants in often-
oppressive ways. The discourse of sensitivity defines sensitive spaces as exceptional: 
dangerous places outside the bounds of ‘standard’ political practice, places occupied 
by criminals and others who threaten state security and national integrity, places of 
unpredictable and menacing danger, and places where knowledge must be regulated 
and limited for the good of the state. This marking has tangible effects not just on 
researchers but, even more so, on residents and security forces at the border. My 
encounter with the BDR hints at a number of different relationships at play within 
Dahagram: the dynamics of information and rumour between the BSF and its 
‘informants,’ the protective yet watchful relationship between the BDR and enclave 
residents, the rituals of power and control—and their limits—that are part of daily life 
within Dahagram, the relationship between the BSF and BDR in their antagonistic but 
mutual task of policing and securing the border, and, of course, the arrival of a 
researcher with seemingly ambiguous intentions, into a sensitive border area. 
Sensitive Insecurities and Lived Ambiguities 
Thinking back to the observation of the BSF jawan recorded above, the 
careless identification of all border residents as thieves and smugglers seems, on first 
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inspection, to be a cruel generalisation and my intent to purchase land an amusing 
misinterpretation. Yet these facets of the jawan’s statement also point to the ways that 
politics of sensitivity produce a space where everything is uncertain and unstable. The 
generalisation that all enclave residents are criminals leads to regulatory practices that 
frequently make ‘criminal’ activities, such as illegally crossing a border to get to 
market, critical for survival. The processes of securing the enclave produces insecurity 
for enclave residents. The jurisdictional ambiguities of the enclave create areas where 
multiple individuals and organisations claim sovereign control of both spaces and 
resources to their own benefit, without providing collateral services to their 
constituents. New assertions of such control produce unexpected reshufflings, 
redistributions, and consolidations of power, money, and allegiances. It is this 
uncertainty and instability, the quotidian experiences of living in a sensitive space, to 
which I will now turn. 
One of my informants, a woman who grew up outside of the enclave and 
married a resident of Dahagram shortly after the Tin Bigha Corridor opened in 1992, 
described life in Dahagram as a constant feeling of instability and transience. “For the 
first few days of our marriage,” she said, “I would feel sort of breathless during the 
night [amar dombhando hoye ashto]. A sense of insecurity [ek rhokom ashohoy lagto]. 
What would happen if we were not allowed to cross the Corridor anymore? I would 
stand in the yard of my in-laws’ house and look eastward towards where my parents’ 
house lies.” This insecurity and persistent perception of threats and instability are 
common throughout the enclave. As I was reminded over and over, the Corridor is 
seen by many as an impermanent passage, something that could be taken away at any 
point, leaving residents effectively trapped and hemmed in by the BSF. And though 
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the enclave residents have varying relationships to the Corridor,65 all agree that the 
partial fulfilment of the ’74 Land Boundary Agreement—the Corridor has not been 
leased in perpetuity to Bangladesh, as the terms of the Agreement state, but rather is 
controlled exclusively by the BSF—is an arrangement that has made their lives and 
livelihoods contingent on a hostile force that could decide to close the Corridor for any 
number of reasons. 
Because of the tenuousness of the Corridor, the often heavy-handed forms of 
regulation and ordering that occur there, and the ambiguities of its status, there 
remains a marked shortage of services that could improve the lives of individuals 
living in Dahagram. Several microcredit organizations offer loans, though several 
others operating in the Patgram region told me that they wouldn’t work in Dahagram 
because either Chhit-lok [enclave residents] would never repay their loans or they 
would not be allowed to enter the enclave. Such perceptions map to a general 
assumption that Dahagram is off limits and filled with criminals.66 Most residents 
complain of a lack of jobs and reliable political representation. Government relief 
programmes are prevalent, but rife with notorious corruption. There is a police 
investigative unit in Dahagram, but it does little to serve the immediate needs of 
residents. Indeed, one informant cynically quipped, “At times of [border] tension, girls 
will cross [the Tin Bigha] wearing police uniforms and the police will cross wearing 
saris.” Residents often look to the BDR to address their problems and, indeed, most 
report that since the BDR entered the enclave in 1995, harassment by Indians and 
Indian officials has decreased markedly. Still, the BDR is limited in its ability to help 
residents by its mandate to work/negotiate with the BSF and its lack of jurisdiction in 
                                                 
65 Migrants, known locally as Bhatiyas, who moved into Dahagram after the opening of the Corridor in 
1992, tend to see the Corridor as a barrier to economic growth, whereas longer-term residents often 
perceive it as a constant and palpable threat. See Chapter 3. 
66 Indeed, when I told many outside the enclave about my intention of working within it, they would 
respond with shock, saying you cannot go there. It is a lawless place. You will be robbed or worse! 
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matters pertaining to many of the day-to-day lives of residents. At best, the BDR plays 
a mediating role. 
This is particularly critical in the case of health care. The lack of facilities 
inside the enclave pose serious problems in the cases of medical emergencies that take 
place during the night, when the Corridor is closed, making the enclaves a particularly 
dangerous place for pregnant women and young children.67 One day, over a cup of tea, 
a BDR officer in charge of handling frequent local negotiations with the BSF 
highlighted this issue. “Yesterday morning, just after the morning prayer [before 
dawn], my sentry knocked at my door to inform me that there was a critical patient 
with a baby who needed to go to Patgram. I ordered two Jawans to take her up to Tin 
Bigha and make a request to the BSF. They allowed her to pass. These sorts of 
necessities frequently occur and we have to play our part. The problem happens during 
the night. If it is nine PM or later, the BSF has many formalities [onek niyom kanun]. 
They call here and there to their company headquarters or somewhere else. And these 
processes swallow one hour or more of time, which is critical for a patient or someone 
in medical emergency or labour pain.” Even after crossing the Corridor, it is still over 
an hour by bicycle-rickshaw to the nearest medical facilities in Patgram. There are no 
formalized processes that guarantee this passage. The decision to cross ultimately lies 
with the BSF. Speaking with bitterness, the officer continued, “They dilly-dally and 
sometimes they just don’t allow. They don’t categorically deny passage because they 
may be condemned for violating international law. But they pretend to talk to other 
                                                 
67 There is, in fact, a hospital facility in Dahagram constructed during the Ershad period (see Chapter 3 
and 4), but it has never seen any patients due to a lack of staffing and the refusal of the BSF to allow 
electricity through the Corridor. This was also in violation of the terms of the 74 Land Boundary 
Agreements, which makes specific provision for running power lines through the Corridor. In 2008, the 
BSF changed this policy, though I have not been able to verify whether the hospital has opened its 
doors. At the time of research, part of the hospital was being used by Dahagram’s Family Planning Unit 
and by a doctor who visited Dahagram twice a week from Rangpur. According to residents, this doctor 
largely referred patients to his practice, over 100 km away, for expensive procedures that few could 
actually afford. 
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authorities, and after some time come out suggesting ‘our company commander isn’t 
available now, so we can’t allow you . . . ’” 
The uncertainties of life are further compounded by constant rumours about 
what will and will not happen with the precarious status of Dahagram as a whole. 
While I worked in Dahagram, these rumours ran the gamut from suggestions that the 
Corridor would finally be opened for 24 hours a day to a concern that Indian 
authorities had built a barrage upstream on the Tista river that would redirect the river 
flow to produce rapid erosion within the enclave, literally wiping it off the map. Such 
rumours speak to the perceived tenuousness of residents’ status, hopes and fears, the 
sheer ambiguity of daily life within the enclave, and the way the livelihoods of 
residents are overdetermined by questions of space, movement, and belonging. While 
most agree that life has become more stable since the opening of the Corridor, 
residents constantly worry and hope for changes in status of the Tin Bigha. As a 
farmer told me, “We get everything like other people – the sun, rain, air. Still we 
cannot move like others. This Corridor is our main problem. It opens at 6:30 am and 
closes at 6:30 pm. The chhitmahol is a poor area. There is uncertainty [anishchaiyota], 
always. What will happen and what will not? We are always occupied with the 
thought of how to live.” 
Yet the Corridor is not the only form of uncertainty linked to land and territory 
within the enclave. Who owns and has the right to property is a particularly 
complicated and ambiguous question that is difficult to negotiate, especially for 
Dahagram’s more recent immigrants and poorer residents. Several months before I 
began my fieldwork, for reasons no one, including local government officials, seemed 
able to explain, land registration had stopped inside the enclave. Residents adopted 
various different informal strategies to exchange and sell parcels of land, but these 
68 
were tenuous at best, as any disputes were resolved by the local UP Chair, who many 
claimed decided cases in favour of the party able to pay the largest bribe. 
What is more, the boundaries of plots of land were often unclear. This was due 
in part to the inability of enclave residents to access land surveys and maps of the 
enclave. Such maps did exist. Indeed, while I was working, a joint border survey team 
from India and Bangladesh was in the process of conducting a new survey to correct 
boundary lines and markers around Dahagram. One day, I encountered the 
Bangladeshi representatives of the team in a local tea stall. One of them carried a large 
tube at least three feet in length slung over his shoulder. “What is that,” I asked. “A 
map of Dahagram,” he responded. I asked if I could see it and he opened the case and 
began to unroll a large-scale cadastral map of the enclave. Unfurling half of the map, 
he turned to show it to me, arms out-stretched. After roughly 30 seconds and a stern 
glare from his superior, he rolled the map back up and started to put it back in its case. 
“Wait!” I exclaimed. “Can I have a closer look at that?” The surveyor shook his head. 
“May I take a photograph of it?” “No,” he replied, closing the tube. 
Though the map provides a nominally public tax record of the lands within the 
enclave, in a sensitive space, such documents, public or otherwise, seem to constitute 
potential security threats. As such, though they are regularly “produced” they cannot 
be “used” by the public.68 Indeed, access to the map was not simply restricted to me, 
but to all enclave residents.69 Even local government officials—the very ones who 
were adjudicating land disputes—did not appear to have access to any formal maps, 
let alone full cadastral surveys showing current property divisions. When I asked to 
see a map at the UP office one day, I was shown a hand drawn and somewhat oblong 
                                                 
68 Unlike in India, there is no official policy restricting access to or making it illegal to possess maps of 
border areas, though in practice, such maps can be equally difficult to come by. For a discussion of the 
restricted access to maps in India, see Brian Axel (2001; 2002) 
69 It is worth noting that such difficulty in accessing land records is not in and of itself unique to 
Dahagram. People in structurally insecure positions in rural Bangladesh often struggle to prove land 
claims due to limited access to government records. 
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sketch of the enclave in a ledger recording council meeting minutes.70 “Are there any 
other maps that you have at the office?” I asked. Looking somewhat puzzled, the 
council member I was talking to produced an equally hand-drawn and equally out-of-
proportion map. “There’s this,” he told me, “but we don’t use it” (see Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7: Maps Available in Dahagram’s Union Council 
                                                 
70 I would like to emphasize that these sketch maps were not “counter-claims” or alternative 
representations of space (Cons 2005; Peluso 1995). Rather, they simply provided a rough division of 
Dahagram into paras that had representation within the Union Council. 
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many years old. The map was at a small scale for a cadastral map, and plots were 
marked off in sizes smaller than a fingernail. The map was hopelessly out of date, 
stemming from before the opening of the Corridor, when there was a massive 
reshuffling of land. The plots of land bore little resemblance to those marked on the 
map. Yet in the absence of other documentation, the map seemed to hold the veneer of 
official fact. “You see?” he said to me, vaguely, gesturing towards the top of the 
map.72 
Sensitive spaces are characterized by an intense restriction of information and 
an almost jealous guarding of official knowledge and documentation in the name of 
vaguely defined notions of security. Access, or lack thereof, to documentation such as 
maps in no small way dictates the terms of power and ability to make claims about 
ownership and rights (Orlove 1991). However, the very ambiguity and regulation of 
knowledge also destabilizes such official markings of space. Who can and cannot 
claim territory, and what does and does not count as proof of such claims, has less to 
do with the “evidence” one can bring to bear, than the simple ability to exercise 
influence and power. Documents such as maps are simultaneously fetishized and 
undermined. They are imbued with symbolic meaning as they are hollowed of legal 
power. The “lawlessness” of the enclave, as such, has less to do with the criminal 
predilections of its residents then the insecurity, uncertainty, and instability produced 
in the collision between rigid regulation of space and the destabilization of legal and 
official process through the intense restriction of access. 
Tangled Loyalties 
If sensitivity is, at its root, a tenuous and troubled link between security and 
national identity, those living within sensitive areas have questionable loyalties by 
                                                 
72 I encountered similar experiences in other enclaves. In one, a land-owner provided a stamped title 
with the Raja of Cooch Behar’s seal on it dating from the late 19th century as proof of ownership. 
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definition. They are in need of monitoring, observation, and control in part because of 
their presumed lack of adherence to and intelligibility within the national project. 
Ironically, though not surprisingly, residents of Dahagram are, or at least regularly 
present themselves as, ardent nationalists and patriots. This is, in part, because there is 
so much at immediate stake in their inclusion or exclusion from the nation. Within 
Dahagram, it is a point of pride for residents to narrate their fraught history as 
uniformly and constantly supporting inclusion and belonging within Bangladesh. 
Dominant narratives of Dahagram’s history position Muslim residents as tirelessly 
resisting Hindu projects of forcible incorporation into India. Yet the confused and 
overlapping modes of sovereignty that emerge within sensitive spaces implicitly 
stretch allegiances and confuse loyalties for those who are living there. Elsewhere, I 
problematize this uniform narrative, showing how the history of belonging within 
Dahagram is much more fragmented and contentious than it appears on the surface.73 
Dahagram is full of internal divisions and politics, many of which hinge on ethnic and 
class divisions within the enclave. Here, I would like to examine the painful and not 
always clear national choice that is constantly forced on residents of this sensitive 
space. 
One day, as we were discussing the political struggle leading up to the opening 
of the Tin Bigha Corridor, our friend Shamsul Ali shared a long and fraught narrative 
with us that highlighted, among other things, the uncertainties and inadequacies of 
Bangladesh’s claiming of the enclave. Shamsul, though a member of the outer circle 
of Dahagram’s political elite, had always felt himself an outsider within Dahagram. 
His father had migrated to Dahagram in the 1950s, making his family, effectively, one 
of the first post-Independence families to move into the enclave from the outside. 
Shamsul had always felt on the margins of acceptance in Dahagram’s community. 
                                                 
73 See Chapter 3, “Histories of Belonging(s).” 
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Though initially put off by our presence, he became one of our closest friends in 
Dahagram and often accompanied us as we roamed around the enclave. As we spoke, 
he started a story several times, then haltingly stopped. This was unlike him, and we 
tried to draw him out. After a few more halting starts, Shamsul began: 
There was an old man, whose name I won’t say. He is very respected even 
now. One day he sent for me. I went to his house and saw a plain clothed BSF 
official sitting there. Maybe he was from other Indian Secret Services. This 
was in ’89, after the flood waters receded. Maybe late ’88. This man, if he was 
from the BSF, was at least a company commander, or of higher position. He 
fed me a couple of times at Indian haats. 
They sent for me for two or three consecutive days, but I wasn’t in. The 
old man arranged the meeting and following this incident, I didn’t talk to him 
for seven years. I began hating him. He was a dalal [traitor]. The old man sent 
for me. When I reached his home, he said, “This man wants to talk to you.” He 
pretended that he didn’t know the purpose. 
At first this Indian officer tried to befriend me. He kept on coming for 
three days. Each day he would meet and talk to me. Then one day, he met me 
in an Indian market, took me to a two-storied shop, which belonged to a retired 
police official. We went upstairs. He fed me and offered me any goods from 
the market I wanted to take with me. I took a few pieces of cloth. He wasn’t 
yet telling me anything direct. I decided I shouldn’t take that much from him. I 
took three or four saris. He said, “As you are doing this, never hesitate to ask 
me for any help or take anything from me. You don’t have to carry 500 or 
1000tk to India to buy cloth. Just remember me. And if you are caught, tell that 
I am Chowdhury Babu’s man. Wherever I am, they would inform me. If you 
give my reference, none will torture you. I will get the message even if I am in 
Siliguri or even farther, and I will order them to release you.” This went for a 
couple of days. At a point, I myself started repenting, thinking, “It isn’t fair. I 
shouldn’t take this charge.” 
Shamsul paused and seemed as though he was reluctant to proceed. As his meaning 
began to dawn on us, Sayeed asked him “Did this man suggest anything directly?” 
Shamsul paused, then replied: 
Yes, he did. He said, “We would give you necessary money, arms, and 
ammunition. We can provide you with extra man-power also, if you organize 
some men here. You and your team will stay in India. Your job is just to kill a 
few people from Dahagram. Afterwards, you will administer this area [erpore 
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tomrai ae jaiga niyontron korbe] .” Maybe the man was good. I felt very sorry. 
One particular day, I touched his feet [paye porci], saying, “I cannot do this.” 
While Shamsul abruptly changed the subject and clearly wished to say no more about 
it, his meaning was clear. The “few” who he was being asked to kill in Dahagram 
were almost certainly the leaders of the Dahagram Shangram Shomiti (DSS), a group 
of students who were at the time advocating for the opening of the Corridor and 
attempting to draw national attention to the plight of Dahagram’s residents.74 During 
the period when the DSS was active, there were regular attempts to capture key 
participants by the BSF. Many of the members rose to political prominence within the 
enclave and held positions of power and influence in Dahagram. These men were all 
among those who Shamsul called his friends. Yet what was more striking than the 
suggestion of an overt attempt by the Indian Security Services to arrange the 
assassination of pro-Bangladesh Activists within Dahagram, was the agony of the 
decision that Shamsul was trying to convey. The choice still pained him. This was 
apparent in his mannerism and behavior, the look of tension on his face as he told the 
story. It was clear in his explanation of the torturous way he declined the offer of the 
Security Service member and in his vehement hatred of the man who had arranged the 
meeting to put the dilemma before him. 
Shamsul’s narrative certainly highlighted the stress of living in the enclave 
during the turbulent years leading up to the opening of the Corridor. Yet there was 
more to the point he was trying to convey. Shamsul redirected the conversation to a 
seemingly innocent topic. He began to explain marriage patterns within Dahagram. 
Many marriage contracts, he explained, were made with families in neighboring 
Indian districts. As he spoke, he suddenly became upset. 
                                                 
74 I address this elsewhere through an extended history of belonging(s) in Dahagram. 
75 
You will find here many a boy whose maternal grandparents are Indian. Many 
are from Kuchlibari, which is a Muslim majority area. Though they are 
Muslim, they are affectionate to India [tara Indiar proti durbal], unlike 
Bangladeshi Hindus. These Muslims will never opt for any other country than 
India. Is there anything special about Indian soil [Indiar mathir ki kono bishesh 
goon ache]? Are they blessed by some saint so that most of the men are 
devoted to the country [kon peerer doai tader ato desh prem]? They say there 
were many saints in Bangladesh also. If so, then why are our people of such 
low morals [nitihin]. I won’t say that India is free of bad people, but what I 
have noticed is that they seldom tell a lie, cheat someone . . . At this point, I am 
bound to praise them. 
Shamsul’s heated explanation seemed to shed new light on his earlier narrative. 
Shamsul’s bitterness and frustration with the confused agendas and resentful politics 
of the enclave, coupled with his always-partial inclusion within the community of 
long-term residents, fueled his indecisions over belonging. The affinity he felt with the 
Indian Security Officer, the enticing appeal of escaping from the sensitive space of the 
enclave, and the ability to move to and from market without the threat and fear of jail 
by Indian authorities, all contributed to the tortured decision. Shamsul’s sudden and 
surprising explanation of why Indians were, as a nation, a better and more just group, 
seemed an attempt to make us understand those tensions of belonging, to explain why 
accepting the officer’s offer might have seemed the right, or at least not the wrong, 
choice at the time. I do not wish to suggest that such choices are only difficult or only 
emerge in sensitive spaces, but rather to call attention to the tension that belonging 
within a sensitive space places on its residents. If sensitive spaces are characterized by 
overlapping sovereignties and competing claims to rule, life within them is also 
fraught with the pain of choosing to belong in particular and often complicated ways. 
Courses of action are often unclear. Loyalties that in retrospect seem, or are presented 
as, obvious, are in practice contingent, fraught, and pained for those who are often 
forced into unsavory choices and betrayals. 
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Yet not all decisions, allegiances, and loyalties are necessarily so painfully 
considered in the enclave. Indeed, casual actions, taken for a variety of reasons, also 
contribute to the sensitive ground of Dahagram. Several days after our night visit from 
the BDR, Sayeed and I were returning to Dhaka to regroup. We stopped by the 
Patgram BDR post to inform the Company Commander of our movements. The day 
could not have been more of a contrast with our last tense meeting. It was a late winter 
day in Northern Bengal: cool, sunny, and breezy. The Commander, the same man who 
had silently regarded us through our interrogation several nights before, invited us for 
tea in the company court-yard. Since the late night visit, we had been in constant 
speculation about what had prompted the sudden recognition and alarm at our 
presence in the enclave and whether there was a connection between the strange 
rumour conveyed to the BSF and the sudden appearance of the security-official. 
Though we guessed that the BSF had made an official inquiry to the BDR about our 
presence and intentions, we had no way to verify this speculation. 
As we sat, talking, the Commander asked how much more time we would be 
spending in Dahagram. I told him that we expected to be working there for many 
months to come. As we chatted, an officer approached and handed him a piece of 
piece. Glancing over it, he grunted, whispered instructions to the officer, and took a 
long sip of his tea. “Another inquiry from the BSF,” he said, frowning. “So many 
inquiries. Every day they are sending them.” He placed his cup of tea down, shook his 
head, and smiling said. “Come as often as you like. Keep us informed, and please let 
me know if you ever have any difficulties.” Though the Commander was certainly a 
generous man, indeed, in the months to come, we came to know him quite well, I 
suspect that his accommodation of our presence there had as much to do with his 
ongoing relations with the BSF over sensitive ground as with his willingness to 
accommodate a foreign researcher. Sayer observes that moral regulation “works 
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through the way it forcibly organized and divides subjectivities and thereby produces 
and reproduces quite material forms of sociality” (1994: 374 ital. in original). Yet 
within performances of state power, particularly in sensitive spaces, such 
reproductions and divisionings also provide ample room for the additional navigation 
of personal animosities and minor political victories. Our presence certainly served as 
an irritant and a source of constant speculation to the BSF, an irritation that the 
Commander may have been willing to encourage as a small measure of satisfaction for 
the constant official inquiries from his opposite numbers. And with his casual 
encouragement and endorsement of our presence, we were further incorporated into 
the sensitive and uncertain terrain of the enclave. 
Conclusion: Making Sensitive Space 
In this chapter, I have tried to demonstrate the ways in which attending to the 
politics of sensitivity can help us to rethink the concept of “exception” and the way we 
understand spaces that are often described as “sensitive” such as border areas. 
Sensitive spaces are complex zones within which questions of sovereignty, belonging, 
and territory are contingent on the dynamics of ambiguity, various and often 
competing projects of regulation, and opportunistic and accidental overlaps of 
different claims to rule, authority, and power. Rather than emerging out of an 
organized and declarative decision taken at an executive level, such spaces are the 
product of these confused, ambiguous, and overlapping claims. Yet these spaces are 
also the outcome of assumptions, conditioned responses, and moral regulations about 
what kind of things are “sensitive” and how one must, consequently, react and behave 
towards them. As such, sensitive spaces are not “things” that, once marked, exist “out 
there.” Rather, they emerge out of enactments of sensitivity by: state officials such as 
archivists, ministers, and civil servants who preserve the ill defined links between 
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knowledge and security; citizens of the countries to which they belong (or are bounded 
by) who re-enforce assumptions about such spaces; security forces who partially and 
unevenly administer such zones in constant contention and complicity with others 
seeking to exercise various forms of power and rule; the residents of such spaces who 
carve out lives and livelihoods on often adverse and ambiguous grounds; and 
researchers who seek to produce “knowledge” about these contentious areas. 
Yet, as I also have tried to show, performances of sensitivity have fluid 
boundaries and ambiguous ends. If sensitivity provides an organizing logic for 
restricting access, it also creates spaces within which a broad array of interests, goals, 
intents, hopes, and fears compete with each other and produce new configurations of 
ambiguity and power. Sensitivity is not an omnipresent, structured phenomenon. 
Rather, different and conflicting manifestations of sensitivity are not only historically 
and contextually determined but also individually negotiated and articulated. While 
being “sensitive” to the politics of sensitivity can provide clues to the ways such 
ambiguities emerge and strategies for reading sensitive spaces, it does not provide a 
uniform template for analysis. Indeed, the interpretation of what counts as “sensitive” 
is radically different, for example, for an elderly man whose borders are being eroded 
year-by-year than it is for an archivist protecting collections that may or may not hold 
contentious information. Attending to the politics of sensitivity, then, does not provide 
a way to rank or classify space as more or less sensitive. Rather it provides a way to 
think through the ambiguities, insecurities, and threats that are present at and complicit 
in producing such spaces. Thus, while sensitive spaces emerge out of complex and 
historically specific situations, attending to the politics of anxiety and uncertainty at 
the heart of such zones may help understand them in relation to each other. 
I call sensitivity a process of state formation precisely because it provides 
vaguely defined, though tangible, articulations between specific people, places, and 
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things and broader, more nebulous concepts such as national survival and state 
security. This link conditions behaviour as it also produces spaces (Lefebvre 1991). 
Ambiguity permeates everything about Dahagram, from its internal political workings 
to its very status as a part of Bangladesh. The politics of sensitivity at play in the 
enclaves both constitute and are constituted by this ambiguity. The notion of 
“sensitive” areas regulates knowledge of and about Dahagram. At the same time, 
sensitivity complicates and facilitates the multiple overlapping of sovereignty and 
jurisdiction both within and linked to the enclave as a whole. 
One of my informants once told me, “Dahagram folks are always in tension. 
They are concerned about what will happen next. Though maybe nothing will happen, 
in fact, but this sense of insecurity is really suffocating [ae onishchoyota khubi 
dombondho lage].” Indeed, this is the central point about sensitivity and sensitive 
spaces. They have a profoundly destabilizing effect on those who live within them. 
While sensitivity articulates with broader and often shifting cartographic anxieties, 
they produce zones within which lives and livelihoods are contingent on ambiguous, 
confused, and overlapping processes. These processes are discussed and analyzed, 
debated, interpreted, and subject to rumours and theorizations by both residents of 
such spaces and by state “security” officials who attempt to administer them. These 
theorizations themselves are often interpolated into the broader politics of sensitivity 
and, as such, become complicit in producing new configurations of power and 
regulation. When viewed in light of the ambiguity so integral to the production of 
sensitive spaces, such questionings of what will and will not happen are both 
unknowable and profoundly unsettling. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
HISTORIES OF SENSITIVITY: THE PRODUCTION OF SENSITIVE SPACE75 
How do spaces become marked as sensitive? What are the historically specific 
conditions of the production of sensitive spaces? And how do sensitive spaces emerge 
within broader debates over territory, nation, and state? These are not the questions 
that are running through my head as I speak to Bhoktiar Ali, a retired member of the 
Bangladesh Civil Service. Rather, I am imagining that I am about to find answers—
tangible explanations of the bizarre failures to resolve the question of the enclaves that 
I have been trying to understand over the past several months. We are sitting in a 
ramblingly large building in Dhaka, full of the offices of various civil service 
functionaries. It is after closing time and what, I imagine, must be a chaotic building 
during the day is relatively quiet. Even now, however, there are still people moving 
briskly through its wide, poorly-lit halls. Sayeed and I have come here to meet Ali, a 
friend of several friends, who, I have been told, was somehow intimately involved in 
the administration of the enclaves. I have heard about Ali from several different 
people in Dhaka, all of whom assure me that he will be able to help. I have been trying 
                                                 
75 A note on sources: this chapter draws from two different sets of data collected during my fieldwork. 
First, it draws on newspaper and press coverage of the enclaves in both English and Bengali-language 
papers. Translations from Bengali papers are by Xulhaz Mannan with assistance from me. Second, it 
draws on records from the Home Political Office’s Confidential Records, housed in the Bangladesh 
National Archives in Dhaka. Following Van Schendel (2005), I have referenced these as “CR” followed 
by their file number. Where applicable, I have included the specific document numbers and dates from 
the archival files, though these rarely corresponded to an order or continuous sequence within the files 
as they are now stored. I have also drawn extensively on two publically available documentary archives. 
The first are the Appendices of Whyte’s Waiting for the Esquimo (2002), which collects an abundance 
of documents related to the enclaves. I have referred to these documents by Appendix number. The 
second is Bhasin’s two volume India-Bangladesh Relations 1971-1994: Documents, which collects a 
vast number treaties, Parliamentary discussions, and speeches (including relevant documents from 
before 1971). I have referred to these documents, where applicable, by both document number and page 
number. Additionally, I draw on Whyte’s enormously detailed history, which offers a comprehensive 
study of the enclaves from the colonial to the postcolonial period. As will be apparent, though my 
intentions in this chapter are different from his, I have found is carefully researched and methodical 
study invaluable. Further, unless otherwise noted, the maps in this section are drawn from Waiting for 
the Esquimo and are used by kind permission of their author. 
81 
to set up this meeting for several months and am imagining that this will be a critical 
step in my hunt for information about the chhitmahals and their problematic history. 
Upon arriving, we are shown into a modestly sized office that, we are told, the retired 
civil servant has borrowed for the meeting. We drink tea and biscuits as we patiently 
await his arrival. After a short time, he enters, a thin and spry man in his late 60s, 
carrying a single thin folder. 
After greetings, another cup of tea, an explanation of my project, how I 
became interested the enclaves, and where I learned to speak Bengali (though the 
interview is conducted in English), we get down to business. Ali is vague about what 
capacity he served in, but he seems to have occupied several positions in both Rangpur 
and Lalmonirhat over the course of his career. He was, he assures me, involved over 
many long years in working to resolve the “problem” of the enclaves and bring some 
relief to their beleaguered residents. He had even written an article summarizing and 
making a case for resolving the enclave issue.76 It seems that we have come to the 
right place. 
Yet, as I begin to ask him for details about what he did and how and when he 
was involved, his opinions about why the problem of the enclave persists, and about 
the enclaves’ history and status, he is maddeningly unclear. Almost every question I 
ask him prompts him to open the folder that he has brought with him, ponder its 
contents, close it, and offer an answer so broad and general that it might have come 
from one of the occasional newspaper reports that appear on the chhits. “The people 
who live there are in terrible condition.” “India has not fulfilled its part of the 1974 
treaty.” More. My notebook, open in front of me, remains all but empty. 
At several points in this conversation, I wonder if he is uncomfortable 
recounting long stories to a foreigner. I wonder if he has a cache of “sensitive” 
                                                 
76 I was unable to track this article down, though have no reason to doubt its existence. 
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information that he is trying to navigate. I wonder if the thin folder he has brought 
with him and that he so often consults holds government information about the 
enclaves that is absent from published accounts. Running out of new ways to ask the 
same questions and not sure what else to do, I ask to see the folder. Ali refuses. We 
continue in the same vein for several minutes—more questions with vague answers. 
New questions (perhaps I am asking the wrong ones). I ask about the folder again. 
Again, he deflects my request. We run out of questions to ask and begin to make our 
departures. “Ohnek koshto dilam (We have given you much trouble),” I say and thank 
him for his time. He invites me to call on him again if I have any additional questions 
he can help with. As we stand, Sayeed says, “Sir, it would be a big help to us if we 
could just quickly look at the folder you have brought with you.” Ali takes a long and 
steady glance at the folder in front of him, then, passes it across the table. I eagerly 
pick it up. Inside are five type-written pages. They are a list of the enclaves, their 
names, and their approximate size in acres. The list appears to be a reprint of a list that 
appeared as a supplement to the 1961 census. This list is well known and is readily 
available.77 There is nothing more inside the folder. 
*  *  * 
I am unable to ascribe a definitive explanation to what happened in this 
interview. Numerous possible and plausible interpretations exist. Perhaps Ali’s 
involvement in the enclaves’ history had been overstated, a boast that became more 
tenuous as I asked more detailed questions. Perhaps Ali, like the archivist described in 
the previous chapter, felt that he was protecting sensitive information from a prying 
                                                 
77 More specifically, this list came from an Appendix to the 1961 Census including a short piece on the 
enclaves by Banerjee (1966). As Whyte (2002) points out, this article was reprinted in a slightly 
abridged version (but including the enclave list) in a 1969 article appearing in India Quarterly. 
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foreigner with ambiguous intentions and credentials. Perhaps I had been unsuccessful 
in asking the right questions or establishing the right bonhomie to get the official to 
open up and share his story. Perhaps there were a combination of these and other 
reasons at work in his reticence. Yet what also seems plausible is the explanation that 
occurred to me in the long rickshaw ride home: that there was, in fact, a marked lack 
of information about the enclaves available—that Ali had been as involved as he 
claimed, and still had little access to information (and answers) about these 
troublesome spaces. 
This interpretation is consistent with my arguments about sensitive space in the 
previous chapter. My suggestion is not that there is no information about such spaces 
available to particular government officials in particular positions and locales. My 
own experiences and encounters within the enclaves indicate that there is a constant, if 
uneven, production of information about these contentious zones. Rather, there may be 
no such thing as a comprehensive, data-rich vision of spaces such as Dahagram that 
can uniformly be accessed by various members of the state system. The enclaves, I 
would suggest, are singularly ambiguous and ill-defined spaces, unintelligible within 
standard models of bureaucratic administration and mis-understood as empirical 
spaces within which complicated formations of security are worked out through and in 
relation to suspect populations. Indeed, as I have argued in the previous chapter, such 
ambiguities are central to the condition of sensitive space and the anxious regulation 
of information within and relation to it. 
Yet, the official’s constant reference to the long list of tiny enclaves during our 
conversation also hinted at another problem of understanding these sensitive spaces. 
The bland list, marking out tiny and seemingly insignificant territories, did little to 
explain the tension, fear, and heated reactions that these marginal areas have inspired 
throughout their postcolonial history. Neither did it illustrate a logic that captures why 
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these spaces persist despite two treaties and numerous “good faith” agreements to 
absorb them into their bounding states. In short, when comparing the enclaves’ tiny 
size to the tensions they have stimulated, the numbers did not add up. 
In the previous chapter, I examined the tangible effects and affects of 
sensitivity on those who live within and those who seek to regulate the enclaves. In 
this chapter, I will address the historical production and specificity of the enclaves as 
sensitive space. I will argue that political and administrative responses to the 
“problem” of the enclaves cannot be easily reduced to rational analysis of intentions 
and outcomes. Rather, they are bound up in the cartographic anxieties specific to the 
postcolonial histories of India and Bangladesh which underpin much of the 
contemporary conflict over territory between the two (Krishna 1996). The outcomes of 
political debates in relation to the enclaves are about more than concrete information, 
diplomatic negotiation, or mutually agreeable outcomes. They are also about the way 
these spaces articulate with broader narratives and anxieties and the ways they are re-
deployed in arguments that seek to define both the real and imagined contours of the 
nation-state. In relation to the enclaves, seeing like a state (Scott 1998) is thus to view 
these spaces with exceptionally poor vision—or at least through glasses with tinted 
lenses. The empirical reality of the enclaves as “concrete” space, populated by “real” 
people, is utterly overdetermined by the various ways that they are caught up in and 
shape debates and fears about territory and space. 
With this in mind, I approach this chapter as an exploration of the historically 
specific, discursive construction of the enclaves as sensitive space. I will show that the 
production of sensitive space is, effectively, a process of making the enclaves loom 
disproportionately large in their intermittent incorporation into political and public 
discourse. I will outline a historical process through which the enclaves come to 
intermittently symbolize a range of broad struggles over space. This symbolic 
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appropriation transforms the enclaves from small and comparatively insignificant 
zones to vectors and sites for a range of struggles, debates, and fears. Examining the 
enclaves’ history as the construction of a problematic space, rather than as an 
explanation of one, sheds important light on the apparent intractability of issues linked 
to the enclaves—issues that staunchly resist realist explanations and logics. 
The Values of Exchange 
My encounter with Bhoktiar Ali is suggestive of ways that the empirical 
realities—the chhits as concrete spaces “on the ground”—appear somehow 
unknowable, as grey areas of official knowledge. This theme of “lack of evidence” 
runs through much of the political history of the chhits. Arguments about this “lack” 
stake out a particular set of claims about the enclaves themselves—claims that the 
details matter and that the problem of the chhits has a technocratic solution that is 
grounded in facts and figures about the enclaves’ locations in space, their populations, 
and their sizes. 
To provide another example, on December 23rd, 1960, in a speech before the 
Rajya Sabha,78 West Bengal Member of Parliament (MP) Atindra Nath Bose made a 
formal complaint about the lack of information available to members about the 
provisions of the proposed 1958 Nehru-Noon Accords, the first major treaty 
attempting to resolve the enclave issue. The Accords, according to Bose, suffered from 
an order-of-operation problem. The proposal before the Sabha was one that asked 
them to first ratify the agreement and only then to demarcate and transfer the lands.79 
                                                 
78 The “Council of States,” or the Upper House of the Indian Parliament  
79 The theme of “demarcation before agreement” has been a consistent theme in debates over enclave 
exchange. In particular, since the 1974 Indira-Mujib Pact (discussed below), the official stance of the 
Government of India is that full demarcation of the border must precede exchange. As such, disputes 
over the demarcation of several areas along the border itself, as opposed to failure to demarcate the 
enclaves, are positioned as preventing the exchange of the enclaves. See The Daily Star, 2006 (February 
7), “Media Reports Misleading, Says Indian HC.”  
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This meant that Parliamentary members could not adequately assess what was being 
gained and lost in the transfer. 
The two Bills [one to divide Berubari Union No. 12 in half and one to 
exchange the remaining enclaves] are like blank cheques which we are 
required to sign. . . . We are going to give our consent to giving away our 
territory without knowing exactly what amount of territory in what area we are 
giving. . . . There is not even a map of the area showing the territory along 
which the demarcation will follow. . . . Further, there is going to be an 
exchange of enclaves. What are these enclaves? We do not know how many 
enclaves are there in India and how many in Pakistan (quoted in Whyte 2002: 
186-187). 
Bose’s consternation is, perhaps, understandable. As an MP being asked to pass 
judgment on the transfer of ambiguous territory, one might expect a desire for clarity 
on the general parameters of the exchange. Yet, it also presents a puzzle. Bose was not 
the only person to make this complaint in a Parliamentary debate over the enclaves. 
Such complaints and concerns have been part and parcel of such discussions since 
Partition. For those seeking to adjudicate decisions about the enclaves’ future, there 
never seems to be enough information available. 
Yet, why is it that these spaces persist as seeming administrative lacunae and 
what else is contained within arguments that reduce the enclaves to a problem of “lack 
of data?” The broad boundaries of most of the enclaves, Berubari being a notable 
exception discussed in more detail below, have never been disputed. Indeed, these 
boundaries were mapped in detail in a 1934 survey of the boundary between Cooch 
Behar and Rangpur.80 Why were these maps and reports unavailable? What does the 
lack of availability signal? And, perhaps more to the point, why do such details 
matter? 
                                                 
80 This survey, which combined aerial and on-the-ground approaches to surveying, is detailed in Arthur 
Hartley’s Final Report of the Rangpur Survey and Settlement Operation, 1931-1938 (1940). The 
appendices of Hartley’s report deal extensively with the surveying of chhit land. They detail the 
creation of pillars to visually mark the space of the enclaves, the process of mapping the enclaves, and, 
indeed, the very sheets within the broader survey on which the enclaves appear. 
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One way to account for this seeming anxiety over information would be to take 
it at face value. The discourse around maps in border regions in India is particularly 
“sensitive,” and such maps are difficult to access, even for officials seeking to use 
them for administrative purposes.81 As Axel argues, maps of border areas in 
postcolonial India “[demand] careful surveillance because, being contiguous with an 
international boundary, the periphery of the nation-state’s territory may constitute a 
conjunction as well as a disjunction between interiority and exteriority” (2002: 254). 
For Axel, the fragmentary claims to community within South Asia problematize the 
image of a self-contained and bounded nation-state in official cartographic 
representation.82 Echoing Krishna (1996), Axel suggests that broad fears and anxieties 
around territorial sovereignty are translated into concrete regulations of, among other 
things, maps—documents that may physically show the tenuousness of the post-
Partition Boundaries and the fragility of claims to a singular Indian identity. Such 
concerns seem particularly cogent in the case of the chhitmahols. The possibility that 
borderlands might be cartographically exposed as spaces of ambiguity is, perhaps, 
nowhere more apparent than at the Cooch Behar border, where the scattering of the 
enclaves along the boundary creates a visual illusion of two states dissolving, or 
disintegrating, into each other (see Figure 9).83 
                                                 
81 The Survey of India designates India’s border regions as falling within a “Restricted Zone,” where 
the publication of maps at greater than a 1:1 million scale is not allowed. Maps published on an 
“acceptable” scale cannot depict a range of clarifying cartographic details such as contour lines, 
kilometer ticks, or spot heights. This restriction makes the publication of “accurate” maps effectively 
illegal. What is more, the publication of maps that “inaccurately” depict the boundaries of India is also 
illegal, and, according to the Survey of India, “tantamount to questioning [its] territorial sovereignty” 
(1987). This paradoxical situation effectively makes the possession or creation of maps of borders 
within India fraught with danger. 
82 Axel is particularly concerned with the formation of a transnational Punjabi identity that lays claim to 
a unified Sikh homeland transcending the India/Pakistan Partition boundary. 
83 Though the government of Bangladesh does not have any “official” policy that mirrors the Survey of 
India, the process of getting maps in Bangladesh can be equally complicated and fraught with both 
frustrations and difficulties. As my experience recounted in the previous chapter suggests, local 
government officials have as little access to “official” maps, at least in Dahagram, as those they 
spatially govern. In various different administrative offices in Patgram, I saw numerous maps that 
depicted the exact locations of the enclaves. These may have been based on Survey of Bangladesh 
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enclaves that analyze the politics of exchange in terms of difference in square 
kilometers that will be gained by Bangladesh in an enclave trade with India.85 While it 
is accurate that there would be small net territorial gain to Bangladesh in such an 
exchange, one might be surprised that such a small amount of land might cause such a 
disproportionately large amount of concern, alarm, and debate. 
My suggestion here is not that such claims be discounted. Indeed, throughout 
the enclaves’ colonial and postcolonial histories there has indeed been a marked 
tension over their mapping and demarcation—even as there has been no dispute over 
their existence or ownership per se. Rather, I argue that we should read discussions 
over the enclaves as empirical, ontological spaces against their discursive production 
as sensitive spaces—that we examine and take seriously the tension between the 
enclaves as small, out-of-the-way spaces occupied by marginal populations and the 
enclaves as symbols of danger, security, and belonging along the India-Bangladesh 
border. In this debate, one might say that the enclaves, as such, are subsumed by their 
“exchange” value—as symbolics of state control and national territory. That is to say 
that the empirics of the enclaves, discussions over their territorial definition, the 
availability of information about them, and the practicalities of their administration are 
bound up within and inextricable from anxieties about space, tensions over the 
meanings of citizen and subject in the wake of Partition, and their political utility in 
nationalist, communal arguments about the border. Though I am not arguing here that 
we understand the enclaves and their histories narrowly through the lens of Marx’s 
commodity form (1992 [1867]), these spaces do emerge as particular kinds of 
territorial fetishes. Like the table described in the opening paragraph of “The 
                                                 
85 Though these numbers are frequently precise down to fractions of an acre, they often disagree with 
each other about the total amount of space involved in such a trade. See Ittefaq, 1998 (March 19), “162 
ti Chhitmahaler Binimoi 24 Bochereo Hoy Nai [Exchange of 162 Enclaves Was not Implemented in 24 
Years];” and Shangbad, 1974 (May 17), Chhitmahal Vagavagi: Bangladesh Bharater 49 Barga-mile 
Peyechey: Bharat Peyechey Bangladesher 18 Barga-mile [Chhitmahol Exchange: Bangladesh Gets 49 
sq. Miles of India: India Gets 18 sq. Miles of Bangladesh].” 
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Fetishism of Commodities,” the enclaves may “stand on their feet”—as tiny spaces 
peopled by a handful of residents with real and urgent concerns about movement, 
lives, rights, and livelihoods—but in relation to these broader problematics, they also 
“stand on their head” and evolve out of their spatial brain grotesque ideas about the 
nationalist and communal politics of space. 
The process whereby this transformation happens is one that is historical. In 
other words, the enclaves were not conceived out of cartographic anxieties, nor did 
they come to embody them at the moment of the Partition of Bengal when their 
territorial location placed them on the wrong side of a new and contentious border. 
Rather, the enclaves emerged over time as sensitive spaces. Their history is one that 
speaks of their transformation from one of a range of administrative complications to 
be worked out in the Colonial and post-Partition moments to seemingly intractable 
“problems” that signify competing and conflicting visions of space. In what follows, I 
will map this discursive process through an exploration of the enclaves’ public 
histories. This discussion will move rapidly through the colonial period and Partition 
to explore debates over the 1958 Nehru-Noon Accords, the 1974 Indira-Mujib Pact, 
and the 1992 opening of the Tin Bigha Corridor. I will conclude by exploring the ways 
that the enclaves, and the sensitivities that they have come to symbolize, are re-
deployed in ongoing concerns and negotiations over the securitization and 
maintenance of the India-Bangladesh border. 
Colonial Confusions 
The pre-Partition history of the enclaves displays, if not the fraught sensitivity 
of the contemporary moment, at least significant administrative confusion. Indeed, 
even origins of the enclaves are somewhat confused and disputed. As Banerjee (1966) 
argues, they were largely left out of early accounts of the area by colonial historians 
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and Gazette collectors such as Buchanan and Hamilton, due to both their small, 
seemingly insignificant size and their complicated and hazy origins. However, there is 
a general consensus that the enclaves emerged out of the expansion of the Mughal 
kingdom in Dacca northward into the Kutch kingdom (present day Cooch Behar). 
Whyte (2002), synthesizing arguments found in various census and gazette accounts 
collected in Vas (1911), Mitra (1953), Banerjee (1966), and Majumdar (1977), argues 
that these spaces first assumed administrative shape out of a 1713 treaty between the 
Mughals and Rup Narayan, the Maharaja of Cooch Behar granting the chaklas 
[administrative districts] of Boda, Patgram, and Purvabhag to Mughal dominion. 
Mughal rulers were unable, or unwilling,86 to dislodge a number of powerful local 
landlords and estate holders. These lands remained under the dominion of Cooch 
Behar. Similarly, Mughal soldiers had occupied land inside of Cooch Behar, which 
became, effectively part of the Mughal Empire. The 1713 Treaty thus laid the 
groundwork for a system of detached fealties, offering tax and tribute not to a 
proximate political ruler, but rather to a more geographically distinct (and religiously 
marked) one. As Van Schendel (2002) observes, such arrangements were neither 
unique to this particular boundary nor to the region. Rather, they were reflective of 
systems of political administration where “sovereignty was expressed not so much in 
terms of territorial contiguity as in terms of jurisdiction and tax flows” (2002: 119). 
Such forms of sovereign power did not necessarily overlay with modes of 
spatial control associated with colonial rule, which saw territorial rationalization, 
mapping, and administrative divisioning as central to monitoring, accounting, and 
                                                 
86 Banerjee points out that the large presence of Mughal soldiers settling in the area led to peasant 
unrest. In such a volatile setting, the presence of Hindu landlords may have been seen as palliative. As 
Richard Eaton details (1993), the Mughal conquest along the Northern frontier from the 17th century on 
was much more prone to resistance and rebellion than, for example, along its Western frontier. 
According to Eaton, “In Kuch Behar and Kamrup a monetized economy replaced a non-monetized one; 
a distant governor replaced a local king; and an armed militia paid from a general tax levied on the 
whole peasantry replaced a corvée militia paid by a system of customary service to a king. These 
disruptions explain the widespread and popular resistance to the imposition of Mughal authority” (191). 
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revenue (Bayly 1999; Edney 1997). When a British expedition invaded and conquered 
Cooch Behar in 1772, the territory was incorporated into the province of Bengal as a 
Princely Kingdom, providing nominal control of the region to the Maharaja of Cooch 
Behar. This created an administrative boundary between Cooch Behar and directly 
administered districts of Rangpur, Jalpaiguri, and Assam, all organized under the 
Bengal Presidency.87 All of these districts held various chhits belonging to Cooch 
Behar and vice versa. This odd geographic dispersal complicated processes of excise 
and taxation, leading to periodic frustrations throughout the Colonial period. Much of 
this frustration was framed as a failure of indigenous land-tenure systems to fit into 
rational models of colonial governance as expressed, for example, through the 
Permanent Settlement of Bengal in 1793.88 For example, as W.W. Hunter observed in 
his famous Statistical Account of Bengal: 
The fact that, although the Mughals forced the cession, they never wrested the 
chaklas out of the hands of the Kuch Behar Raja accounts for the irregular 
nature of the boundary which exists between them and Kuch Behar Proper. A 
long narrow strip of Kuch Behar territory extends from the north of Patgram, 
crossing the present Tista, and divides Kazirhat from Boda. This would no 
doubt have been included in the ceded tract if the boundary had ever been 
regularly laid down. In Patgram the very fields are intermixed, one forming 
part of the chakla, and the next belonging to Kuch Behar territory, to the great 
confusion of the administration (Hunter 1877: 317). 
The enclaves’ peculiar territorial configuration—discontinuous landholdings that fell 
across an important administrative divide—made them sticking points in projects of 
rationalizing a territorial model of sovereignty onto a space with land tenure 
arrangements and histories of a different kind. 
                                                 
87 For more on the politics of colonial sovereignty in relation to Princely States, and particularly on the 
links between Princely sovereignty and anti-colonial nationalism, see Bhagavan (2003). 
88 The Permanent Settlement was a system put in place to structure revenue collection and production. 
For the classic study exploring the settlement’s impact on land tenure, agriculture, and colonial and 
anti-colonial politics, see Guha (1996 [1981]). 
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Hunter’s description gives the impression that the administrative boundaries of 
these spaces were unknown or poorly marked. This may have been true, in part, 
though as Whyte (2002) points out, a number of the larger enclaves appeared in J.J. 
Pemberton’s 1856 map of Rangpur and again in his 1859 survey of Cooch Behar, the 
earliest colonial maps of these districts.89 Further, the enclaves appeared on the 
thakbust maps of the area, non-official maps that did not constitute legal evidence of 
ownership or boundary demarcation but that were, none-the-less, regularly used by the 
Colonial administration in areas that had not been formally surveyed (Syed and 
Woodroffe 1907). These maps suggest that the boundaries of the enclaves were 
ascertainable, at the very least, at a local level. Yet, the existence of the map did little 
to clear up administrative confusion over the chhits or, even, to stem questions about 
whether they truly existed as recognized parts of the border. 
For example, in a series of letters exchanged in 1911 between the provincial 
governors of East Bengal and Assam and Cooch Behar, the reality of the enclaves 
themselves were called into question. The Eastern Bengal Department of Revenue 
submitted a query asking for explanation of records from Cooch Behar showing 
revenue collection in chhits situated in Rangpur. The letter further demanded 
documentation that such chhits existed and were under the jurisdiction of the Maharaja 
of Cooch Behar. In a somewhat heated response, the Superintendent of Cooch Behar 
State, a colonial officer dispatched to aid in the administration of the district, wrote: 
I have the honour to state that these “chits” have formed part and parcel of the 
Cooch Behar State from time immemorial representing as they do those 
portions of the old kingdom of Cooch Behar which were not taken possession 
of by the Moghuls, just as certain British “chits” in the Cooch Behar State were 
formerly outlying portions of the Moghul Empire. . . .90 But if paragraph 2 of 
the above letter be construed to be an assertion of a claim by Eastern Bengal 
                                                 
89 James Rennel’s famous 1779 Atlas of Bengal does depict the area, though not at a large enough scale 
to include any details of boundaries in the region. 
90 It is worth noting, here, that “time immemorial” is shorthand for “prior to colonial rule,” the moment 
when, in colonial views of liberal governance, India began to acquire history (Mehta 1999).  
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and Assam Government to the “chits” in question, which are shown in the 
Government revenue survey and thakbust maps as belonging to the Cooch 
Behar State, then the Cooch Behar Durbar, having been in possession of these 
“chits” for centuries, do not feel called on to state in greater detail the grounds 
on which they base their claims to these “chits” as they are of the opinion that 
such onus should be thrown on to the claimants to the “chits” and not on the 
party which is admittedly in possession thereof ( Whyte 2002: Appendix 1-12, 
pp 257-258). 
If the existence of the chhits was a source of administrative confusion in the late 
Colonial period, it also appears that they also may have been sensitive spots of sorts, 
calling up questions of ownership and eliciting somewhat sharp responses between 
colonial officials and others with claims to sovereign territorial control.91 
If the enclaves themselves were sources of confusion for colonial 
administrators, the question of exchanging them to rationalize the colonial border 
proved equally vexing. The most concrete move to change the configurations of 
sovereignty across the Princely frontier appears to have come in 1917 in response to 
questions of smuggling. The presence of the enclaves on either side of the border 
facilitated the rapid expansion of licensed shops selling a range of dutiable goods in 
the border region. These goods were subsequently smuggled across the border to avoid 
excise taxes and tariffs.92 The concern over the illicit movement of goods across the 
Cooch Behar border prompted the Bengal government to normalize the economic 
space by declaring the enclaves as de facto economic zones within their bounding 
states (Whyte 2002). In other words, while the enclaves were to technically remain 
parts of their “home” territories, for purposes of taxation and excise they would be 
considered part of their bounding administrative spaces. Under this arrangement, a ban 
                                                 
91 Part of such sensitivity may have been due to disparities in revenue collection, as the query from 
Eastern Bengal and Assam seems to suggest ignorance of colonial land holdings inside of the Princely 
State. If so, the Cooch Behar Darbar may have been enjoying revenue from both enclaves within and 
outside of its borders. 
92 Though the enclave presence may have made such movement easier, little comparative evidence 
exists to suggest whether enclaves facilitated an increase in such smuggling or merely provided 
convenient outposts for smugglers and advantageous locations for licensed shops. 
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was placed on opening new shops within three miles of the border and shops situated 
in Cooch Behar chhits in Bengal paid Bengal excise tax and vice versa. In addition, 
the Bengal state agreed to pay a compensation to Cooch Behar to account for 
comparative loss of revenue, as the Cooch Behar chhits in Rangpur were larger in 
terms of number, area, and population. 
The equation of the enclaves with smuggling was to become a theme of 
administrative debates in the postcolonial era as well. The enclaves’ peculiar 
geographic situation almost certainly has made and continues to make them sites 
within which certain kinds of criminal activities take place. In a sense, any economic 
activity that bridges the enclaves’ borders could be constituted as “smuggling.” 
Moreover, their conception as territories at once inside and outside of the bounds of 
regulatory control also make them potent spaces for the imagination of crimes 
committed by colonial subjects, such as smuggling, that are predicated on territorial 
transgression. It is interesting to note that, despite such concerns, real or imagined, the 
colonial administration was only able to effect a political economic reconfiguration of 
enclave territory, rather than a wholesale territorial exchange. 
Indeed, such exchanges, which were proposed and abandoned at several points 
during the late colonial period, appear to have been contentious. The Final Report on 
the Survey and Settlement Operations in the Jalpaiguri District, 1906-1916 (Milligan 
1919), makes reference to several proposals to exchange the enclaves in order to 
create territorially contiguous and easily administrable districts, however no concrete 
moves to implement these proposals were recorded. Again, during the 1932 Survey of 
the Rangpur/Cooch Behar Border, the Director of Land Records and Surveys for 
Bengal made a proposal to the central government that the Survey presented an 
opportunity to value the land in the chhits and make a full exchange, paying 
compensation to Cooch Behar for any difference in land price. “If this exchange can 
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be effected, each of the districts and State concerned will have a compact area and 
from the administrative point of view it would be a great advantage to both the State 
and to this Government” (Hartley 1940: Part III, Appendix III, p. 140). Hartley’s Final 
Report of the Rangpur Servey and Settlement Operations 1931-1938 contains no 
further account of the discussion around this proposal. However, it does contain a 
letter dated two years later from the Revenue department stating that, “in view of the 
strong local objections to the proposed exchange Government have decided to 
abandon the proposal” (Part III, Appendix III, p. 141). 
The difficulties of exchanging the enclaves were greater than the value of such 
an exchange from the perspective of either administration or revenue. Whether this is 
because the local tensions over exchange were truly intractable, or whether they 
simply posed more problems than the rationalization of these small spaces were 
“worth” is unclear. The chhits do seem to have been spaces that were sensitive, to the 
extent that there was resistance over their incorporation into colonial visions of space. 
However, their position across an administrative boundary does not appear to have 
marked them with the same kinds of tensions that they came to embody following 
Partition. Yet, importantly, several themes that emerge in the colonial discussion of 
the chhits—particularly the questions of smuggling and “local resistance”—would re-
emerge as central problematics in the postcolonial discussion of the enclaves’ fate. 
Partitioned Spaces 
The colonial administration of the enclaves hints at ways in which these spaces 
may have been points of tension between colonial and more localized visions of 
territory, sovereignty, and space. However, the contemporary transformation of the 
enclaves into sensitive spaces—their move from administrative complications to 
problems embodying a range of broader anxieties—began with Partition in 1947. 
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Partition heralded the end of Colonial rule in India and also a resolution of the 
contentious and communal politics of the anti-colonial movement by dividing Punjub 
in the West and Bengal in the East into the new states of India and Pakistan. This 
division precipitated a massive, violent, and traumatic displacement across these new 
national borders. The ensuing social and political reconfiguration, as well as the 
memories and politics of this division, continues to reverberate differently in 
contemporary politics. While the broad outlines of the history of Partition in the East 
are well known, the processes of thinking through the Bengal Partition’s unfinished 
history is still an emerging project. Feldman notes that in the vast outpouring of 
writing on Partition since the mid-1980s, the experience of Partition in Bengal has 
been notably silent, “leading one to assume either that Partition is insignificant for 
East Bengal or that the East Bengal experience is insignificant for understanding 
Partition in India and Pakistan” (1999: 180). Restoring historical and spatial 
specificity to the narrative of Partition, Feldman suggests, helps to complicate grand 
narratives and highlights the contradictions embodied in both the moment of Partition, 
its experiences, and its aftermaths.93 
In a turn of phrase that is particularly useful in thinking about the poscolonial 
histories of the enclaves, Zamindar (2007) has recently framed such explorations as 
studies of the “Long Partition:” engagements with the way the displacements of 
Partition were central to, as opposed to simply preceding, the emergence and ongoing 
formation of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.94 The enclaves’ emergence in the post-
                                                 
93 In the past decade, the experience of Partition in the East has begun to be reinterpreted and rewritten 
back into broader narratives of Partition in some of the ways that Feldman suggests. For example, on 
the politics leading up to Partition, see Chatterji (1995) and Roy (2009), on the politics and experiences 
during and immediately after Partition, with particular reference to the border, see Chatterji (1999), Van 
Schendel (2001b; 2005), Rahaman and Van Schendel (2003), and on the aftermaths of Partition in 
Bengal and the massive displacement and social reconfiguration it engendered, see Chatterji (2007), 
Feldman (2003), Samaddar (1997), and Sinha-Kerkhoff and Bal (2007). 
94 Zamindar is, of course, far from alone in making this observation. As Chatterji notes, “partition was a 
messy, long-drawn-out process. It was in no sense finally or tidily concluded in August 1947; indeed, 
98 
Partition moment as, at once, seemingly problematic artifacts of the sundering of 
Bengal into East and West and, on the other, as sites of tension in and around which 
the communal politics of territory making become amplified in particular ways, is 
suggestive of the ways in which Partition is productively reconsidered as a 
“contestatory process of state formation” (Feldman 1999: 168). 
The boundary between West Bengal and East Pakistan was formally laid out 
by the Radcliffe Award on August 17, 1947. The Award nominally divided Bengal by 
contiguous majority population mapped out at the subdivision, thana, or mouza 
level,95 such that contiguous Muslim majority areas would be awarded to East 
Pakistan and contiguous Hindu majority areas to India. The Award itself was not 
based on survey work or on-sight observations and was worked out as much in 
relation to the dueling proposals of Congress, the Muslim League, and various other 
political parties as it was based an independent evaluation of the division of space 
(Chatterji 1999).96 Indeed, even in its moment of conception, the new border appeared 
to substitute a political vision of space for an empirical one assessed, as it were, “on 
the ground.” 
The emergent border produced as much ambiguity as it did clarity about the 
boundaries of the two new states. As Van Schendel argues, “the Bengal Boundary 
Commission’s Brief was to partition the territory on the basis of Muslim and non-
Muslim majority areas, and population figures were available only for districts and 
other administrative units (subdivisions, thanas, mouzas) whose shapes owed much to 
precolonial demarcations. Not surprising, the Commission opted to follow the 
                                                                                                                                            
one could argue that the process had just begun, and that it is still unfinished today” (Chatterji 1999: 
186). 
95 Thana translates as Police Station. Used as an administrative unit, it means the area under the 
jurisdiction of a given police station. Patgram Thana is thus the area under administration of the central 
police station in Patgram town. Mouza is a revenue unit corresponding to a specific land area containing 
one or more settlements.  
96 Despite a significant amount of political lobbying and competing plans, the final Radcliffe line most 
closely resembled the Congress Party’s proposal for Partition. See also, Chatterji (2007). 
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boundaries of these units wherever they could” (2002: 120). The zigzag border that 
emerged was approximately 4100 kms in length (not including the border with 
Myanmar or coastal areas).97 
The twist and turns of the border proved particularly complicated to negotiate 
both for those seeking to regulate them and those living within them. As Van Schendel 
(2005) argues, very little of the border actually separated majority Muslim and Hindu 
districts and, in practice, the border more frequently ran through areas where there was 
a majority of the same religious group on both sides. Further, there were numerous 
spaces where the nominal designation of a village in one country or the other was 
questionable at best. There were numerous pockets of territory that were connected to 
their home state by only narrow strips of land that could be easily controlled and 
blocked by police and border officials from their surrounding states. Some of these 
spaces, effectively became incorporated into their bounding state in “adverse 
possession.”98 Further, “the clear lines that appeared on the maps used by colonial 
officials, including the Bengal Boundary (or Radcliffe) Committee, did not correspond 
with anything visible ‘out there.’ There was no way unequivocally to recognize the 
new border on the ground” (55-56). In practice, the border was worked out and 
established through lengthy and often contentious legal and political negotiations 
between India and Pakistan, negotiations that, in several areas, remain unfinished.99 To 
adjudicate several of these disputes, an international committee—known as the Bagge 
                                                 
97 Not all of the border was based on administrative subdivisions. Areas of the border mapped out based 
on geographical landmarks proved equally problematic. The rivers that made up portions of the new 
border were much less stable and fixed in place than they may have looked from the survey maps. The 
physical location of these rivers frequently moved with the fluctuation of seasons in the alluvial delta 
regions of Bengal. Further, siltation island known as chars, regularly emerge and sometimes disappear 
in rivers throughout Bengal. When such islands emerged in the midst of rivers that made up the new 
border, disputes arose over their ownership and who was entitled to their fertile land (Chatterji 1999; 
Van Schendel 2005). Indeed, two such disputes, over New Moore Island and Mahuri Char became 
closely tied to the opening of the Tin Bigha Corridor (see below). 
98 Technically defined as a territory of one state occupied and controlled by another. 
99 Conflicts over the location of the boundary in three sectors along the India-Bangladesh border mean 
that there remains several kilometers of officially undemarcated border area (Jamwal 2004). 
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Tribunal after the Swedish judge who presided over it—was set up in 1949. Yet, 
despite these interventions, the post-Partition period was characterized by literally 
hundreds of local “testings” and negotiations of the new, confused, and far from 
concrete boundary.100 Many of the ambiguities resulting from this process, including 
the enclaves themselves, continue to plague border residents and are the source of 
ongoing conflicts. 
A number of the chhits fell on either side of the new border.101 Residents of 
these enclaves now were nominal citizens of a state other than the one in which, for all 
intents and purposes, they resided. From a legal standpoint, this meant that enclave 
residents effectively violated the border every time they went to market, leaving them 
vulnerable to arrest and persecution whenever they left their home territories. Further 
complicating this issue were the claims that India and Pakistan made for the protection 
of members of their majority religion beyond their territorial boundaries. This doctrine 
of “proxy citizenship” (Van Schendel 2002) meant that Muslims residing in India 
were technically under the protection of the Pakistani State and vice versa.102 Indeed, 
much of the back and forth in the 1940s and 1950s between the Home Political Offices 
of the two states—the departments charged with overseeing a range of issues related to 
Partition including disputes over the new border—involved advocacy for and attempts 
to address various forms of abuse towards minority communities in the other 
                                                 
100 Many of these incidents are cataloged in the Confidential Home Political Records (hereafter CR) 
from the period housed in the National Archives in Dhaka. For studies that detail this process of making 
the border, see Chatterji (1999) and Van Schendel (2005). 
101 A number of other enclaves remained across the Cooch Behar/Jalpaiguri border. As both of these 
districts were now sub-districts of West Bengal, this posed little difficulty for residents. The Cooch 
Behar chhits in Jalpaiguri were formally transferred to Jalpaiguri in two waves, in 1952 and again in 
1955. The Jalpaiguri chhits were formally transferred to Cooch Behar in 1960, effectively eliminating 
internal enclaves from the greater territory of Bengal (Whyte 2002). 
102 This informal policy was solidified by the Nehru-Laiquat Agreement in 1950 which provided an 
official rubric for the protection of minority communities in each state and provided a platform for the 
pressuring the other state to protect and uphold their rights. See Bhasin (1996: No. 656). 
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country.103 This arrangement meant that enclave residents sharing religious identity 
with the majority religion in their bounding state were both de jure citizens of their 
“home state” and de facto citizens of their bounding ones. This allowed them to make 
claims not just on government officials from both states, but often on residents of 
adjacent communities with shared religious affiliation. In the years before the 
Liberation War, Hindu residents of Dahagram were able to move freely into and out of 
the Hindu majority thana of Mekhliganj, go to market without fear of persecution, and 
more easily achieve positions of power within the enclave itself.104 
If life within the enclave was legally complicated in the period immediately 
following Partition, in practice it may have been similar to life in other areas along the 
confused border. Movement across the border was largely, at least before passport and 
visa regulations were established in 1955, unregulated and people regularly moved 
across the new boundary which had bifurcated families, villages, land holdings, and 
even households (Chatterji 1999; Rahman and Van Schendel 2003). Violence often 
erupted out of this quotidian movement, particularly during harvest periods when 
valuable crops were easily carried off for sale elsewhere. The presence of the border 
meant that disputes over livestock and crops often took on an international character, 
where police, border officials, and administrators became embroiled in adjudicating 
claims and counter-claims. In this context, the kinds of disturbances reported in 
enclave areas were often not dissimilar to those in other areas. 
                                                 
103 This included everything from the publication of communal propaganda to physical violence against 
minority communities. 
104 This was particularly so in Dahagram because of the enclave’s peculiarly sensitive role in the 
relationship between India and East Pakistan/Bangladesh (see below and Chapter 3). It should be noted 
that proxy citizenship did not necessarily guarantee social protection for enclave residents. Many 
Muslim residents of Indian enclaves in Bangladesh shared stories of expropriation by their Muslim 
neighbors during the East Pakistan period. Effectively, whether or not one shared religious affiliation 
with those in surrounding communities, residing in an enclave where it was difficult to call on police or 
other branches of “one’s own” state system placed residents in positions of increased vulnerability. 
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Yet, the administrative ambiguity around these spaces marked them, and their 
residents, as particularly vulnerable and problematic within this broader pattern of 
negotiating the border. As the two countries began a formal process of demarcating 
the border in the late 1940s and early 1950s, there were discussions at both local and 
central levels of simply leaving the chhits out of the demarcation process, as it could 
not be decided how best to handle them.105 Such discussions officially, marked the 
chhits as administrative grey zones, areas that by necessity had to be treated as 
“different.” Regular questions of ownership arose in relation to land within them, 
particularly in cases where old residents had fled the land in the confusion of Partition 
and the enclaves had been re-occupied by residents of the majority community.106 The 
enclaves featured prominently in a number of disputes over cross-border raids on 
livestock and crops, forcible subscriptions and extortions by police and other officials 
from surrounding areas, and the spreading of threatening communal propaganda.107 
Though similar events are recorded elsewhere along the border, the territorial position 
of the chhits made committing such acts relatively easy, as perpetrators could quickly 
escape into their home state and rapid response by authorities was unlikely. Most 
problematically, the easy access to the enclaves resulted in several cases in the early 
and mid-1950s in which the enclaves were invaded and over-run by residents of 
surrounding areas, resulting in wholesale displacement of enclave residents to 
surrounding areas or across the border.108 
                                                 
105 See CR 3C2-2/52-36 (Decisions Taken at the 26th Chief Secretaries’ Conference Held at Shilong 
from 6th November to 8th November, 1952). 
106 See CR 1B2-9/51-34 (Memo No. 154, February 16, 1953). 
107 See CR 1B4-16/51 (Proceedings 2342-2348, January 1955). 
108 In once instance, recounted by Van Schendel (Van Schendel 2002), Muslim residents of the 
Pakistani enclave of Dhabalshuti were intimidated out of their homes: “One day [in 1955] they found a 
poster on a tree just outside their enclave that made them realize that it was now almost suicidal to enter 
Indian territory. ‘Muslims! The day has come to sell your blood to the Hindus. Hindus! Get your money 
ready.’ A month later, a group of armed Hindu volunteers from India entered the enclave, sat down in 
the house of a Muslim villager, called his neighbors, and told them that the enclave had been taken over 
by India” (131). 
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Through the 1950s, as a range of both small and lager conflicts continued to 
plague the border, and as tensions between India and Pakistan over the question of 
Kashmir made diplomatic relations between the two states increasingly frosty, 
administrators scrambled to develop strategies for managing the chhits. In 1950, the 
two countries established a formal protocol for allowing police and other 
administrative officials to legally travel across the border and enter “their” enclaves.109 
This allowed for the administrative completion of a range of tasks, from collecting 
revenue to adjudicating local disputes. As Van Schendel (2002) notes, while these 
arrangements facilitated the visits of officials for such tasks as the collection of 
revenue, it did little to ameliorate the difficulties of movement for residents 
themselves or to address their need for access to services and protections. The process 
for arranging the complicated passage across another state’s sovereign territory was 
time consuming and officials were rarely able to respond to crises within the chhits in 
a timely fashion. Moreover, the ability of officials to move into and out of the enclaves 
did as much to accentuate the exceptional status of these spaces as it did to resolve 
them. The actions of officials while in enclaves occasionally seemed to reaffirm views 
of the enclaves as problematic spaces. For example, in 1954, a complaint was filed by 
the Deputy Secretary of the Home Political Office against several members of a 
Pakistani police force situated in Dahagram,110 claiming that they had kidnapped two 
Hindu women from Mekhliganj and held them prisoner in Dahagram until the women 
were able to escape several hours later.111 
                                                 
109 CR 3C2-5/50 (Decision Taken at the at the 17th Chief Secretary’s Conference held at Dacca, 29th and 
30th August 1950) and CR 3C-61/49 (Memo No. 250, Government West Bengal Home Political Office, 
24th March, 1949).  
110 As far as I have been able to ascertain, Dahagram was the only enclave that had a separate police 
force within it. This police force remained at least until the Dahagram War in 1965 (see Chapter 3). 
111 The District Magistrate of Rangpur countered that these accusations were baseless and that the 
women were the daughters of a prominent Hindu resident of Dahagram. According to the Magistrate, 
the women were simply visiting their father’s household. See CR 1B2-24/54 (Memo No. 189 CR-1b-
87/53, Government of West Bengal Home Political Section, January 19th, 1954). 
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It appears that the process facilitating administrative visits to the enclaves was 
largely abandoned by 1955, when a formal passport system was established between 
the two countries. The passport agreement made formal acknowledgement of the 
complications of life inside of the enclaves, allowing for the issuance of special visas 
that would allow unlimited journeys in transit along “one or more specified routes 
between the enclave and the mainland of the country to which the enclave belongs” 
(Whyte 2002: Appendix 1-22, p. 323). It further stipulated that holders of these special 
visas would not be obliged to travel through official border crossings.112 This visa 
system, on paper, resolved many of the complications of living in the enclaves. In 
practice, however, it was short-lived. As tensions continued to increase between the 
two countries, travel even with a visa become more and more risky for residents. By 
the time the controversy over the Nehru-Noon Accords erupted three years later, the 
visa allowance for chhit residents appears to have been all but abandoned. 
The 1950s might be thought of as a period during which the administrative 
claims to including the enclaves in their home state—the practical negotiations over 
the chitts’ quotidian management—were gradually removed and replaced with more 
broad debates about what the status of the enclaves and their residents should be. As 
such, the practicalities of regulating movement and allowing officials to visit the 
enclaves were replaced by broader and much less tractable discussions about exchange 
(see below). Even attempts to collect revenue from these troublesome areas seem to 
have ceased by the mid-1950s (Van Schendel 2002). Concomitant with various 
strategies of formalizing the border, this period marks the transition of the enclaves 
from one of a range of issues related to the new border in need of “working out,” to 
special cases to be dealt with at a higher administrative level. 
                                                 
112 As both Whyte (2002) and Van Schendel (2002) note, the agreement made no comment on how 
enclave residents were supposed to make the journey to apply for and receive these visas. 
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This breakdown itself made the enclaves into sensitive issues—special cases 
among the range of problems of administratively controlling the border. Yet, this 
emergence was not purely linked to administrative breakdown. Indeed, through 
particular incidents in the post-Partition moment one can glimpse the ongoing linking 
of the enclaves to a range of emergent fears over the tenuous border. Most notably, the 
chhits came to be further identified with and symbolic of smuggling along the border. 
For example, in 1951, the Deputy Secretary of the Government of West Bengal sent 
an urgent complaint to his counterpart regarding a reported sanctioned blockade of the 
enclaves. 
This Government have received further reports that the East Bengal authorities 
have announced by beat of drums at the border hats [markets] at Ambari, 
Mirzapur, etc. that people living in Cooch Behar enclaves surrounded by 
Pakistan territory will not be allowed to buy and sell articles in the hats located 
in Pakistan and if any of them are found marketing in those hats, they will be 
arrested and suitable action taken against them. It is also reported that the bi-
weekly hat in the vicinity of the Akhuara Customs Checking Station, within a 
mile from the border, could not sit on the 16th June, 1951, due to the cordon 
made by the local ansars [members of the East Pakistan police]. . . . If the 
reports be correct, there appears to have been a move for the economic 
blockade of Cooch Behar enclaves surrounded by Pakistan territory (CR 1B2-
35/51 [5563-CR, June 7th, 1951]). 
A blockade of even the largest enclaves essentially placed a strangle-hold on residents. 
The enclaves were in no way self-sufficient or self-contained and the survival and 
economic livelihood of their residents relied on constant interaction with their 
surrounding areas. The double threat—first of arrest within local markets and then of 
the physical removal of those markets—posed serious challenges to the negotiation of 
the awkward territory of the enclaves themselves. It essentially mandated that 
residents would need to make the dangerous crossing into West Bengal to go to 
market—a movement itself fraught with danger, particularly when laden with goods. 
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In a curt reply, the East Pakistani Deputy Secretary sarcastically observed that 
it was “really strange that the West Bengal Govt. should start taking interests even in 
the internal administration of the district.” He went on to argue that the economic 
actions had been taken to stem rampant smuggling, appending a report from his travels 
in the area in which he recommended the closing of haats: 
During my tour [of the area] I found that big Hats are being held right on the 
border which cater mostly to the requirements of the Indians. This is a very 
dangerous aid to smuggling because it leads to an outward flow of all 
commodities. This should be controlled and stopped as early as possible. I will 
like you to examine the shifting of all such Hats to places at least 5 miles away 
from the border. I also found a number of traders very close to the border 
storing jute and paddy with the sanction of Government Officers. This amounts 
to an active connivance at smuggling. No person should be allowed to store 
more than his personal requirements if his house is situated within 5 miles of 
the border. (CR 1B2-35/51 [16 June, 1951, Memo No. 1054 c.]) 
There are several implicit implications of such a response. First, markets in border 
areas are seen as primarily intended for enclave residents—suspect subjects of another 
state—and not for citizens of East Pakistan residing in the border region, who 
presumably could make the five-mile journey inland. From this perspective, all 
economic activity in the border area is linked to smuggling with the chhits as spaces 
that facilitate illegal trade. The suggestion appears to be not only that the purchase of 
and movement across the border of goods is a primary goal of markets in the 
borderland, but also that the transportation of goods into Indian enclaves in East 
Pakistan itself constitutes smuggling. The question of administering and dealing with 
these territorially problematic spaces is thus reframed purely around curtailing the 
activities of criminals. This is reinforced by the leap from a ban on shopkeepers 
stockpiling goods to a general ban on all stockpiling of rice and jute in the area. In a 
region where the majority of residents were smallholder farmers making a living 
through agricultural activity, the effect of such a blockade was thus not just to prevent 
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residents from accessing markets critical for daily survival, but to also criminalize 
their very livelihoods. 
Addressing the “Odd Bits” 
If the discursive production of the enclaves as sensitive space can begin to be 
glimpsed in exchanges such as the one discussed above, their incorporation into 
national debates over territory transformed the chhits from one among a range of 
complications in the post-Partition moment to problems of national concern. Public 
and parliamentary discussions of the meaning of these spaces—and as importantly, 
their residents—in the later 1950s began to frame the sensitivities around these spaces 
as linked to not just danger and crime but also to belonging and territory. Such a move 
played on emerging dynamics of transition from colonial to national territory and, 
importantly, from colonial subject to national citizen. (Mamdani 1996; Sherman, 
Gould, and Ansari 2010). In other words, the enclaves were transformed from spaces 
within which unruly and criminal subjects violated laws and transgressed boundaries 
to zones within which contestations over space were also framed against the discourse 
around rights and political and national membership. 
The mixing of a range of these discourses of concern can be read, for example 
in a 1953 article in the Hindusthan Times, one of the first extensive public pieces on 
the enclaves in the post-Partition era.113 
Condition of the inhabitants of these enclaves of both the States is very 
deplorable. Surrounded by a different State, these inhabitants are living like 
Robinson Crusoe in isolated islands. The only difference is that Robinson 
Crusoe has no neighbors to disturb him. Whereas these chitlanders are daily 
persecuted and harassed by neighbors of the majority community. As there is 
no power to enforce law and order (for communication difficulty) “Might is 
                                                 
113 The article also contained a comprehensive list of enclaves on either side of the border and a special 
plea from residents of Haldibari, a town in Cooch Behar, that in such an exchange, several Indian 
enclaves situated just over the border should be retained by India, as they contained a population that 
was claimed to be almost 100% Hindu. 
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right” there. For this reason, these chit lands have become dens for all sorts of 
miscreants (Reprinted in Whyte 2002: Appendix 1-24, p. 326). 
Though this article does not depict the conditions of the chhits as nationalist concerns 
per se, it does seem to illustrate a somewhat ambivalent mixing of claims about the 
enclaves and the problems that they represent. On the one hand, the conditions of its 
residents are “deplorable.” They live in isolation, like “Robinson Crusoe,” though 
presumably without a metaphorical “Man Friday.” Residents are persecuted by their 
neighbors and in need of rescue by the State. On the other hand, the enclaves are also 
“dens of miscreants:” lawless spaces of danger and crime. This double argument is 
representative of a view of the enclaves that would both characterize and complicate 
debates over exchange in the 1950s. It signaled the enclaves as an issue within which a 
number of different complex narratives about state protection were mixed and 
reframed. 
In 1953, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani Prime Minister 
Chaudhry Mohammed Ali met twice to discuss the standoff on Kashmir. While little 
progress was made on this issue, the two agreed that the enclaves should be exchanged 
as soon as possible. This “in principle” agreement proved publically contentious even 
before it was adopted as official policy. The total area that would be exchanged in an 
enclave swap gave a net advantage to Pakistan, as there were more Indian enclaves in 
East Pakistan than Pakistani enclaves in India. The popular press took up this question 
and began to put forward a range of solutions to this imbalance.114 One was that 
Patgram Thana, which had been a Hindu Majority Area at the time of Partition,115 
                                                 
114 Indeed, one of the spaces where the Patgram exchange was put forward was the Hindusthan 
Standard article mentioned above. 
115 The Radcliffe Award marked Patgram as part of East Pakistan only because the accession of Cooch 
Behar, as a Princely State, was still in question. If Cooch Behar had opted to join Pakistan, Patgram 
would have been stranded as a large enclave hemmed in to the West, North, and East by the potentially 
Pakistani district of Cooch Behar and, to the South by the Pakistani District of Rangpur. 
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should be transferred entirely to India.116 This proposal was met with enthusiasm by 
residents of Haldibari and Mekhliganj, as the central road providing access to 
Mathabhanga and Cooch Behar towns ran through Patgram thana, an area that was 
now officially cut off by the Partition boundary. This necessitated a round-about route 
to travel to other areas of Cooch Behar state. On the other hand, Muslims living in 
Patgram voiced their strong opposition to such a transfer, professing their desire to 
remain within Pakistan (Whyte 2002). 
Despite the public debate, no concrete actions were taken on enclave exchange 
until 1958. On June 4th of that year, in a somewhat cavalier statement made in his 
monthly press conference, Nehru claimed that the ongoing border disputes between 
the two countries were relatively minor and that “any two reasonable people on behalf 
of the two Governments could sit together and decide them in a day or two” (Whyte 
2002: 91). This “responsible” counterpart presented himself in Feroz Khan Noon, who 
assumed the Prime Ministership of Pakistan in December 1957. Noon had already 
moved to temper the Muslim League’s bellicose rhetoric in relation to the border 
issues in the East and appeared ready to negotiate a solution to outstanding border 
issues.117 In early September, Nehru put this theory to the test when the two heads of 
state met in Delhi to hammer out the contours of what would be known as the Nehru-
Noon Accords, provisions that aimed to address many, if not all, of the outstanding 
“minor issues.” The Accords did address a number of border problems, including the 
exchange of the enclaves, and questions around the transfer of Berubari, a disputed 
                                                 
116 Though it is not clear that, given the high density of enclaves in Patgram Thana, that such an 
exchange would not have re-balanced the territorial scales in favor of India. 
117 Noon apparently feared that the US would cut off military aid to Pakistan if a war broke out. See 
Time, 1958 (September 22), “Pakistan: Border Trade.” It is worth noting the dismissive view that this 
article takes to the enclave problem. Describing Noon’s arrival with his wife in Delhi for the 1958 talks, 
the article writes: “Nehru sprang gallantly forward to retrieve Begum Noon’s golden slipper when it fell 
as she stepped out of the plane. He escorted them to the high-domed Presidential House, and the talks 
began. The two leaders quickly worked out an agreement to trade several small enclaves along the 
disputed East Pakistan border ‘with a view to relieving tension.’”  
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area situated precariously on the border between Jalpaiguri in West Bengal and 
Dinajpur in East Pakistan. 
In a triumphant Statement to the Lok Sabha118 outlining the results of the 
Accords, Nehru offered a somewhat dismissive account of his presumably successful 
resolution of the minor problem of the chhits: 
There is one thing more, which has been long causing us, and I believe, 
Pakistan, a great deal of trouble. These are the Cooch-Behar enclaves. The 
Cooch-Behar State had little bits of territory all over, and some of those fell in 
Pakistan and some in India on partition. . . . Therefore, the result is that we 
have some territory in Pakistan, little enclaves, little islands, and they have 
some here, which is very awkward. They cannot deal with their territory inside 
India, and we cannot deal with our territory inside Pakistan. In fact, nobody 
deals with those territories. In law, we cannot, in practice, we cannot, and they 
are just odd bits, usually the home of smugglers and other fugitives from the 
law. So, it has been decided ultimately that we should just exchange them 
(Bhasin 1996: No. 660, p. 1512). 
Nehru’s remarks reduced the enclaves to administrative hassles—tiny spaces that 
could be easily dealt with by rational intervention. The repeated reference to their 
insignificant size and oddity and the use of terms like “awkward,” positions the chhits 
as inconsequential spaces in need of an easy and obvious solution. Moreover, the 
speech continued the marking of these zones as largely criminal spaces, outside of the 
bounds of national territory and in need of elimination for, if no other reason, purposes 
of law and order. However, Nehru radically underestimated not just the complexity of 
the enclave issue, but also the enclaves’ potential resonance in nationalist narratives of 
space that both reaffirmed the link between nationality and the geo-body of India and 
drew on such links to make particular oppositional claims to Nehru’s nominally 
secular Congress Party. 
Goswami (2004) charts the emergence of territorial nationalism in India in the 
lived experience of colonial state space and capitalist economy. As Goswami argues, 
                                                 
118 The “lower” or “people’s” house of Indian Parliament 
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“the materialization of colonial space in everyday landscapes made possible emergent 
popular imaginings of colonial India as a temporally dynamic and spatially bounded 
entity” (9). This landscape facilitated a particular form of territorial nativism, that at 
once allowed for a territorialization of history and a spatial delimiting of differences—
twin processes that were at the heart of anti-colonial nationalisms in India. Though 
Goswami’s analysis focuses specifically on the Colonial moment, the production of 
such territorial nationalism has informed the politics of communal and oppositional 
nationalism in post-colonial India in marked ways. One such way is the production of 
a particular nationalist view of territory that sees any question of territorial reduction 
as a physical assault on the metaphorical body of the Bharat Mata (mother India) 
(Axel 2001; Krishna 1996). Taking on board these considerations, it is no surprise that 
though the Accords effectively addressed many of the complications that Nehru had 
suggested that they might, the enclaves and Berubari proved a significantly more 
sensitive affair than Nehru had imagined. 
At the heart of the emergent controversy was an ongoing debate at both the 
local and national level over the fate of Berubari. The debate arose from an ambiguity 
in the Radcliffe Award in which a section of the Jalpaiguri-Boda boundary was, due to 
an apparent oversight, not mentioned. This left South Berubari Union No. 12, an area 
of approximately nine square miles in size, connected to Jalpaiguri district in West 
Bengal by a narrow neck no more than 500 feet in width. As early as 1948, East 
Pakistani officials had claimed that the Union should have been included in the 
Pakistan part of the award. Pakistan, from Partition, had effectively controlled the 500-
foot strip connecting Berubari to mainland India, transforming South Berubari into an 
enclave in practice if not in name. Berubari had been a constant source of debate in the 
preceding decade, resulting in repeated resolutions by border surveying teams to avoid 
demarcating the contested zone and to wait for a higher-level administrative decision 
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on the fate of the Union and its residents.119 Thus, even before the Accords, the space 
had been constructed as a zone of contention within which the definitive designation 
of territory could not be negotiated locally. Thus, surveyors had deferred a decision on 
this sensitive area to higher, though no less contentious, levels of administration. 
Though Berubari was not an enclave, Nehru’s speech had lumped the border 
dispute together with the question of enclave exchange, effectively tying the two 
issues together. Yet, from a technical standpoint, the space not only belonged to India, 
but was also geographically contiguous with it. The issue was further complicated 
because of the large and predominantly Hindu population of the 12,000 person Union, 
approximately 8,000 of whom were refugees from East Pakistan who had been 
resettled by the West Bengal State (Whyte 2002). The Accords proposed to address 
the dispute over the Union’s ownership by simply dividing Berubari Union No. 12 in 
half. This solution meant that some portion of these refugees, as well as more long-
term residents of Berubari, would either be again displaced or be deprived of their 
Indian citizenship, as the Accords had made no provision to address the change in 
citizenship status of residents of exchanged territories. 
Almost immediately following the September 10th announcement of the 
Accords, both Nehru and Noon were criticized by conservative oppositional parties 
within their own countries for having betrayed national interests and national 
sovereignty. In Pakistan, Fazlur Rahman, a Muslim League representative in 
Parliament, mounted an attack of Noon for what he claimed was a blatant attempt to 
“to hoodwink and mislead the people to hide the fact of the shameless surrender of 
Pakistan’s vital interests at the alter of Bharati [Indian] appeasement.”120 Meanwhile, 
in India, Nehru was attacked by the Hindu right for his decision on Berubari. The 
                                                 
119 CR 1B2-18/52-30 [Precise by M. Asir and S.A.A. Haider, Janury 17, 1953]. 
120 Dawn, 1958 (September 17), “Border Accord is a Betrayal of Pakistan Interests.” The Muslim 
League was a primary advocate of taking a more aggressive military stance on border issues in the East. 
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Bharatiya Jana Sangh121 claimed that the enclave exchange was part of a “policy of 
appeasement” towards Pakistan, while Hindu-right wing West Bengal Hindu 
Mahasabha122 began to advocate for an organized resistance movement to oppose the 
Berubari exchange “against Nehru’s playing with the life and property of such a large 
number of Hindus.”123 
Later that year, in a speech in the Lok Sabha attacking the Accords, then Jana 
Sangh member and future BJP leader and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee 
claimed that the Accords were not only illegal, but a betrayal of national interest and 
indeed of the rights of citizenship of Berubari residents. Lumping the debate over the 
Accords together with recent reports of cross border raids, Vajpayee lashed out at 
Nehru and at Pakistan. “Nobody, not even the Prime Minister, has the right to deprive 
any Indian citizen of his nationality and citizenship. . . . We should not accept that 
agreement.” (quoted in Chitkara 1997a: 123). By tying the question of territory 
together with citizenship, the Jana Sangh drew out one of the emerging problematics 
of sensitive space. They reframed the enclaves as not just as problematic zones filled 
with criminals and smugglers, but also as spaces within which Indian [Hindu] citizens 
precariously held on to tenuous national territory. 
The Accords proved an unpopular political stumbling block for Nehru’s 
Congress Party.124 Indeed, in the face of increasing opposition of the Accords from the 
Hindu Right and from the West Bengal Congress Government, which also opposed the 
question of exchange, Nehru was forced to qualify his earlier enthusiasm. While 
refusing to abandon the principle of the Accords, in December of 1960, Nehru 
                                                 
121 The Jana Sangh was the political arm of the Hindu Nationalist movement in India and the 
predecessor of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). It was closely ideologically affiliated with the 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). For an overview of Hindu Nationalism in India, see Jafferlot 
(2007). 
122 Also closely affiliated with the RSS. 
123 Dawn, 1958 (September 18), “Sabha Move to Resist Return of the Enclaves” 
124 For a breakdown of the different Party positions on the Berubari split, see Appadorai (1981). 
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publicly retracted his earlier unqualified enthusiasm for the Berubari split and chhit 
exchange: 
At the time I was clear in my mind that the whole agreement, including 
Berubari, in spite of certain aspects of it which were not agreeable to us, was 
profitable and advantageous to us. That is why I took that step and I remained 
with that opinion for a considerable time; and I am still of that opinion. But 
there is a “but.” I did not realise then that there is a certain human aspect of it. 
It is perfectly true. My mind was not applied to it, nor did anybody tell me 
what the population was and how many people will be affected. Somehow it 
happened. I am sorry it did not come before me and it was not put before me. 
And subsequently when this aspect has come before me, I have felt troubled in 
my mind (Bhasin 1996: No. 673, P. 1562). 
Nehru’s qualification represented its own particular kind of appeasement of an 
increasingly contentious political outlook on territory. It highlighted the stakes of not 
treating the enclaves “sensitively,” that is, both as spaces of confusion and danger and 
spaces containing symbolic value as territory peopled with citizens at the mercy of 
criminals and [Muslim] others. As a 1961 editorial in the Indian paper Vigil put it, “At 
the time of making the agreement, the human aspects and the possible political 
consequences of the proposed transfer of territory were not taken into consideration. 
Whether even after such consideration the deal might be regarded as justifiable is 
another question (Reproduced in Whyte 2002: Appendix 1-34). 
If the political appropriation of the exchange issue extended the debate over 
the Accords in India, in Pakistan, the question of approving the Accords was quashed 
when Parliament was dissolved, martial law declared, and General Ayub Khan 
installed as head of the government only a month after the signing of the Accords. 
Khan, making use of the executive privileges extended to him by martial law, simply 
ratified the Accords himself (Whyte 2002). In India, the process was much more 
complicated. Tension over the Berubari issue was only heightened with the emergence 
of the military government in Pakistan. Ongoing debate over the exchange eventually 
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led Nehru to refer the case to the Supreme Court to decide if legislative action was 
“needed” to allow the exchange. The Court agreed that the Constitution would need to 
be amended in order to legalize the Accords and, in December of 1960, accomplished 
this transformation with the Ninth Amendment.125 
Yet ultimately, Nehru’s recognition of the “human aspect” of the Berubari 
problem proved inadequate to address either national contention over the status of 
Berubari or local contention over the kind of legibility that might be acceptable to 
residents. As part of the agreement, a joint Survey team began to work in Berubari to 
survey the division. However, trouble abounded. There were disagreements within the 
Survey team on the appropriate method for demarcating the partition of Berubari 
Union. Moreover, there was vehement opposition from residents who opposed the 
split. In one incident in November of 1963, a group of residents attacked a survey 
team, throwing bricks at them and preventing them from proceeding with their work. 
The team had to be evacuated by border security forces in charge of protecting them 
(Bhasin 1996: No. 1598). Such complications continued to slow the progress of the 
demarcation, which dragged on over the next two years. Though discussions would 
continue over the division of Berubari up until 1971, the 1965 War between Pakistan 
and India effectively destroyed diplomatic will to exercise the 1958 Accords. 
Corridors to Contention 
If the Nehru-Noon Accord exposed and marked the enclaves as sensitive 
topics, the post-Liberation War disputes over exchange deepened tensions over the 
chhits and continued to embody them with a range of broader territorial anxieties. The 
Liberation War, in 1971, marked a sea change in the relationship between India and 
East Bengal. During the Liberation War, India had opened its borders to Bengali 
                                                 
125 See Bhasin (1996: No. 674, pp. 1568-1572) for complete text of the Amendment. 
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refugees fleeing both violent campaigns targeted at the Bengali population by the 
Pakistani Army and fighting between the Army and the Mukti Bahini [Liberation 
Fighters].126 This massive cross-border movement effectively, if temporarily, erased 
the contentious border (Van Schendel 2005). The mood of cooperation in the post-
Liberation War moment was further marked by India’s intervention in the war, which 
helped bring about its end in December of 1971. The transformation to Bangladesh 
also marked a critical, if again temporary, shift in the communal international 
dynamics between the two governments. Whereas previously, East Pakistan had been 
part of a religiously defined state, the movement for Bangladesh was identified with a 
linguistic and cultural Bengali nationalism. Indeed, the Constitution of Bangladesh 
defined the new state as founded on the tenets of secularism and socialism. Sheik 
Mujib’s Awami League thus came to power after the defeat of the Pakistan Army in 
December of 1971 as a political party with deep ties not just to India, but also to Indira 
Gandhi’s Congress Party.127 
Against this backdrop of cooperation, another attempt was mounted to resolve 
the ongoing debate over the chhits and to settle any outstanding issues with the border. 
In May of 1974, negotiations over resolving border issues between the two countries 
began in Delhi. The resultant Indira-Mujib Pact essentially revisited the problematic 
Nehru-Noon Accords, but with slight modifications that attempted to address the 
complications and sensitivites around the 1958 treaty. While the plan to exchange the 
majority of chhits remained in place, Bangladesh would drop its claim to South 
Berubari Union entirely. Rather than simply ceding this territory, the Pact positioned 
Berubari as a land trade that would allow Bangladesh to extend sovereign control to 
Dahagram, the largest Bangladeshi enclave in India. In the words of the treaty, “In 
                                                 
126 As Saikia (2004a) points out, Liberation War violence, particularly gender-based violence, was not 
solely committed by Pakistani soldiers against Bengali women, but was rather a broader dynamic of the 
conflict.  
127 For a history of the Liberation War and the emergence of Bangladesh, see Van Schendel (2009). 
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exchange [for Berubari] Bangladesh will retain the Dahagram and Angarpota 
enclaves. India will lease in perpetuity to Bangladesh an area of 178 x 85 meters near 
‘Tin Bigha’ to connect Dahagram with Panbari Mouza (P.S. Patgram) of Bangladesh” 
(Bhasin 1996: No. 383, p. 779). Additionally, the question of citizenship was directly 
addressed within the Pact. “The Governments of India and Bangladesh agree that 
when areas are transferred, the people in these areas shall be given the right of staying 
on where they are, as nationals of the State to which the areas are transferred” (Bhasin 
1996: No. 383, p. 780). If the Nehru-Noon Accords had appeared to take a cavalier 
attitude towards the politics of exchange, the Indira-Mujib Pact attempted to reframe 
the issue in a more equitable light. 
Despite this shift in tone and approach, the Pact proved even more contentious 
than the Nehru-Noon Accords had been. In Bangladesh, the Mujib Administration fell 
under immediate criticism for failing to address a range of pressing territorial 
questions in the Pact, notably the question of the Farakka Barage128 and water sharing 
on the Ganges—a longstanding dispute and issue of pressing concern for Bangladesh 
residents living downstream of India.129 As such, as Jacques (2000) notes, from its 
outset, the Pact was intimately linked to a range of territorial conflicts to which Indira 
and Mujib had not been able to negotiate easy solutions.130 
Yet, the central issue around the 1974 Treaty in Bangladesh was the question 
of Berubari. The Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal, or the National Socialist Party, claimed that 
                                                 
128 The Farakka Barage is a barrage across the Ganges River situated in West Bengal. Its construction 
was begun in 1960 and completed in 1974. It has been at the center of a number of debates between the 
two countries over water sharing and, further, has been linked to a range of issues related to water 
quality and public health in Bangladesh. See Jacques (2000) and Islam (1992). 
129 See Ganokantha, 1974 (May 18), “Ae Porajoyer Glani Dhakben Keamon Korey [How Will you 
Cover Up the Same of Such Defeat?]; Ittefaq, 1974 (May 18), “Jukto Ghoshonay Vashanir Protikriya 
[Vashani’s Reaction to Joint Decision].”  
130 Beyond the Farraka, these include the dispute over New Moore (South Talpatti) Island, a siltation 
island in the Bay of Bengal that emerged in 1970 and became the center of a dispute over the maritime 
boundary of the two countries and, later, Muhuri Char, a char in the Muhuri river on the border between 
Noakhali District and Tripura. See Jacques (2000). 
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the Pact transformed Bangladesh into a colony of India, ready to cede sovereign 
control and territory to the Indian government at their whim. “Neglecting the basic 
rights of his own nationals, Mujib has expressed his dictatorial attitude. Berubari was 
recognized as an integral part of Bangladesh in the Radcliffe Agreement and in the 
Nehru-Noon Accords. . . . [the handover of Berubari is a] serious attack on the 
national interest of the country [that] chopped Bangladesh’s interest with an axe.”131 
Other opponents took an even more grim view of the treaty. As an editorial in the 
Bengali daily Ganokantha put it, “Every citizen of a country expects good, friendly, 
and cooperative relations with its neighboring countries. But if that relation is to be 
achieved at the cost of your own state’s independence and sovereignty and that 
relation is one of subordination and servitude than that relation is by all means 
unwanted and unacceptable.”132 Mohammad Bhashani, a prominent left-leaning figure 
in the Language movement who had split with Mujib’s Awami League before the 
Liberation War, roundly criticized the treaty and called for a day of national prayer to 
“save the country from disaster.”133 Effectively, in the wake of an emergence from two 
colonial relationships, the question of ceding territorial sovereignty of any kind proved 
to be a problematic proposition. 
Within days of the announcement of the Pact, a writ had been filed in the 
Dhaka High Court for an injunction against the Berubari handover, claiming that the 
                                                 
131 Ganokantha, 1974 (May 19), “Shimanto Chukti o Jukto Ghoshona Proshongay JSD-er Oveemot: 
Desh ke Noya Uponibeshe Porinoto Korar Padokkhep [JSD on Border Treaty and Joint Declaration: 
Attempts to Turn the Country into a New Colony].” See also, Ganakantha, 1974 (May 19), “Noya 
Uponibesher Jaal? [Trap for a New Colonialism?];” Ganakantha, 1974 (May 25), “Dilli Chukti 
Proshongay Jatiya Shanshad Shadassya Moinuddin Mank o Sattar: E Chuktir Shorto Bangladesh-ke 
Bharat-er Chiro Podanata Korey Rakhbey [The Conditions of thie Treaty Will Make Bangladesh 
Subjugated to India Forever: MP Moinuddin Manik and Sattar on Delhi Treaty];” Ganokantha, 1974 
(19 May), “Banglar Sharther Proti Marattok Kutharaghat [Serious Attack on Bangla’s Interest].” 
132 Ganokantha, 1974 (May 22), “Bangladesh Bharat Chukti Proshongay Bidhan Shiraj-er Bibitir 
Purno Biboran [Full Details of the Statement of Bidhan-Shiraj: On India Bangladesh Treaty].” 
133 Ittefaq, 1974 (May 20), “Shat-e June Vashanir Monajaat Dibosh [Vashani’s Prayr Day in 7th June].” 
See also Ganokantha, 1974 (June 8), “Shadhinaota Sharbodhoumotto Bikie Debar Odhikar Kaoke Dea 
Hoyni: Shimanto Chukti Batiler Proshonge Bashani [Nobody Has the Right to Capitulate the 
Independence and Sovereignty of the Country: Moulana Bhashani, While Discussing the Dismissal of 
the Border Treaty].” 
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Constitution did not grant Mujib the power to sign away any part of Bangladeshi land. 
The Dhaka High Court denied the writ, but granted the right of appeal to the Supreme 
Court.134 Though the Supreme Court also dismissed the appeal as “premature,” since 
the Pact itself needed to be ratified by the Parliament, it did agree that in order for the 
transfer of Berubari to be ratified, a Constitution amendment was needed. On the 21st 
of November, a bill to make this amendment was introduced into Parliament. As 
Whyte (2002) observes, debate on the bill was unusually, and, given the resistance to 
the Pact in the popular press, surprisingly short. Though discussion closely mirrored 
the debate in the Indian Parliament over the Nehru-Noon Accords—including the 
question of rights for residents of Berubari and a complaint about the lack of available 
maps for members to understand the actual terms of the exchange—the bill ultimately 
passed by an overwhelming majority after just four and a half hours of deliberation 
(Whyte 2002).135 
If the debate over the exchange of Berubari in Bangladesh was heated yet 
relatively brief, the controversy over the Tin Bigha Corridor in India became much 
more protracted, this fraught issue highlighting the sensitive tension between security 
and belonging that would drag out for the next 18 years. Initially, the Pact appears to 
have been greeted with a comparative amount of warmth. As an editorial in 
Anandobajar Patrika, a Calcutta daily, observed, “The border demarcation treaty will 
end a long drawn out dispute, which could not be resolved during Pakistan period for 
the cunningness of Islamabad. That era of cunning diplomacy is over and now it will 
be easier to resolve the issues.”136 Yet, any concrete moves to either transfer the 
                                                 
134 Ittefaq, 1974 (May 21), “Berubari Shongkranto Reet Aebondon Nakoch: Apeeler Onumoti Daan 
[Writ Petition on Berubari Dismissed: Appeal Approved];” Shangbad, 1975 (May 21) “Berubari 
Shomporke Injunction Aabedon Supreme Court-ey Utthapito [Berubari Injunction Appeal Placed 
Before Supreme Court]; Ganokantha, 1974 (May 30), “Berubari Mamlar Churanto Shunanir Din 14-ey 
June [The Final Hearing Date of the Berubari Case is on the 14th of June].”  
135 See Butalia (2003) for a brief look at the present conditions of Berubari. 
136 Anandobajar Patrika, 1974 (May 18), “Sahojogitar Pratishruti [Promises of Cooperation].” 
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enclaves or to establish the Tin Bigha Corridor as a transit-way for residents of 
Dahagram were delayed by broader political transformations in both India and 
Bangladesh. In 1975, at the urging of the West Bengal Chief Minister Siddharth 
Sankar Ray, Indira Gandhi declared a State of Emergency in India to halt widespread 
protests against Congress over, among other things, alleged fraud in the 1971 
elections. The Emergency, which in Gandhi’s famous words “brought Democracy to a 
grinding halt,” lasted for 21 months.137 Following the lifting of the Emergency in 
1977, Gandhi’s Congress party was defeated by the coalition Janata Party and Morarji 
Desai assumed the Prime Ministership. In Bangladesh, shortly after the Emergency 
was declared in India, Sheikh Mujib was assassinated in a military coup. Following a 
period of confusion, Major General Zia Rahman assumed power as Chief Martial Law 
Administrator in 1976 and, in 1977, as President. Zia’s administration marked a move 
away from a secular administration and a subsequent decline in relations between the 
two governments.138 
While the Berubari issue had been resolved in 1974, the leasing of the Corridor 
remained both politically and legally problematic and unresolved in India.139 This, 
effectively, meant that the Government of India was in violation of the terms of the 
Indira-Mujib Pact. In 1978 in response to continued prompting by the Zia government, 
the question of negotiating the terms of the perpetual lease were raised in the Lok 
Sabha. In response, Amar Roy Pradhan, a member of parliament from West Bengal, 
claimed that the lease undermined Indian sovereignty and placed residents of 
Mekhliganj at risk. “This type of gift of Tinbigha to Bangladesh must be stopped at all 
                                                 
137 For an account of the Emergency that focuses on the experience of living through it, see Tarlo 
(2003). For a study of Gandhi’s political trajectory highlighting both her roles in the Bangladesh crisis 
and the Energency, see Dhar (2001). 
138 On April 22, 1977, Zia pushed through a martial law ordinance to amend the official principles of 
the Bangladesh state by removing “socialism” and “secularism” from the Constitution and substituting 
them for “economic and social justice” and “trust and faith in Almighty Allah” (Anisuzzaman 2001). 
139 For a full description of the legal battle in India over the Corridor, see Whyte (2002). 
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costs. Certainly, we want friendship with Bangladesh, but not at the cost of our 
motherland. No more appeasement. No more surrenders. No more cessation of our 
motherland” (quoted in Jacques 2000: 45). Of particular concern for Pradhan was the 
question of what would happen to Kuchilbari, a town within Mekhliganj Thana, if 
sovereignty over the Tin Bigha was ceded to Bangladesh. Kuchlibari was situated to 
the South East of the proposed site of the Corridor and was surrounded to the North 
and East by Bangladesh, to the South by the Tista river, and to the West by Dahagram 
(see Figure 10). The only legal access to the rest of Mekhliganj, and India, was via the 
Tin Bigha Corridor. Residents of Kuchlibari feared that if the Corridor fell under 
sovereign control of Bangladesh, that Kuchlibari itself, an area with a population of 
35,000, would, effectively, become an enclave (see Chapter 3).140 
The question of Kuchlibari was to prove divisive both in the central 
government and in West Bengal. Two organizations, the Tin Bigha Shangram Shomiti 
(Tin Bigha Movement Committee)141 and the Kuchlibari Shangram Shomiti 
(Kuchlibari Movement Committee), were formed to oppose the transfer. These groups 
were comprised of both residents of Kuchlibari and local politicians including 
members of both West Bengal’s Left Front government and the Hindu Nationalist 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Notable among these supports were Kamal Guha, a 
member of the West Bengal Legislative Assembly and Pradhan, who championed the 
cause of the TBSS and the KSS in the Lok Sabha throughout the 1980s. 
                                                 
140 The exact population of Kuchlibari appeared to be a fairly plastic number. While Roy initially 
claimed that 35,000 Indian citizens were living there, he later revised the number upward to 40,000. 
The BJP adopted a higher number of 50,000 (presumably) Hindu residents in their campaign to block 
the opening of the Corridor (Whyte 2002: Appendix 1-45) 
141 Shongram might be better transferred as “struggle” or even “national struggle.” I use “movement” 
here in the sense of social movement or organization of a group of individuals for collective action. 
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Figure 10: Detail of Kuchlibari, Mekhliganj, India142 
In 1981, as a step towards resolving the question of Dahagram and pushing for 
implementation of the 1974 Treaty, the Government of Bangladesh attempted to 
conduct a census in Dahagram. Terms of passage through Indian territory were 
negotiated for census workers, but following the implementation of the census, the 
KSS organized a blockade of the enclave, cutting it off from access to both Indian 
markets in Mekhliganj and Bangladeshi markets in Patgram. The Bangladesh 
Observer reported that supplies of food and medicine in the enclave were scarce and 
that several residents had died from starvation and lack of medical care. It further 
reported that Indian authorities had refused Government of Bangladesh requests to 
                                                 
142 Map by Brendan Whyte. 
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deliver emergency aid to the enclave. “Equipped with guns, arrows, lathis and hand 
bombs, the Indian nationals are patrolling around these enclaves, preventing helpless 
Bangladeshi nationals of Dahagram and Angarpota to come out and enter Bangladesh 
main soil to purchase essential commodities” (Bangladesh Observer (August 9) 1981, 
quoted in Bhasin 1996: 808).143 The blockade was widely reported in the Bangladesh 
press as a sign of the betrayal of Bangladesh’s goodwill in expediting the Berubari 
decision and as a blatant violation of the rights of Bangladeshi citizens living within 
the enclave. Such violations confirmed popular sentiment about India’s territorial 
colonialism and flagged the question of enclave exchange as both symbolic and 
symptomatic of India’s willingness to discount Bangladeshi lives and the rights of the 
Government of Bangladesh to protect them. As the Bangladesh Times wrote: 
The will of eight thousand people144 in the border enclaves of Dahagram and 
Angarpota to live as Bangladeshis on the strength of the Indo-Bangladesh Land 
Boundary Agreement of 1974 seems resisted by a strong siege of armed Indian 
nationals and a thicket of BSF vigil to go with it. Thus an inherent and a 
legally vested right of a population and its natural custodian, the State of 
Bangladesh is going ignored” (Bangladesh Times (August 12th) 1981, quoted 
in Bhasin 1996: 808). 
As conditions in the enclave continued to worsen, the TBSS announced that it would 
accept the Tin Bigha Lease agreement under the condition that sovereignty and 
jurisdiction over the Corridor was maintained by India, Bangladeshis passing through 
be required to carry photo identification, and no members of the Bangladesh police or 
military would be allowed to pass though.145 In other words, the TBSS would only 
                                                 
143 A Red Cross team was eventually allowed access to Dahagram, though they were refused passage 
through the Tin Bigha Corridor and instead had to take a more circuitous route into the enclave via 
Changribandha (Bhasin 1996: No. 407). 
144 It should be noted that the population figures of Dahagram were as plastic as those of Kuchlibari. 
145 The blockade of the enclave also provided the impetus for residents of Dahagram to found their own 
resistance movement to advocate for the opening of the Corridor, the Dahagram Shangram Shomitti 
(see Chapter 3).  
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accept the Corridor under conditions of limited control for Bangladesh officials not 
just in the Corridor, but in Dahagram itself. 
The media coverage of the blockade in Bangladesh raised concerns in the Lok 
Sabha about their overall impact on India-Bangladesh relations. In a heated debate on 
August 20th, Pradhan dismissed concerns over the census, suggesting that the suffering 
of residents of Dahagram was inconsequential compared to the suffering of over 
100,000 Indian citizens living in Indian enclaves inside of Bangladesh. In Pradhan’s 
words, “in Bangladesh, they are living under sub-human conditions—no 
administration, no police, no chowkidar [guards], no panchayats [political 
representation in local government], no voting, nothing of the sort. It is a matter of 
grave regret” (Bhasin 1996: No. 406, p. 804). Another MP, claimed that the 
Bangladeshi press was capitalizing on the blockade to stir communal tensions. “In 
Bangladesh, recently this Dahagram issue has been magnified in their press for anti-
Indian propaganda. It has been alleged in Bangladesh press that Dahagram has been 
surrounded on all sides by the Indians and they cannot even call for medical aid i.e., 
call for doctors and so on, and there has been death of certain number of people” 
(Bhasin 1996: No. 406, pp. 806-807). The actions of the KSS, the debate over the 
blockade in the Bangladesh press and the Indian Parliament, and the subsequent 
formation of organized opposition to the KSS within Dahagram (see Chapter 3) all 
indexed the enclave to broader concerns in the relationship between India and 
Bangladesh. These included the rights of citizens (of both states) at the border, the 
sovereign control of space, and the violent actions of, or sanctioned by, the opposing 
state on the bodies and livelihoods of those on the bleeding edge of territory. It further 
associated the Dahagram issue with the unfinished processes of Partitioning Bengal, 
the stakes involved in the marking of national space, and the communal politics of 
movement. 
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In September, after more than a month, the blockade ended and in November 
of 1981, representatives of the two governments resumed talks over the 
implementation of the Pact. Concluding the talks, the foreign secretaries announced 
that there was no barrier to outlining the terms of the lease and that the Tin Bigha 
Corridor would be implemented as soon as India ratified the 1974 Treaty. In October 
of 1982, the terms of the lease were finalized. In principle, these terms mapped to the 
broad outlines of the Pact, though with several important differences. First, the 
Corridor would be controlled by the Indian BSF and full sovereignty of the Corridor 
retained by India. Citizens of India would be allowed to pass through the space 
occupied by Tin Bigha Corridor (running across, rather than through it) at will. 
Bangladeshi citizens, including police, military, and paramilitary personnel would be 
allowed to pass through the Corridor, moving from Panbari to Dahagram and vice 
versa. The lease further noted that both countries would have the right to run power 
lines through the Corridor as needed (Bhasin 1996: No. 414). 
Despite the agreement on the Tin Bigha lease, no concrete action was made on 
implementing the lease throughout the 1980s. As both the TBSS and the KSS worked 
in India to advocate for the blocking of the handover and the DSS worked to facilitate 
it in Bangladesh, the enclave became a site of intermittent blockades and constant 
harassment of residents (for more on Dahagram in the 1980s, see Chapter 3). A series 
of court cases challenging the legality of the lease filed both in the Calcutta High 
Court and in Delhi were dismissed. Despite the supposed clearing of these hurtles, 
there was no move to actually implement the lease agreement or to ratify the Pact. The 
reticence on the part of the Indian government to implement the treaty began to be 
seen as a lack of good faith in the agreement by Bangladeshi government officials, 
prompting several to publically proclaim the ceding of Berubari as a mistake (Bhasin 
1996: No. 436). As the New Nation, an English language Daily in Bangladesh, put it: 
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“This baffling shilly-shally unfortunately characterizes not only the Tin Bigha 
agreement, but also other issues like those of sharing of Ganges water and South 
Talpatty, all of which look like a game between two partners where one partner is 
violating the rule of the game at will” (Bhasin 1996: 816). 
The reasons for the ongoing delay in implementing the lease were not solely 
linked to the local activism of groups like the TBSS and the KSS or the advocacy of 
politicians like Pradhan. The issue itself was caught up in conservative shifts in both 
countries. In Bangladesh, General Hussain Muhammad Ershad came to power 
following the assassination of Zia in 1981. Ershad, whose controversial tenure as head 
of the Bangladesh government lasted until 1991, radically curbed democratic liberties 
and persistently blocked efforts to overturn military rule and restore Parliamentary 
Democracy within Bangladesh. Further, his regime continued the move initiated by 
Zia away from secular Bengali nationalism and towards a more overtly Islamist 
Bangladeshi state. Against this backdrop, the political relationship between India and 
Bangladesh remained strained. This relationship was further stressed by the 
increasingly virulent rhetoric of the BJP in India against the threat of illegal 
immigration from Bangladeshi Muslims and pressuring of the Congress Party to take 
action against it by, among other things, fencing the border (Van Schendel 2005).146 
Indeed, the sensitivity of the issue of the Tin Bigha Corridor was effectively 
increased by both Ershad and the BJP championing the cause. Ershad hailed from 
Rangpur and was notoriously sympathetic to the needs of North Bengal. In particular, 
the Tin Bigha Corridor gave him an issue to both pressure the government of India 
with and to stir up nationalist sentiments over territorial aggression by an unfriendly 
neighbor. Ershad and several of his chief ministers visited Dahagram by helicopter 
                                                 
146 On BJP rhetoric over “infiltration” from Bangladesh, see Gillan (2002) and Ramachandran (1999). 
For details of the debate over fencing beginning in 1983 between India and Bangladesh, see Bhasin 
(1996: No. 435, and No. 437). 
127 
several times in the late 1980s, much to the consternation of Government of India 
officials, and used the visits to publically call for the handover of the Tin Bigha and a 
fulfillment of India’s side of the Indira-Mujib Pact. Ershad began to propose a series 
of seemingly reasonable alternatives to the Corridor, such as the construction of a 
flyover bridge that would allow the passage of Bangladeshis to their home country 
without ever having to touch Indian soil. Such proposals, despite the likely 
impracticality of their implementation, highlighted the Government of India as an 
uncooperative partner in fulfilling the ’74 Pact. In a visit to Dahagram in 1986, Home 
Minister Mahamadul Hasan publically lamented the breakdown in India-Bangladesh 
relations, recalling that even during the Pakistan period, there had been a police 
outpost in the enclave, an arrangement that claimed would be impossible now (Bhasin 
1996: No. 439). Such claims, tinged with regret, highlighted the move away from 
cooperation and retrenchment of communal politics within the Indian Government. 
In India, the BJP enthusiastically adopted the cause of the KSS and TBSS. 
Claiming to defend a country marred by Partition and betrayed by its political leaders, 
the BJP began to use the Tin Bigha issue as a whip to beat both Congress and West 
Bengal’s left-front government.147 As a pamphlet published in 1992, mirroring much 
of the rhetoric deployed in public and in the Lok Sabha, claimed: 
BJP . . . [was] not there in 1947 to resist that evil design, but today, in 1992, 
things have changed. Today we, the general people, refuse to be a mute party 
to the sinister design of transferring Tinbigha Corridor to Bangladesh by Roa 
Govt.—Jyoti Basu combined. . . .148 Power or no power, India is one, its 
people are one, and will remain so in future too. So we appeal to all the 
Indians, all its valiant fighters for national integrity . . . to stand up, face the 
situation squarely and remove the danger of 50,000 people of Kuchlibari 
                                                 
147 Indeed, the BJP deployed the Tin Bigha issue as a way to increase its presence and power in West 
Bengal. See Frontline, 1992 (July 17), “To Build Bridges: Positive Turn in Indo-Bangladesh Ties” by 
SD Muno. For a discussion of the ways in which the BJP used rhetoric over the sundering of national 
territory throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, see Krishna (1996). 
148 The political reference here is to the Narasima Roa led Congress Party Government and the Jyoti 
Basu led CPI(M) government in West Bengal. 
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becoming Refugees at some point of time in future. Spoil the politically 
manipulative designs of Delhi and Writers,’ show solidarity with the other 
suffering brethren to honour the blood and culture we have all inherited.149 
Refrain from assisting in any way the transfer of Tinbigha at all cost (“Save 
Tin Bigha, Save Kuchlibari,” a BJP pamphlet, in Whyte 2002: Appendix 1-45). 
BJP position seems to cover up the fact that the terms of the lease very clearly dictate 
that sovereignty over the Corridor would be maintained by the BSF and that residents 
of Kuchlibari would have free and clear passage through it. In doing so, it reframed 
the question of the Corridor as one of nationalist failure in the past—the betrayal of 
the nation at Partition—and a future threat to Indian citizens—through the implication 
that Bangladesh would, at some point in the future, assume sovereign control of the 
Corridor. Indeed, reports in the Indian press suggested that the BJP was, in fact, 
actively encouraging a misapprehension of who would maintain sovereign control of 
the Corridor locally within Kuchlibari by conjuring images of a renewed Partition 
displacement. As an article in Frontline reported: 
‘I came to Kuchlibari from East Pakistan in 1951 leaving all I had. I will 
become a refugee for the second time. I do not know where I will settle now,’ 
said 65-year old Basanta Roy of Kuchlibari. Roy seemed to have been taken in 
by the view of the BJP leader, Mahant Avaidyanath, MP, who told Frontline 
that ‘a conspiracy hatched by the Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Roa, and the 
West Bengal Chief Minister, Jyoti Basu, is rendering the people of Kuchlibari 
refugees for the second time.150 
The moves of both Ershad and the BJP are best interpreted as capitalizing more 
on the deployment of Tin Bigha as a sensitive issue for political gain, than as a 
commitment to the welfare either of residents of Kuchlibari or Dahagram. Yet, the 
ways that these discourses are deployed also map to immediately recognizable 
rhetorical structures within India and Bangladesh. The Ershad administration 
                                                 
149 “Writers” refers to the Writers Building in Kolkata, the secretariat building of the State Government 
of Bengal. 
150 Frontline, 1992 (July 17), “The Tin Bigha Link: A New Lease of Friendship,” by Kalyan Chaudhuri 
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positioned Dahagram as a question of an uncooperative, recalcitrant India, a 
territorially greedy neighbor unwilling to make reasonable compromise. The rhetoric 
of the BJP, on the other hand, marks the enclave as part of the ongoing narrative of 
Partition, a question of the erosion of national space, and an ongoing corruption and 
betrayal of the nation by those who refuse to protect [her] territorial integrity. 
The Tin Bigha Corridor would continue to become—and be deployed as—a 
sensitive issue throughout the early 1990s as diplomatic talks moved closer to 
implementation. With the ousting of the Ershad government in 1990 through massive 
campaigns of popular protest and the restoration of democracy in Bangladesh, there 
was an easing of tension between the two countries. In this new and equally temporary 
mood of cooperation, plans were pushed through to open the Corridor. On March 26th, 
the Foreign Ministry in India announced that the transfer would take place three 
months later, on June 26th. Explaining the agreement in the Lok Sabha, the Minister 
for External Affairs observed, “Given time and goodwill, the Tin Bigha corrior which 
unfortunately generated much controversy and tension in the past will turn into a 
crossroad of friendship between India and Bangladesh.” In response, an unnamed 
parliamentary member said, “Sir, with great respect I want to say that the hon. 
Minister has betrayed the people of West Bengal and the West Bengal people will 
never accept it” (Bhasin 1996: No. 449, p. 935-936). 
Tension continued to build around the opening of the Corridor up until its 
implementation. The BJP announced its intention to train a “suicide squad” to prevent 
the opening of the Corridor and made a number of public pronouncements that 
members were willing to lay down their lives to protect the motherland.151 The 
Corridor continued to cause rifts in West Bengal politics as well. Kamal Guha, after 
repeated frustrations with Jyoti Basu’s CPM(I) government’s unwillingness to take a 
                                                 
151 Frontline, 1992 (July 17), “The Tin Bigha Link: A New Lease of Friendship,” by Kalyan Chaudhuri 
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firmer stand on Tin Bigha split the Forward Bloc party from the coalition Left Front 
government. “Alleging that Basu and the Center were surrendering India’s sovereignty 
to Bangladesh, he rallied the people of Tin Bigha to lead a determined movement 
against the Left Front government of West Bengal. This embarrassed Basu greatly, 
especially since the Forward Bloc was a constituent of the ruling left coalition” 
(Sunday (28 June-4 July) 1992, “Acres of Contention”).152 In the days leading up to 
the opening of the Corridor, Guha was preemptively arrested to prevent him leading 
any protests that would further deepen this embarrassment.153 Meanwhile, the KSS 
and TBSS continued to step up their efforts to block the Corridor opening through a 
series of protests and renewed blockades of Dahagram.154 In the days leading up to the 
opening, the BJP and the KSS began to circulate claims that a number of residents of 
Kuchlibari had been beaten by police and that supplies to the area had been cut off to 
force residents to flee.155 Whether or not this claim is true, it does appear that a 
number of residents of Kuchlibari fled the area for the opening of the Corridor in the 
26th, expecting violence and trouble.156 
                                                 
152 See also: Ittefaq, 1991 (September 28), “Tin Bigha Corridor Hostantore Forward Blocker Tibro 
Apotti [Strong Objection by Forward Block in Handing over the Tin Bigha Corridor];” and Ittefaq, 1991 
(October 10), “Tin Bigha Hostantor Protihoto Korar Oshubho Tot Porota [Ominous Adroitness To 
Protest Tin Bigha Handover];” and Dainik Bangla, 1992 (June 26), “Ora Kaeno Emon Korlen? [Why 
did they do so?].” 
153 Frontline, 1992 (July 17), “The Tin Bigha Link: A New Lease of Friendship,” by Kalyan Chaudhuri. 
154 Ittefaq, 1991 (October 27), “Shoshostro Bharotioder Kora Nojordarite Dahagram Angorpota 
Bashira Oboruddho [The People of Dahagram Angorpota Are Imprisoned by the Strong Observation of 
Armed Force in India].”  
155 Indeed, the BJP began to allege that members of the CPM(I) were disguising themselves as police 
and terrorizing residents of Kuchlibari. See, Sunday, 1992 (June 28-July 4), “Acres of Contention.” 
156 Frontline, 1992 (July 17), “The Tin Bigha Link: A New Lease of Friendship,” by Kalyan Chaudhuri. 
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The transfer marked an end to the issue’s prominence in national politics, though 
debates over the Corridor, notably over its hours of operation and the allowance of 
electric lines through the Corridor, continue.160 As with the Nehru-Noon Accords, 
however, though action was finally taken to resolve the central concerns, no concrete 
steps were taken to actually transfer the remaining enclaves. 
The Grammar of Sensitivity and the Calculus of Exchange 
If the debate over the chhits was a prominent part of the discourse over the 
border before 1992, their presence in such debates in the post-1992 period is much 
more intermittent. This is not to say that they have disappeared from public discussion. 
There continue to be ongoing negotiations over their full exchange and periodic 
alarms over their presence. Perhaps most significantly, the enclaves re-emerged as 
critical sites of concern in connection with a large-scale border clash between India 
and Bangladesh in 2001, in which an Indian enclave held in adverse possession in 
Bangladesh became the site of a battle in which fifteen BSF jawans were killed.161 
                                                 
160 The BSF did not agree to allow power through the Corridor until 2009. 
161 During this incident, the BDR occupied a section of the border known as Pyrdiwah on the 
Sylhet/Meghalaya border. Pyrdiwah had, disputably, originally been part of East Pakistan following 
Partition, but had become an Indian military outpost during the Liberation War in 1971. Since the 
Liberation War, Pyrdiwah continued to be held in adverse possession by India. On April 15th, for 
reasons that remain unclear, the BDR “reclaimed” Pyrdiwah, occupying it with, reportedly, 1000 
jawans and surrounding the BSF camp. In retaliation, on April 18th the BSF mounted an offensive to 
capture a BDR outpost in Roumari (the area is known as Boraibari in India), an Indian enclave held in 
adverse possession by Bangladesh in Kurigram district. The BDR outpost was notified by local 
residents who saw the BSF force transgressing the border and was prepared for their attack. Though 
there remain conflicting reports of what actually happened, 16 BSF jawans were killed in the 
subsequent attack. Their bodies were returned, mutilated, to Indian officials several days later. The 
incident proved to be the most significant border violence between the two countries since before the 
Liberation War, sparking troop build-up along the border, accusations and bellicose threats in the 
popular press, and a breakdown in India-Bangladesh relations. See India Today, 2001 (May 7), 
“Bordering Truth.” See also Van Schendel (2005) and Banerjee (2001).Though the majority of the 
debate over the Roumari incident was framed as a discussion of the politics of BDR/BSF exchanges in 
the borderland, the incident did raise the question of the enclaves to brief public prominence once again 
(C.f., Frontline, 2001 (April 28-May 11), “Disturbed Border.”). One of the outcomes of this incident 
was the creation of a Joint Border Working Group that would meet regularly to begin to address 
outstanding issues, the enclaves among them, between the two countries (BBC, 2006 (June 13), 
“Progress in Bangladesh Border Talks”). This working group has proved singularly ineffective in 
addressing issues related to enclave exchange. 
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Yet, by-and-large, these spaces have been characterized less by being a central focus 
of concern, than by being opportunistically deployed as signifiers within broader 
conflicts and negotiations over a range of tensions between the two countries. It is to 
this discursive deployment, what might be called a “grammar” of sensitivity, that I 
would like to briefly turn to in the concluding part of this chapter. What is key to note 
about such deployments is that they emerge specifically out of the enclaves’ historical 
constructions as particular kinds of problematic space. 
This periodic emergence of the enclaves in contemporary debates draws on the 
same themes and arguments that became linked to the enclaves in their pre-1992 
history. The enclaves are cited as reminders of such tensions—as signifiers of both 
danger and belonging. In other words, if the debate over exchange of the enclaves 
before the opening of the Corridor constructed them as sensitive—spaces that contain 
and signify a broader range of concerns over national survival and territory—the ways 
that the enclaves are often deployed in the post-Corridor moment are as shorthand 
connections to these broader issues. My argument here is not that only once the 
enclaves were made into sensitive space that they were available to be deployed as 
such. Rather such deployments are part of the ongoing construction of the enclaves’ 
sensitivity. The central trope of this grammar of sensitivity remains the tension 
between visions of the enclaves as spaces of concern, crime, and danger and as spaces 
where beleaguered citizens continue to suffer for territory and belonging within the 
nation. 
The politics of the border since the restoration of democracy in Bangladesh in 
1991 have been overdetermined by several key and linked issues—illegal migration; 
crime, terrorism, and violence at the border; and the border fence constructed by India 
to block illicit movement from Bangladesh.162 The rhetoric over illegal migration from 
                                                 
162 This is not to say that these are the only issues structuring India-Bangladesh relations, but rather to 
say that they dominate discussions and debates involving territorial boundaries. 
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Bangladesh has led to a series of recent conflicts and tensions over belonging between 
the two countries. Most notably, in September of 1992—not coincidentally, shortly 
after the opening of the Corridor163—Congress mounted a large-scale operation to 
deport illegal Bangladeshi migrants. In this initiative, known as “Operation 
Pushback,” Muslim Bengalis from slums in Delhi and Calcutta were rounded up and 
taken to the border, where they were ceremonially tonsured by the BSF. When the 
BSF tried to force them across the border, the BDR halted the detainees movement at 
the Benapole border crossing, questioning whether they were, in fact, Bangladeshi 
(Ramachandran 2002).164 The BDR’s actions were consistent with a longstanding 
claim of the Bangladesh Government that there was no illegal migration from 
Bangladesh into India—a claim in seeming denial of overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary (Ramachandran 1999; Samaddar 1999). Since part of the roundup of these 
alleged migrants was predicated on their lack of documentation, there was no formal 
way to prove that they were Bangladeshis. While officials debated the migrants’ fate, 
they were, effectively trapped in a veritable “no mans land” at the border. Despite its 
overwhelming failure both from the standpoint of deportation and public relations 
(Ramachandran 1999), the Government of India launched a series of similar 
operations throughout the 1990s and 2000s, often resulting in impromptu refugee 
camps set up on the border with deportees trapped between the BSF on one side and 
the BDR on the other.165 
                                                 
163 The Operation’s timing suggests that it may have been a reasonable response to BJP rhetoric around 
the opening of the Corridor and ongoing (since the 1980s) criticism of the Congress Party for their weak 
stance on illegal immigration from Bangladesh. Suggestive though this timing appears, I have not found 
any concrete discussions linking the two events, nor have I seen them linked in other writing. 
164 Ramachandran writes: “Foreign Minister Mustafizur Rahman clarified: ‘We will not accept [the 
deportees] unless the Indian authorities provide documents that they are our citizens.’ Still, Khaleda 
Zia, then Bangladesh’s Prime Minister, added to this controversial posture with the stark proclamation: 
“They are not our headache since they are not Bangladeshis”(2002: 323). For a critique of the notion of 
“Indian Citizenship” in light of Operation Pushback, see Sen (2003). 
165 For coverage of several instance of such “push-backs” see: Shangbad, 1998 (November 14), “Bharat 
Ar Push In Korbe Na [India will Stop Push-In];” Bangla Bazar, 1999 (September 6), “Shimanter 12 ti 
Poin e Push In-er Procheshta [Attempt of Push in at 12 Ponts of the Border];” Drishtipat, 2003, 
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Connected to such projects of stemming migration have been an ongoing series 
of violent attempts at halting smuggling in the borderland resulting in regular killings 
of border residents by the BSF. According to Odikhar, a human rights group based in 
Bangladesh, between 2000 and 2005, more than four hundred Bangladeshis were 
killed by the BSF (Jones 2009a).166 As Jones observes, the frequency of the killings, 
the lack of accountability for Border Security Forces in such deaths, and the banality 
with which these incidents are reported in papers on both sides of the border has 
served to normalize such incidents in the borderland. As this quotidian violence marks 
the border as an unstable and violent space, it also reinforces rhetoric around questions 
of cross-border smuggling, arms trading, and terrorism. 
Concerns of illegal migration and cross border crime coalesced in the 
construction and completion of a barbed-wire fence around the Bangladesh border in 
2007. The fence has served as a political irritant in the relationship between the two 
countries since its was proposed by the BJP in the mid-1980s (Van Schendel 2005).167 
Yet, not surprisingly, it has been singularly unsuccessful in stemming cross border 
movement of people and goods. As Wendy Brown argues of such projects, “If walls 
do not actually accomplish the interdiction fueling and legitimating them, if they 
perversely institutionalize the contested and degraded status of the boundaries they 
limn, they nevertheless stage both sovereign jurisdiction and an aura of sovereign 
power and awe” (2010: 26). In Bangladesh, such a display reaffirms as it irritates a 
history of viewing India as a colonial power, particularly in relation to the border. 
However, the construction of the fence also raised a range of further questions, beyond 
stagings of sovereignty, about the meaning of territory, borders, and the relationship 
                                                                                                                                            
“Stranded Beaings of No Man’s Land;” Prothom Alo, 2003 (January 26), “BSF er Abar Push In 
Procheshta: Khola Akasher Niche Shoto Shoto Banglabhashi [Attempt to Push-In Again: Hundreds of 
Bengali Speaking People Under the Open Sky].”  
166 Which is not to say that the BDR is not also complicit in cross-border killings, though an 
overwhelming number of killings are attributed to the BSF. 
167 For a complete discussion, see Kabir (2005). 
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between the two countries. Among the issues emerging from the fence’s construction 
was the stranding of a number of Indian villages on its “wrong side.” Due to 
international law, the fence could not be constructed within 150 yards of the border. 
This left a series of Indian villages situated directly on the border cut off from the rest 
of India.168 Though erected under a steady rhetoric of protection—the stemming of 
crime, cross-border terrorism, and the incursion of illegal migrants—the fence itself 
also appeared to sacrifice a number of Indian citizens in the name of vaguely defined 
threats emanating from Bangladesh. In other words, the wall emphasized the rhetorical 
nature of urgent claims to protect Indian citizenship at the border that were central to 
discussions over the Tin Bigha. As such, it underscored the claimed transformation of 
border residents from subjects to citizens in the postcolonial moment as little more 
than that—claims. 
What is notable about the enclaves in relation to these issues is not their direct 
connection, but rather their resonances within these debates. The enclaves themselves 
summon a range of similar problematics—those of being stranded at the border; of 
being hemmed by communal violence; of crime, smuggling, and instability. In a 
number of discussions of issues such as the fence, the enclaves do emerge as 
additional “problems” and contradictions of border management.169 Yet, more than 
their direct links, they are symbolically indexed to discussions over the formation and 
regulation of territory. They are easily recognizable problems within these broader 
frames—sensitive spaces that highlight and accentuate (make sensitive) a range of 
dimensions of the ongoing project of making the Bengal border. Within such frames, 
the enclaves seem able to contain a range of contradictory arguments and assertions—
claims that are often in no way anchored to concrete realities within them. 
                                                 
168 See also Time, 2009 (February 5), “A Great Divide,” by Thottam and Pandihar. 
169 C.f., Jamwal (2004), Kabir (2005), Ahmed(2007), Godbo (2001). 
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Perhaps most persistently, the enclaves emerge as reminders of partial, 
unfulfilled, and blocked claims to citizenship and belonging within their states. Even a 
survey of the titles of pieces covering the chhits in the popular press in both 
countries—for example, “Captivity of the People of Dahagram Angorpota is Still 
Prevailing,” “Freedom Eludes Enclaves Along Bangla Border,” “Annihilation 
[Tandab] Made by BSF in the Enclaves,” and “The Nowhere People”—suggests the 
ways in which the enclaves’ sensitivity is intimately tied to their representation as 
national spaces outside of the bounds of state protection.170 Much of this discussion is 
cast as a question of human rights. For example, a Purnima article from 2004 states: 
“People living inside these 50 enclaves are all Bangladeshi citizens. But still they are 
dependent on another state. They are deprived of most basic human rights and almost 
all civil rights. Their human security is by no means comparable to that of the rest of 
the country.”171 If the question of enclave residents’ rights is posed as a problem of 
citizenship, it is also often framed as a question of risk—a claim that because their 
home states have been unable to actualize residents’ rights they are at risk of being lost 
to their bounding states. For example, The Statesman, in 2003, reported Mukulesh 
Sanyal, a leader of the Forward Bloc in West Bengal, pushing for enclave exchange as 
saying, 
Not once have these enclave residents known the charm of celebrating 
Independence Day. The fruits of our freedom have so far eluded them. . . . 
Many children of these enclaves attend schools in Bangladesh and follow the 
Bangladesh curriculum. They are not even aware of the importance of 15 
August [India’s Independence Day].”172 
                                                 
170 Ittefaq, 1999 (June 26),” Dahagram Angorpota Bonditto Ghocheni [Captivity of the People of 
Dahagram Angorpota is Still Prevailing];” The Statesman, 2003 (August 14), “Freedom Eludes 
Enclaves Along Bangla Border;” The Daily Inquilab, 2004 (December 17), “Chhitmahal-e BSFer 
Tandab [Annihilation Made by BSF in the Enclaves];” Frontline, 2002 (June 8-June 21), “The 
Nowhere People.”  
171 Purnima, 2004 (August 12), “Fifteen Thousand Dwellers of Dahagram-Angorpota.” 
172 The Statesman, 2003 (August 14), “Freedom Eludes Enclaves Along Bangla Border.” 
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Interestingly, the question of citizenship here is one of choice and failed obligation. 
Because India has been unable to provide appropriate rights of citizenship, these 
residents have never known the joy of celebrating their country’s independence day. 
Yet more importantly, these residents are in danger of exercising their “choice” to join 
Bangladesh, to effectively abandon the nation that has abandoned them.173 
Such a position, of course, also frames the discussion of enclave residents’ 
rights through a particular nationalist lens. The important issue is not whether 
residents of these spaces have or do not have rights as citizens, the question is which 
state will provide these to them. Claims of concerns over the rights of enclave 
residents, as such, should not be misunderstood as concern purely for residents 
themselves. Indeed, as an article in The Statesman published shortly after Sanyal’s 
comments suggests, such concerns are also intimately grounded in claims to territory. 
As the article reports: “Over the past decades, more than 40 % of the land in these 
Indian enclaves have been purchased by Bangladeshis, who pass themselves off as 
Indians—becoming citizens of virtually both countries in the process.”174 In other 
words, the spaces of the enclaves are at once at risk of being possessed by Bangladesh 
and becoming sites within which people of undeserving citizenship acquire national 
privilege. 
The tension of citizen and subject that is embodied in such discourse—the 
imagined deserving member of the nation and the dangerous other encroaching on 
national territory—is accentuated through equally potent narratives that continue to 
define the enclaves in terms of crime, terrorism and violence. Such discourses build on 
colonial imaginations of the enclaves as sites of crime and confusion and reinforce 
visions of the enclaves as problematic zones in nationalist imaginations of interiority 
                                                 
173 An interesting claim, given that if enclave exchange were to happen, than these Indian citizens 
would become official, as opposed to simply tacit, citizens of Bangladesh. 
174 The Statesman, 2003 (August 22), “Hope on Enclaves.” 
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and exteriority. As throughout their colonial and postcolonial history, the enclaves are 
deployed as sites of smuggling and zones that are emblematic of the porous nature of 
the border.175 For example, a story in Calcutta Online in 1998 reported that a BJP MP 
from West Bengal was preparing a briefing on the Tin Bigha that highlighted it as a 
site of illegal migration, smuggling, and arms trafficking: 
Unbelievable as it may seem, Tin Bigha Corridor is free for smugglers of 
Bangladesh for four hours a day. . . .176 Tin Bigha Corridor is open for 
Bangladeshis for one hour for four times a day—a time “utilized to the hilt by 
smugglers across the border,” [Tapan Sikdar, the lone BJP MP from West 
Bengal] stated in his communication to the PM. BSF officials, Mr. Sikdar 
informed, think that the Corridor “offers a very safe passage of illegal 
immigration from India. Second, this helps illegal arms trade across the Indo-
Bangladesh border.”177 
Sikdar’s claim imagines178 the Tin Bigha Corridor as a particular kind of conduit, one 
that serves as an open gateway into India. Such claims reinforce the vision of the Tin 
Bigha Corridor as a national betrayal—a space within which the sovereignty of India 
is repeatedly violated through transgressions and penetrations of national space. It 
poses an image of the space of the Corridor itself as a sort of sieve through which 
illegal migrants leak from Bangladesh into India. In other words, it maps a particular 
vision of Bangladesh onto Dahagram itself. 
Such claims are particularly marked within the history of struggle over the 
opening of the Corridor, yet they are not confined only to Indian discussions of 
                                                 
175 Again, this is not to claim that smuggling does not occur in the chhits. Rather, it is to highlight the 
ways that theses spaces play into broader discussions of concern along the border. 
176 In 1998, the amount of time during the day that the Corridor remained open had increased from its 
initial 1 hour per day to four hours per day. Currently, the Corridor is open for 12 hours a day. 
177 Calcutta Online, 1998 (April 14), “Where Smuggling is Not Illegal.” See also Bhorer Kagoj 1996 
(May 15), Bangladesh o Bharate Chhitmahal Shomoshar Shomadhan Hochchhe Na [No Settlement 
About Chhitmahal Issue of Bangladesh and India].” 
178 “Imagine” being the operative word here. In 1998, before the completion of the border fence, the 
Corridor and Dahagram would have presented a highly risky spot through which to illegally migrate to 
India—one that was highly militarized and under intense surveillance. This, again, is not to claim that 
such transgression never happen in Dahagram, but rather to point out that the borders of Dahagram, 
unlike those of other enclaves, are highly securitized. 
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Bangladeshi enclaves. Indeed, multiple narratives of the enclaves in Bangladesh 
express similar concerns and imaginations of the chhits—as spaces of refuge for 
criminals who commit various crimes in their bounding states and flee police by 
slipping across the enclaves’ porous boundaries.179 As an article in The Daily Star 
claims: 
Most of the 12 Indian Enclaves in Thakurgaon and Panchagarh district are safe 
havens for criminals. . . . Taking this advantage these enclaves have become 
transit points for smuggling of drugs, arms, and other goods. Hemp is now 
replacing crops and vegetables in many areas as this is much more profitable 
and has ready markets in Bangladesh, they say. . . .”We prefer hemp 
cultivation because the profit is assured, unlike in case of vegetables,” a 
resident at Putimari said. When contacted a police official in Panchagarh said 
they know what goes on in Indian enclaves. “But we can not enter there or 
track down criminals or destroy hemp fields,” he said seeking anonymity.180 
Again, the suggestion that police and government officials are unable to cross enclave 
boundaries is one that should be treated with a certain circumspection. As the 
postcolonial histories of the chhits suggests, police and paramilitary officers have 
regularly violated their borders, blockaded their residents, and been complicit in a 
range of expropriations and exploitations of their residents. Which, again, is not to 
argue that enclave residents have not resorted to a range of violent activities to claim 
and opportunistically exploit space (see Chapter 3). Rather, it is to point out that this 
marking of the enclaves as spaces of crime and criminality reinforces a vision of them 
as holes in a pattern of sovereign control, spaces through which law and order appear 
to trickle out of border regions. 
If the imagination of the enclaves as spaces of smuggling plays on 
longstanding concerns about law and regulation within the enclaves, a more alarming 
set of claims—one that bespeaks a different and more violent logic of response—
                                                 
179 The Daily Star, 2005 (February 24), “Indian Enclaves in Dinajpur ‘Safe Haven for Criminals.’” 
180 The Daily Star, 2005 (June 8), “Indian Enclaves in 2 Dists. ‘Safe Haven for Criminals, Large Scale 
Hemp Cultivation in Enclaves in Dinajpur, Panchagarh, Kankan Karmaker, Dinajpur.’” 
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extends this vision to the enclaves as safe-havens for insurgents and terrorist training 
camps. Part of the emerging discourse around the India-Bangladesh border suggests 
that various different insurgent groups set up base across the Bangladesh border and 
make strikes at India from this safe vantage point. Such attacks are supposedly carried 
out with the tacit agreement of the Bangladesh government. Marking the chhits as 
training spaces for such groups extends the logic that citizenship is under threat within 
enclaves and overwrites it with a narrative that the spaces have already been erased as 
pieces of the nation and, instead, become grey spaces outside of sovereign control. In a 
2003 article in The Statesman, for example, the chhits are claimed as operating bases 
for insurgent groups striking at India’s Northeast: 
According to intelligence reports, there are some 130 such Chitmahals where 
militants are running their training camps. Indian police hardly have access to 
these enclaves, which are somewhat detached from the mainland, while 
Bangladeshi troops stay away from the Chitmahals as they legally come under 
Indian territory. A BSF Intelligence report says most of these Chitmahals have 
become hide-outs of KLO [Kamtapur Liberation Organization] militants.181 
Bangladeshi terrorist groups like Awal, Sanwara, Motaleb have been operating 
their training camps in association with the KLO inside some Indian enclaves 
like Dahala Khagrabari and Basuniapara under Devigunj district in 
Bangladesh.182 
There are a series of interesting slippages in this argument. The first is a move from 
stating that there are a number of chhitmahals situated in Bangladesh to an argument 
that they are all training spaces for terrorist organizations. There is a further link 
between Indian terrorist organizations and Muslim ones. In other word, the article 
positions the enclaves as spaces within which multiple threats to Indian sovereignty 
abound. It is worth also noting that the voracity of such claims has little meaning here, 
                                                 
181 The KLO is an organization seeking an independent Kamtapur state as an ethnic homeland for 
Rajbangshi Adivasis in India’s Northeast. 
182 The Statesman, 2003(September 30), “Chitmahals a safe haven.” See also The Tribune, 2000 (March 
24), “N-E Ultras Have ‘Bases in B’desh.’” 
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given the paucity of information that appears to be available to either state. Rather, 
what is notable is the linking of the enclaves to danger, threat, and violence. 
Conclusion 
One of the things that appears remarkable in the enclaves post-1992 history are 
the ways in which they are deployed as sensitive spaces in similar ways across this 
border. The ways that these spaces are incorporated into nationalist discourses over 
territory, anxiety, and survival share a particular grammar and similarity of 
deployment. This is not to suggest that cartographic anxieties and nationalist histories 
in Bangladesh and India share a modular (Anderson 1991 [1983]) or derivative form 
(Chatterjee 1986). Rather, it is to suggest that the postcolonial histories of nationalism 
in India and Bangladesh, particularly nationalist discussions and appropriations of 
territory as shorthand for identity and survival at the border, emerged out of a shared, 
if oppositional, experience of the Long Partition of Bengal. More specifically, it is to 
argue that the construction of the enclaves as sensitive spaces played one, among 
many, important parts in the shaping of this history. 
The tensions that have emerged in relation to the enclaves since Partition both 
reflect and refract a set of normative debates over the meaning of territory, over the 
changing dynamics of postcolonial citizenship and subjectivity, and over security and 
the porosity of the border. If these debates have shaped politics within the enclave, as I 
will discuss in the next chapter, they have also structured political possibilities in 
relation to them and strategic political and nationalist deployments of them. As I have 
argued in this chapter, the mappings of these broader projects of nation and 
statemaking onto the enclaves is not, solely or even primarily, about the enclaves as 
concrete empirical spaces. Indeed, these mappings effectively erase as they transform 
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these spaces, making small areas with marginal populations into symbols of national 
struggle and threat. 
The process through which this occurs—the production of sensitive space—as 
I have tried to show in this chapter is a historical one. The enclaves emerged as 
sensitive space out of a series of debates and discussions about their status and their 
futures. These debates themselves were framed within broader contexts of post-
Partition politics in each state, the waxing and waning of competing secular and 
communal nationalist projects within them, and changing understandings of the 
relationship across them. 
As the two vignettes that I shared at the outset of this chapter suggest, this 
mapping is a profoundly problematic one that emphasizes a series of contradictions 
and ongoing confusions about these tiny spaces and the disproportionate emotions that 
they continue to stir both locally and nationally. These confusions manifest in the 
production and ongoing tensions between failed projects to know the enclaves as 
empirical spaces—for example, in the almost always contentious projects of 
demarcating their boundaries—and a seemingly immediate identification of their 
symbolic meaning within public discourses around the failures to resolve their status. 
Whether such debates frame the enclaves as spaces of refuge for criminals or spaces of 
refugees without the protection of the nation-state, they all serve to substitute the 
often-quotidian realities of life within enclaves for vivid imaginations of struggle, 
threat, and national dissolution. 
What then are the possibilities for enclave exchange or of an alternative 
imaginative solution to the territorial dilemma posed by the enclaves themselves? If 
the postcolonial histories of these spaces suggest anything, it is that the success of 
such initiatives, posed at a national level, is deeply doubtful. As repeated attempts at 
incorporation since Partition have demonstrated, such debates are premised on a series 
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of broader and seemingly intractable concerns. As Van Schendel observes, discussions 
over the enclaves’ futures are locked in the pattern of a slow and repetitive political 
tango. “The tune is that of Partition, the orchestration that of foreign policies which 
constantly recreate national selves by distinguishing the other in terms of territory, 
boundaries, and security” (2002: 141). 
Ongoing debates over exchange continue to be a regular feature of post-1992 
discussions over the border.183 Indeed, as I suggested in chapter 1, the hope that such 
initiatives will succeed and the fear that they will collapse or, potentially, further 
complicate life for residents, is a constant source of debate and discussion for enclave 
residents. While it would be problematic to see the enclaves as locked in a stasis of 
sensitivity, as historically formed objects that are subsequently suspended in an 
ahistorical relationship to their surroundings,184 the framing of these debates seems to 
make the possibilities for a radical transformation of enclave status remote. While 
residents of areas such as Dahagram wait in the wings of nationalist debates, and, 
indeed, while other enclaves wait in the wings of debates about spaces like Dahagram, 
it seems likely that the nationalist symbolics of the enclaves will continue to 
overdetermine more grounded concerns for their residents. 
That said, it would be equally problematic to assume that residents themselves 
might not and have not played a role in articulating their own strategies and narratives 
of belonging, or that the local politics of territory within spaces like Dahagram might 
                                                 
183 See, for example: The Statesman, 2003 (August 22), “Hope on Enclaves;” The Statesman, 2004 
(January 1), “Envoy Visit Lifts Enclave Spirits;” Shangbad, 2004 (January 15), “Uttorancholer 5 Jelate 
Chhitmahal O Shimana Nirdharoner Kaaj Shuru [Chhitmahal and Border Marking Processes Have 
Begun in 5 Districts of the North];” The Daily Star, 2005 (May 13), “BDR Boss Visits Tinbigha, Talks 
with BSF DIG;” The Statesman, 2005 (December 18), “India to Push for Swapping of Enclaves with 
Bangladesh;” New Network, 2006 (February 11), “India’s Nod to Mujib-Indira Accord Could Resolve 
90% of Border Problems: Babar;” The Daily Star, 2006 (March 25), “Legal Move for Enclave Rights;” 
and The Statesman, 2006 (August 8), “India, Bangla for Enclave Exchange.” 
184 Indeed, as I discuss in the conclusion, progressive policies towards the enclaves, such as the 
allowance of electricity through the Tin Bigha Corridor or, indeed, the gradual, if slow, increase in the 
number of hours the Corridor remains open, or indeed, the opening of the Corridor itself, have indeed 
transformed life for residents.  
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not be constitutive of broader narratives about them. If broad framings of territory and 
space tend to erase the concrete realities of residents and their demands, these 
residents have equally played a role in shaping and re-appropriating such realities to 
articulate their own claims and shapings of space. Whether such demands might 
coalesce into a unified project of reclaiming the discourse around the enclaves is an 
open question, one that itself is shaped by internal factures, politics, and debates. Yet, 
as I suggested in my introduction, enclave residents have been and continue to be very 
much present at their own making. If this chapter bracketed such narratives to focus 
more on the discursive production of sensitive space, it is to these more local histories 
of belonging and struggle that I now turn. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
HISTORIES OF BELONGING(S): NARRATING TERRITORY, POSSESSION, 
AND DISPOSSESSION AT THE INDIA-BANGLADESH BORDER 
June 26th, 2007 marked the 15th anniversary of the opening of the Tin Bigha 
Corridor. This anniversary is usually a day of celebration for Dahagram’s 16,000 
residents, commemorating the long political struggle over the opening of the Corridor. 
Friends had been telling me for months about the festivities that would accompany the 
“Corridor Open Day.” You must come. There will be music, sweets. Indians will 
parade in the Corridor to protest and we will also protest back, demanding a full 
opening of the Corridor.185 Traveling to the enclave from Patgram—a busy market 
town in Northern Lalmonirhat district in Bangladesh—in a light summer rain, I was 
looking forward to this spectacle of territorial belonging. As I arrived, there was a 
crowd of Indian protesters in the Corridor itself, yet there was no corresponding crowd 
from Dahagram. Curious, I proceeded directly to my friend Tariq’s186 tailoring shop to 
find out what had happened. As it turned out, the celebrations had fallen victim to the 
ban on political gatherings put in place by the Emergency Administration. “We spoke 
to the UNO [Upazila Nirbahi Officer],187” Tariq sourly told me after whisking me 
away for a cup of tea, “and decided that because of the Emergency, this year we 
wouldn’t have any celebrations.” And so, while activist groups from the surrounding 
Indian village of Mekhliganj protested the existence of the Corridor, and indeed, the 
enclave itself—shouting slogans of “United we stand, united we fight,” and “Leave 
Bharat [India]!”—Dahagram residents gathered in tea stalls and grumbled. 
                                                 
185 I use the convention of italicizing quotations and discussions from my fieldnotes. Quotations from 
recorded interviews are not italicized. 
186 I have changed the names of my informants to protect their identity. 
187 Upazilas are Bangladesh’s second smallest administrative unit in Bangladesh above the Union 
Parishads [councils] and below Districts. In this case, Patgram Upazila is a sub-district in Lalmonirhat 
District. The UNO is the Upazila’s chief executive officer. 
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This discontent marked more than a lost holiday, or inability to counter the 
taunts and jeers of Indian protesters. The June 26th Anniversary, even with the paltry 
media coverage it usually draws, is an annual opportunity to reassert the enclave’s 
claim of belonging to Bangladesh. This is critical to enclave residents because even 
after 60 years of struggle, such claims remain highly partial and, at moments, debated. 
The Corridor is only open during daylight hours and enclave residents are effectively 
“locked in” at night. The Corridor itself runs through sovereign Indian territory and is 
controlled by the Indian Border Security Forces (BSF), who many believe might close 
the Tin Bigha for good at any moment. What is more, Dahagram residents know that 
the enclave itself plays a largely symbolic role in concepts of state, nation, and 
territory within Bangladesh. The enclave is more important as an idea of territory 
“saved” from the clutches of a “spatially greedy” Indian state, than as a material 
geographic reality that is complicated, problematic, and economically and socially 
marginal from the perspective of the central government. Belonging is a question, as 
such, that is rarely taken for granted within the enclave. 
The problem of understanding life in areas such as Dahagram is one that has 
recently reemerged as a central problematic in social science and historical research. 
The outpouring of literature on borders and frontiers has highlighted the importance 
and the possibilities of engaging borders as sites from which to begin unpacking state 
control. As many of these studies show, life for borderland residents is often one of 
tenuous negotiation.188 At the same time, debates over rights and sovereignty set 
against the backdrop of the global war on terror have fore-grounded the contingency 
of membership within nations and states, thus reviving Arendtian (1968) concerns 
about the tenuous link between rights and statelessness.189 
                                                 
188 And not one that need necessarily always be cast in the negative. See Walker (1999). 
189 See, for example, essays in Hansen and Stepputat (2005). 
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Despite these critical interventions, the methodological and linguistic 
approaches to understanding and describing life in unstable and sensitive border areas 
such as Dahagram are often overdetermined by broad and abstract concepts such as 
citizenship, statelessness and, in the wake of Agamben’s Homo Sacer (1998), 
exception and ‘bare life.’ Though such concepts have been productive in thinking 
through the processes and practices of securing border areas (Basaran 2008; Jones 
2009a), they do not necessarily clarify the ways residents of such spaces frame their 
own struggles, histories, and concerns. In a recent critique of the paucity of language 
for exploring such conditions, Butler argues: “I think we must describe destitution . . . 
but if the language by which we describe [it] presumes, time and again, that the key 
terms are sovereignty and bare life, we deprive ourselves of the lexicon we need to 
understand the other networks of power to which it belongs, or how power is recast in 
that place or even saturated in that place. (Butler and Spivak 2007: 42-43). As Butler 
suggests, the reliance on such tropes limits our ability to describe complex conditions 
of statelessness and the ways that people who live in such conditions forge their own 
claims to rights and resources and the way they frame their own conditions, histories, 
and political possibilities. 
What then is the grammar through which we should begin to reconstruct such 
histories and claims for those who live in places such as Dahagram? My modest 
response to this question is that a critical starting point is to explore the ways that such 
issues are framed by those who live in such conditions themselves. If the last chapter 
engaged with the broad histories and constructions of the enclaves as sensitive, this 
one engages with at a more localized history of Dahagram. It explores the histories of 
belonging within the enclave. In doing so it sheds light on how people frame particular 
claims to membership—in communities, in nations, in states—and how they seek to 
actualize rights. The landscape of Dahagram is historically sedimented with histories 
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of belonging (Moore 2005). Citizenship, displacement, security (both national and 
personal), and rights are all subsumed within a range of notions of belonging and 
indeed belongings (material goods). Movement and the ability to hold and dispose of 
possessions—land, clothing, houses, crops, livestock—are central to my exploration. 
Yet belonging is more than purely a question of possession. It is also one of 
community and identity: who has the right to belong and why. I explore history from 
within the enclave, examining the intertwined political economies and cultural politics 
of belonging(s) in Dahagram largely as its residents told them to me. Rather than 
establishing the “facts” of Dahagram’s history, I argue that these narrations are both 
the memories of possessions and dispossessions and the bases for ongoing claims to 
belonging. These claims, in turn, structure particular notions of nation and community 
that govern who is a legitimate member and what such membership means. 
My opportunistic adoption of the homonym “belonging” is intended to draw 
attention to the ways that the politics of membership within the enclave are 
inseparable from debates over and claims of ownership. Enclave residents would 
occasionally use Bengali words and phrases such as ami oi barir lok, gramer lok, or 
more often chhiter lok [I belong to that household, village, or enclave] to denote 
belonging (membership) and jinishta amar [that is mine], dokhol kora niechi [I 
(forcefully) took] to denote belonging (possession). The limited usage of these terms 
per se is not what interests me here. Rather, I am suggesting that broadly exploring 
ways that membership and property are linked in narrations of Dahagram’s history is a 
more productive way to understand the dilemmas of life in unstable and sensitive 
spaces than more narrowly defined problematics such as “statelessness” or 
“citizenship.” Belonging, conceived as such, is a plastic concept, one that holds many 
meanings, variations, and subtleties for those who negotiate it on a daily basis. By 
focusing on these meanings, I hope to show that belonging is a robust historical 
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analytic that can underscore the dilemmas of living in a sensitive space and illuminate 
what Partha Chatterjee has recently (2004) called “the politics of the governed” that 
undergirds ongoing struggles to establish even basic rights for and by those who are 
“only tenuously, and even then ambiguously and contextually, rights-bearing citizens 
in the sense imagined by the [Indian or, in this case, Bangladeshi] constitution” (38). 
In attending to the ways questions of belonging, and indeed, belongings, are 
articulated as a claim that is always already ethnicized, gendered, classed, and 
communal, I further seek to show how such claims are re-inscribed within Dahagram 
itself, as a set of normative notions of community identity and representation. Feldman 
writes, “Constructing a nationalist order framed by concepts of insiders and outsiders 
indicates both how notions of difference are constituted within particular social spaces 
and how they are symbolically reproduced to legitimate an already existing territorial 
boundary” (1999: 176). The ways that histories are remembered and narrated in 
Dahagram constitute a range of strategies for shaping this articulation between social 
spaces and national territory. Exploring such relationships shows how narratives of 
expropriation are reconstructed as arguments for rights and as silencings of other pasts 
and projects that reinscribe such claims in another set of exclusions within the enclave. 
Tensions of Belonging 
Though punctuated by moments of violence and open conflict, the history of 
Dahagram during the East Pakistan period is perhaps best described as a story of 
uncomfortable belonging to both India and Pakistan. The gradual formalization of the 
border ossified an asymmetrical relationship of rights and power inside the enclave 
drawn along communal lines. Van Schendel argues that notions of citizenship in the 
post-Partition period had a general character of transterritoriality. “Both states saw 
themselves as being in charge of the populations living in their own territory, but also 
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of a [religious] category of people living in the territory of the other state.” (2002: 
127). Dahagram’s population was roughly divided between Hindus and Muslims. As 
movement across the border became more and more legally precarious, the ability of 
Muslims living within Dahagram to freely and safely travel to market in surrounding 
areas decreased. Such informal or unstated policies meant that Hindus in Dahagram 
were residents of India in all but address. At the same time, Muslims were doubly 
alienated from membership within Pakistan, legally residing within sovereign East 
Pakistani territory, yet hemmed in by another state and residing side-by-side with 
others who effectively held more rights than they. While Hindus in Dahagram were 
able to live largely as though they were actually residing in India, Muslims had to 
negotiate the vagaries of paramilitary forces, police, and often-hostile neighbors 
simply to buy and sell goods.190 
As with Indian enclaves in East Pakistan, daily navigation of such issues posed 
intermittent problems. When disputes arose over ownership of livestock or crops, 
Muslim residents had little recourse, as those who could legally represent and protect 
their rights were situated across an international border. With the debate over the 1958 
Nehru-Noon Accords these situations became more precarious. As tensions rose, 
Dahagram became a zone of contention, and monitoring of and hostility towards its 
residents grew. An Indian border security camp was established near what is now the 
Tin Bigha Corridor,191 and both residents of the surrounding Indian Thana of 
Mekhliganj and border security jawans [soldiers] began to patrol its perimeter. 
                                                 
190 Though exact census figures for Dahagram are unavailable, residents recalled that the population of 
Dahagram remained, roughly, evenly split between Hindus and Muslims until the opening of the 
Corridor in 1992 (see below). 
191 Though I have not been able to verify the exact date that this camp was put in place, residents agree 
that it was before 1965 and after 1958. This suggests that the camp was initially established by the West 
Bengal Rifles, before they became incorporated into the new, national border security force (the BSF) 
in 1965.  
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Dahagram residents characterize this period as one of suffering, where the act 
of going to market was fraught with risk and life within the enclave was one of 
extreme instability. As residents recall, it was common practice for the BSF to require 
a payment or bribes for passage to move into or out of the enclave. As Akkas Ali, a 
small-holder farmer living in the north of Dahagram, described it, “Whenever we 
crossed into Indian territory, we had to go through BSF scrutiny.192 The BSF would 
note our name, put some mark on our shoulder, such as branding cows. They even 
compelled us to do work for them, doing such chores as cleaning their lavatories, 
cutting their lawns, sawing wood for them, etc.” While residents in the South of the 
enclave, closest to Bangladesh, frequently dodged security forces to reach the East 
Pakistani mainland, others residing in the North would more frequently make the trip 
into India. This trip was more risky as it made one vulnerable for longer. Many were 
arrested in the haat in Mekhliganj.193 Enclave residents frequently reminded me, there 
is not a single family in the enclave who has not suffered [koshto] while a household 
member was detained in an Indian jail. Beyond the problem of moving into and out of 
the enclave, Muslim residents faced vulnerability from looting by both Indians in 
Mekhliganj and Hindus living within the enclave. 
There was an East Pakistan Police (EPP) posting in the enclave during this 
period. As Niranjana Majumdar noted in a concerned article in the Calcutta Paper The 
Statesman, “Despite many futile Indian protests, there had apparently been injected 
into Dahagram a police force. . . . This could have come only from the Pakistan 
mainland; and therefore could have entered Dahagram only through Indian territory—
illegally” (originally in The Statesman, May 1, 1965. Reprinted in Whyte 2002: 
                                                 
192 No residents of Dahagram that I spoke with made any distinction between the BSF and the various 
paramilitary groups that preceeded their formation.  
193 As Whyte notes, residents of the enclave could frequently get a better price for agricultural products 
in East Pakistan as prices in India were fixed. As such, there was a double incentive to make the 
crossing to Patgram Thana. 
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Appendix 1-38).194 The presence of the EPP post certainly suggests a level of 
commitment to administering and possessing Dahagram by the East Pakistan 
administration. Yet this effort, though symbolically important, was limited. The post 
was staffed with eight unarmed officers, and most residents remember it as largely 
ineffectual. Few Hindu residents of the enclave or the surrounding areas recognized 
their authority. The police themselves had little ability to enforce Pakistani law, as to 
defend their decisions, they would have to illegally cross the Tin Bigha, back into East 
Pakistan and, again, illegally return through the Tin Bigha with reinforcements and/or 
higher authorities.195 The quasi legality of their presence, coupled by the elevated 
stakes of administrative officials crossing a frontier, meant that the EPP could do little 
to protect enclave residents. As such, those who remember this post, tend to comment 
on it derisively, as a weak gesture of administration in the face of inability to establish 
more substantive forms of protection and rule. 
The Dahagram War 
Such tensions of belonging characterized life for (Muslim) Dahagram residents 
both before and after the Liberation War in 1971. Indeed, this situation only 
substantively changed with the opening of the Tin Bigha Corridor in 1992. However, 
this is neither to say that the difficulties of life within and movement out of the 
enclave were unchanging nor that they were purely reflections of local struggles over 
the status of the enclave and its residents. Certain moments in agricultural cycles—
during rice harvests, for example—were more violent than others. Conflicts regularly 
arose over the exact location of the border and raids were carried out on both sides of 
the border to carry off the freshly harvested paddy. Moreover, the politics of belonging 
                                                 
194 Indeed, Majumdar goes so far as to suggest that the Dahagram War (see below) may have been a 
retaliation for the existence of this post. 
195 Such a breach would qualify as an international incident with broad ranging political implications, as 
opposed to a simple case of trespassing. 
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within the enclave were indexed to broader debates and struggles over territory, 
sovereignty, and space between the India and Pakistan. In moments of tension, for 
example during the debate over the Nehru-Noon Accords, daily practices of regulating 
movement periodically resolved themselves into moments of crisis and open violence. 
In such moments, residents of the enclaves, and indeed, residents of the border region 
more broadly, were more likely to experience expropriation, thefts, and various forms 
of organized communal attacks. 
Perhaps the most vividly remembered of these incidents within Dahagram 
occurred in the spring of 1965 and resulted in the destruction of much of the enclave. 
This incident, which came to be known as the Dahagram War continues to resonate in 
enclave politics today. The War was set against the backdrop of increasing tension 
between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. As the dispute intensified, there was a 
marked build-up of Indian and Pakistani troops along border regions in both the East 
and West.196 Beginning in January, the BSF began to mass troops and dig trenches in 
the area along the Tin Bigha, by far the closest point of the enclave to the mainland. 
This effectively cut off Dahagram residents from Patgram Thana in East Pakistan and 
forced them to make a more risky197 crossing into Mekhliganj in India to buy and sell 
goods.198 Tension in Dahagram reached a dangerous height following India’s build up 
along the Rann of Kachchh—another space that had been contentious and sensitive in 
the relationship between India and Pakistan situated on India’s West Coast—in early 
March199 and a series of incursions along the East Pakistan border.200 Violence seemed 
inevitable to residents of Dahagram. 
                                                 
196 For a detailed exploration of the 1965 war, see Gupta (1967). 
197 Risky because residents could be arrested at any point while at market as opposed to only during the 
border crossing. 
198 See The Pakistan Observer, 1965 (March 20), “India Deploys Dogras, Jats, Rajputs Along Ranpur 
[sic] Border.”  
199 There is a marked link between the Rann of Kuchchh and the enclaves. Both were areas of political 
and geographical ambiguity that emerged out of the post-Partition reshuffling of the Princely States. 
Both are areas of continuing ambiguity and intrigue. The ambiguous space of both the enclaves and the 
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On the morning of March 13th, in the Dangbari neighborhood of Angarpota, a 
small herd of goats were rustled by a group of Indians from Mekhliganj. Such back 
and forth rustling was a common occurrence, particularly along Dahagram’s northern 
border.201 Yet in periods of tension, disputes could quickly escalate to overt violence. 
Bachao Miah, the goats’ owner, crossed the border to demand their return and was 
shot in the leg by a man who was repeatedly described to me as a “BSF officer.” Miah, 
assisted by his sons, retreated back into Dahagram. That night, Indians surrounded 
Dahagram on three sides. With the support of the BSF, they began moving from the 
border in towards the enclave’s center, burning Muslim homes as they went.202 
Sharif Udin Talakdar, who was as a boy at the time, remembers the expected 
violence leading up to the War. 
A few days prior to the actual trouble, we anticipated that Indians would loot 
our household [loot kore nieche]. . . . We had four guns, bows, arrows, and 
other weapons. We used to be on guard [pahara diechi] during the night. On 
that particular day, the Indian Colonel shot Bachao Miah and in the groves 
towards the North of my house, we noticed a few West Bengal Rifles203 people 
looking. An elder and I proceeded to see what they were doing there. Getting 
nearer, we noticed that there were hundreds of them. Then, after the sun went 
down, they started shooting. From our side also, my uncles and cousins 
replied. I, with my two younger brothers ran to the Tin Bigha [10 km from his 
house], which is what everybody else was doing. All the villagers flocked 
                                                                                                                                            
Rann have led to frequent violence both between border security forces and communities living on 
either side of the border. Indeed, on March 20th, six days after the outbreak of the Dahagram War, 
fighting broke out in the Rann between India and Pakistan. The two regions are further similar in that 
they have both been the focus of intense negotiations over the meaning of space, identity, and nation 
and are critical sites in the construction of contested borders. For more on the Kachchhi frontier, see 
Ibrahim (2009).  
200 See The Pakistan Observer, 1965 (March 18), “Pakistan Warns India Vacate Aggression in 
Dahagram.”  
201 For a classic study of communal social conflict in Bangladesh around livestock, see Roy (1996). 
202 It is worth noting that there is some controversy over what exactly happened during the Dahagram 
War. Indian papers reported that Muslim residents burned Hindu residents’ homes, forcing them to flee 
the enclave. These reports claimed that the BSF entered the enclave in defense of or retaliation for this 
attack (Whyte 2002).  
203 There is an elision between the West Bengal Rifles and the Indian Border Security forces in many 
remembrances of this occasion. This is, in part, because in 1965, the Indian government replace 
individual state border security forces, such as the West Bengal Refles, with a national security force. 
Despite this nominal transfer, the BSF was run by state governments until 1967. As such, in 1965, the 
West Bengal Rifles and the BSF were, effectively, the same organization (Van Schendel 2005).  
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there. There was an EPP camp in the enclave. A few police personnel already 
had deserted the village during the previous nights. But still, five of them were 
there. These police were also with us. They disguised themselves as women 
wearing saris [Tara shari pore naribesh niese]. They feared that they may be 
taken away by Indians if their identity was disclosed. 
Talakdar’s description recalls a bitterness with both the EPP and the Pakistani state for 
not actively asserting the belonging of the enclave by defending it as East Pakistani 
territory. The local representatives of the state, indeed the only officials with the 
authority to “administer” the enclave, are remembered as feminized, cowardly 
dressing in saris to conceal their identity rather than protecting Pakistani territory and 
citizens. This gendering of defense highlights a claim shared by many of the men 
involved in Dahagram’s politics that they themselves had defended and claimed the 
enclave for Bangladesh. While representatives of the government behaved “like 
women,” refusing to defend their territorial integrity, the Muslim men of the enclave 
asserted the inclusion of Dahagram in East Pakistan by defense of their own land. 
For most, the memory of the outbreak of the war is not one of bold defense, 
but rather of confusion and chaos. One day, as we sat under a tree in Bongerbari Field, 
an open space in the center of Dahagram’s largest village and the location of the 
Union Parishad Council Offices, Kolim Hyder, who was a boy of eight in 1965, tried 
to explain the confusion and rupture of that night. Kolim’s resonant voice became 
agitated as he remembered the destruction of Dahagram. 
It was around eight in the evening. We saw people North of the village 
crossing the road. Everybody was carrying bundles, gripping their children, 
and walking fast. . . . People were carrying pillows, quilts. . . . I remember we 
hadn’t taken our evening meal, though usually we ate earlier. My father took 
the rice pot [bhater hari]. A few days earlier, we had harvested mashkalai 
dal.204 Our yard was filled with kalais. Do you know how to collect kalais 
from field? The roots comes out, not just the plant. Kalai bunches were lying 
scattered in the yard where during the day ten or twelve people labored to husk 
them. 
                                                 
204 A breed of lentils grown widely in North Bengal. 
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My father rushed to the cow-shed and untied all of the cows, so that 
they could save their lives and also eat the dal. In those days, we used to grow 
plenty of kalai. We had vast plots of land [anek jomi] near the char, which 
have now gone under the river. My father took hold of the rice pot. We kids 
were walking alongside my mother. We reached Tin Bigha. 
When we arrived at the Tin Bigha, the BSF weren’t allowing us to pass. 
. . . BSF was firing to prevent people from crossing Indian territory, but we 
were desperate and by 10 PM, we passed Tin Bigha and reached the mainland. 
Not everyone could pass. Others had to wait until the next night. . . . We went 
to Patgram. We took shelter in a school and we had no food that night. My 
father threw away the rice pot he carried in the rush across the Tin Bigha, as he 
had to grip us children. There was a huge crowd. My father threw the rice pot 
when the BSF fired in Tin Bigha. I walked all the way to Patgram [11 km 
away]. My mother took hold of my young sisters, while my father looked after 
the elder pair. During the crossing, my father held tight so that I would not be 
lost in the crowd [Par howar shamoi, abba amar hat dhore rhakse, jano ami 
harai najai]. 
The themes of chaos shared in Kolim’s vivid remembrances were echoed by almost all 
who recall the War. Only a few were able to escape through the Tin Bigha on that first 
night. Most were held there for another twenty-four hours in terror of an attack from 
the front by the BSF or from behind by the same villagers who had burned their 
homes. 
Perhaps what are most vivid in Kolim’s narrative are the loss of means to eat 
and the trauma of separation from places and belongings. His description highlights 
the stark contrast between the bounty of the dal harvest and the sudden loss of even a 
pot to cook rice in. Indeed, the story of rescuing a rice pot from a burning house only 
to lose it in the panic of flight was repeated, in various ways, by multiple people. 
Some simply could not carry their cooking pots on the mad dash south. Some report 
saving their pots only to have lost the rice that was in them. Some remember a 
fortunate and generous few, mostly those with homes situated close to Tin Bigha, who 
were able to salvage some rice and share it with those huddled together in hunger and 
fear, waiting for more than a day for clearance to cross into safety. These collective 
memories seemed to symbolize and encapsulate the loss of homes and the physical 
158 
flight from the enclave. For Kolim, the forced discarding of the pot seems to mark a 
stripping away of belongings, reducing the residents of Dahagram to refugees 
dependent on the hospitality of others. The loss of the pot presaged the difficulties to 
come. 
The large influx of refugees into Patgram dangerously stretched the town’s 
resources. Refugees from Dahagram were billeted in impromptu camps set-up in 
Patgram’s schools and railway stations. The day after residents fled, fighting began 
between the East Pakistan Rifles post in Panbari and the BSF post near the Tin Bigha 
in Mekhliganj. Heavy fire was almost continually exchanged for the next two 
weeks.205 As demands for a withdrawal of aggression were swapped between India 
and East Pakistan,206 troop build-ups continued in the border regions around Patgram, 
along the length of the Rangpur border, and around other border districts such as 
Kushtia and Sylhet.207 Meanwhile, waves of Muslim refugees living in the Indian 
district of Cooch Behar began moving across the border amidst reports that they were 
being forcibly expelled by the BSF.208 
On April 1, a cease-fire arrangement was reached and Dahagram residents 
began to return to their homes from Patgram.209 As part of the arrangement, the Indian 
government agreed to provide basic compensation for victims of the attack. These 
included essentials such as a small amount of rice and cooking oil and a cow for every 
family that had lost their home so that they could re-till their fields. These meager 
                                                 
205 Though none of the newspaper coverage of the War that I was able to locate reported any casualties. 
206 See The Pakistani Observer, 1965 (March 28), “India Sternly Told: No Talks Without Restoration of 
Status Quo” and The Pakistan Observer, 1965 (March 18), “Pakistan Warns India Vacate Aggression in 
Dahagram.” 
207 See The Pakistan Observer, 1965 (March 20), “India Deploys Dogras, Jats, Rajputs Along Rangpur 
Border;” The Pakistani Observer, 1965 (March 19), “Intruders at Kalirhat Driven Out;” The Pakistani 
Observer, 1965 (March 18), “Indian Forces Fire on Sylhet Border;” The Pakistani Observer, 1965 
(March 25), “India Deploys More Troops Along East Pakistan Border;” The Pakistani Observer, 1965 
(March 28), “Indian Troops Deployed Along Kushtia Border;” and The Pakistani Observer, 1965 
(March 29), “In Patgram-Baura Sector: Indiscriminant Firing By Indian Troops.”  
208 See The Pakistani Observer, 1965 (March 25), “Fresh Influx of Refugees: Evictions from Cooch 
Behar.” 
209 See The Pakistani Observer, 1965 (April 1), “Cease Fire at Dahagram.” 
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supplies were inadequate to carry most residents through the next harvest cycle. Many 
had lost not only their homes and possessions, but also the stores of rice and dal 
necessary for both income and household self-sufficiency. What is more, many of the 
fields planted with rice for the boro harvest in mid-summer had been burned or 
damaged. 
Tensions along the border remained high. The declaration of war between 
India and Pakistan in June caused further military build up along all of East Pakistan’s 
boundaries. Though there was no further direct military action against Dahagram, 
residents of the surrounding Mekhliganj Thana enacted a blockade of the enclave, 
preventing Muslim residents from traveling to either Mekhliganj or Patgram markets. 
As one resident bitterly recalled, “We used to wait for rain or darkness so that we 
could rush through [the Tin Bigha] to Patgram to buy essentials. Life was very hard in 
those days. There was nothing human in that vast India.” Others remember sifting 
through the dirt and remains of their burned homes to recover even tiny amounts of 
rice. Many families were forced to slaughter the cows provided as compensation for 
food. Most supplemented insufficient diets by fishing the Tista river. As Kolim told 
me, “if it were not for the river, at that time we would have starved.” 
While returning Muslim refugees struggled to rebuild and survive through to 
the next harvest, many faced the added indignity of seeing their looted possessions in 
the hands of their Hindu neighbors and the difficulty of negotiating to recover their 
lost belongings. As Kolim recalled these complications: 
There was a Hindu man named Dhoroni Babu. My father was a friend of his. 
My father went to visit him when he noticed a cow in the member’s yard 
staring at him. My father said to the member, “Dada [uncle], it is my cow.” 
Then he said, “how can it belong to you?” Then my father said, “untie it and 
see if it comes to me when I call it. Would you return it then?” The man said, 
“okay, I will.” My father won the challenges, and got the cow back. 
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Kolim’s family was one of relative wealth, standing, land holdings, and power within 
the enclave. Most were less successful in their attempts to reclaim property. 
The loss proved to be one that many families were unable to recover from. 
Jasmine Begum, now an elderly woman living in a run down home built on the site of 
her family’s original property, bitterly recalls the war as the beginning of her family’s 
long decent into poverty. Before the conflict they had been moderately wealthy, 
owning livestock and enough rice to run a self-sufficient home, and jute to sell in the 
Mekhliganj and Patgram markets. “During the fire, we were unable to take anything 
away with us. We survived on whatever relief we got. We have never recovered from 
the fire. We learned fear then. Fear has been part of our life since.” 
The Dahagram War marked a moment of trauma that laid bare the vagaries of 
life for enclave residents in the years before the Liberation War. In memories of this 
moment, the imagination of forms of belonging within nation and state as linked to 
possession are clarified. The inability of the East Pakistani state to protect residents in 
their own homes; the loss of the very means to cook food; and the meager recompense 
for loss of homes, crops, and livestock all speak to memories and experiences of 
instability, uncertainty, and anxiety that were part of daily life within the enclave. Yet, 
it also marked the way that questions of territorial belonging resonated both within and 
in relation to Dahagram. Not only were the stakes of national belonging high for 
enclave residents, but the space of the enclave itself was imbricated in broader 
questions of territory. While it may be an exaggeration to claim, as many enclave 
residents do, that the 1965 India-Pakistan War broke out first in Dahagram, it is 
certainly true that the fate of enclave residents and their ability to live within and move 
into and out of the space of Dahagram was intimately linked to broader conceptions of 
national space. Such conceptions were to form the basis of future claims for inclusion 
and membership. Indeed, the Dahagram War, and memories of it, resonated with other 
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articulations of territory and national belonging that were to emerge following the 
Liberation War. 
Belonging to Bangladesh 
If the ‘East Pakistan Period’ was characterized by periodic violence and 
territorial uncertainty, the period after Bangladesh’s independence in 1971 leading up 
to the opening of the Corridor in 1992 was the most unstable and contentious period in 
Dahagram’s postcolonial history. During this time, the lines of belonging and 
exclusion were starkly drawn and the complications that shaped the lives of residents 
during the East Pakistan period more frequently became open conflicts. Though not 
far from areas that saw intense fighting during the Liberation War, Dahagram escaped 
direct involvement. In any case, the Liberation War, at least initially, led to 
significantly relaxed conditions for Dahagram residents. Following India’s military 
and humanitarian interventions in the Liberation War, a climate of cooperation 
emerged between India and Bangladesh. During this period, residents moved more 
freely both across the border to trade in Indian markets in Mekhliganj and to the 
Bangladeshi mainland to trade in Patgram. 
This relaxing of tensions, effectively, began to end with the controversies 
surrounding the Indira-Mujib Pact in 1974. The Pact transformed Dahagram into a 
focal point and symbol of territorial tension and political dispute between Bangladesh 
and India. As legal disputes over the Corridor began to grow, movement again became 
complicated for Dahagram’s Muslim residents. The BSF imposed a five kilogram (kg) 
ceiling on goods moving into and out of the enclave. This effectively meant that 
residents could not sell enough crops to purchase household essentials. As one woman 
living near the zero-point in Angorpota explained it, “we sold tobacco and bought rice, 
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but how much rice can you buy selling only five kgs of tobacco? Yet you also need 
oil, salt and all the other things.” 
Residents, moreover, describe being forced into positions of compromise as it 
became harder to access markets without negotiating with border security forces. Yet, 
for many residents, memories from this period are also framed as claims of stoic 
resistance to territorial aggression. As Bashar, who grew up during this period as a 
member of a politically influential, though comparatively less wealthy family in the 
enclave, put it: 
BSF would come, demand mangos, wood, or timber, and take anything away 
they wanted. Anything. A goat, a hen. We had no way to say no. They would 
bring in their laborers with them. If we said no, the next day they would punish 
[shasti] us on our way to Mekhliganj. Believe me, we were just like prisoners 
[ashami]. Worse than prisoners. A prisoner is not in want of food or medicine. 
We had want of everything. Moreover, we had no freedom to move. The 
period from 1982-1992, we were in a condition that is not describable in any 
language [bhashai bola jai na]. For example, if you take Ethiopia, though they 
are in want of food or medicine, they at least have the freedom to roam around. 
We had nothing. No freedom, no essentials. Children died of diarrhea. They 
were buried without clothes [kafoner kapor chara]. . . . But brother, still 
Dahagram people did not give their allegiance to India [India ke kono chhar 
die ni]. They didn’t surrender. Even after such severe torture and blockades. 
The equation of life inside of Dahagram to a prison was a frequent analogy I heard 
during my research. Here, this metaphor is extended to suggest that Dahagram was 
worse off than a country beset by war and famine. Though hyperbolic—male residents 
did regularly leave Dahagram to access both Mekhliganj and Patgram—the narrative’s 
ultimate claim to belonging is clear: despite deprivation and suffering, Muslim 
residents persevered and refused to surrender their land and allegiance to India. The 
communal claim to belonging repeatedly positioned residents as stoic sufferers 
holding their land in the name of a Muslim Bengali state. 
The challenges posed by these regulations of movement led to increased 
“illegal” border crossings by often-desperate residents. Many tell stories of men 
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waiting for dark, rain, or fog to cross the Tin Bigha to reach Bangladesh. Others tried 
their luck in the Mekhliganj markets. Both these activities had a risk of arrest, for 
which the standard penalty was a fine and one month in jail, though many were 
detained for longer. During this period, detainees had no way to communicate with 
their families to inform them of the arrest, leaving their households in states of anxiety 
until their release. Basharul, a local school teacher, described his experience with such 
an arrest to me one day as we drank tea in his yard. 
I was an 8th grader when I was arrested. My family had ordered rice from an 
Indian trader and my brother asked me and several other laborers to go and get 
it. There were five other adults and me. Though we had ample lands in those 
days, our yields [folon] were not high, so we had to buy rice from outside when 
we fell short. In those days, Indians were making our life hard all the time. I 
was very young then and did not understand what was going to happen. On our 
way back from gathering the rice, a group who worked for a man who had a 
dispute with the trader blocked our way. There were 15 or 20 of them. They 
blocked the road and were saying that they would not let us bring the rice, that 
it was illegal. . . . Then the police came and took us to Mekhliganj, where a 
case was filed [mamla korce] and we were sent to custody [hajote bhorse]. I 
served one month and five days in Mekhliganj and two more months in Cooch 
Behar. 
The belonging of Dahagram residents was layered and enmeshed in local disputes. 
Residents’ ability to move, sell goods, and avoid jail were contingent on a complex set 
of interrelations, many of which were not just beyond their control, but outside of their 
knowledge. 
If the position for men was complicated, women were in an even more 
vulnerable and compromised position. Movement into and out of the enclave was 
markedly gendered. While men would periodically risk crossing to India or 
Bangladesh—frequently returning with boastful tales about near misses and bold 
evasive ploys—women rarely left Dahagram. Their movements were confined not 
only by religious prohibitions on their leaving the home, but by the added belief, much 
repeated by men, in their inability to flee from pursuers. During this period, many 
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women died of complications related to childbirth, as access to medical facilities was 
impractical if not impossible. The threat of violence from hostile neighbors and 
security forces created further arguments for the cloistering of women within the 
enclave. 
Yet there were more complications and dangers of living in the enclave than 
just the restriction of movement. Kidnapping and rape were common features of life in 
Dahagram during this period. Women from within the enclave were periodically taken 
by villagers from surrounding areas and “tortured” for days before being allowed to 
return. Men within the enclave also engaged in the kidnapping of women from 
Mekhliganj. Indeed, these kidnappings were occasionally remembered as celebrations 
of resistance by Muslim men who had been regularly humiliated by BSF tolls on 
movement, insults in Mekhliganj haats, and Hindu neighbors who accentuated such 
insults through the very freedom of their own movement. The gendered violence 
involved in territory making in the post-Independence and pre-Corridor years marked 
women’s’ bodies both as belongings (objects within the political and spatial economy 
of territory) and belonging (symbols of nation and community in need of protection, 
preservation, and purity).210 Women in Dahagram were thus regularly caught-up 
within multiple and violent politics of possession and inclusion. 
The Dahagram Movement Committee 
If the Bangladesh period saw an increase in projects seeking to forcibly 
exclude Muslim residents of Dahagram by Hindus within and outside of the enclave, 
as well as border security forces, it also saw a renewed interest within Bangladesh in 
claiming Dahagram as part of the nation. This movement was intimately linked to the 
                                                 
210 On the violent and gendered politics of nation-making and territory, see Saikia (2004b), Mookherjee 
(2006), various other essays in Chatterjee and Jeganathan (2000), Menon and Bhasin (1998), and 
Butalia (1998). 
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political shift away from secularism in the wake of the assassination of Mujib in 1975 
and the assumption of the presidency by Ziaur Rahman in 1977. This period saw an 
extension of the communal politicization of territory signaled in the debate over the 
Indira-Mujib Pact in 1974. In 1977, the Zia Administration issued 16 “Civil Guns” to 
Dahagram. These guns, nominally for use in “defense,” were given to the enclave’s 
unofficial Union Parishad governing body and, in effect, seem to have been 
distributed to wealthy and politically influential Muslim families within the enclave. 
This endorsement of violent defense marked, for many, the first concrete step in 
Bangladesh securing the enclave as a part of its national territory. If, from the 
perspective of the administration, the distribution of these guns marked territorial 
sovereignty over Dahagram, for residents, they signified a political acknowledgement 
that Dahagram belonged to Bangladesh and could be defended as such. While it is not 
clear how, or if, the weapons were used (many residents told me stories where the 
guns played significant roles in intimidating Indians, though none shared stories of 
their being fired), the guns are spoken of almost reverentially as critical symbols of 
belonging. While representatives of the state could not directly “administer” the 
enclave, they could encourage residents to claim and defend their own territory. 
Zia’s awarding of the “civil guns” presaged a series of events in the early 
1980s that would bring the questions of belonging and the issues around the Corridor 
to a head. In July of 1981, when the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics attempted to 
conduct a census in the enclave as a first step in negotiating the terms of the Tin Bigha 
Corridor’s lease. The census brought many of the tensions of belonging in and around 
the enclave to a head.211 For Bashar Hassan, this census was a catalyst for galvanizing 
political elites in the enclave into broader advocacy and protest for realization of the 
Indira-Mujib Pact. At the time, he was one of the privileged few within the enclave 
                                                 
211 See Chapter 2 for the public debate over this census. 
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whose families could afford to send them to school in Patgram. Bashar’s memories 
position the census as a focal moment, both of suffering and of resistance. 
Dahagram’s first census happened in 1981. If you hear the stories, you will 
simply tremble. Bangladesh decided to conduct a census to show the world that 
“Dahagram is ours and we are controlling it [Dahagram amader neontrone].” 
We who were studying here [in Patgram], were trained as enumerators. . . . 
However, we were blocked on the way in. Indians came with bows and arrows. 
. . . Indians were saying that though the enclave belongs to Bangladesh on 
paper, they would not allow the possession of it. Then the two DCs [District 
Commissioners] of the neighboring districts sat again. Indian politicians 
suggested that “If you have to do a census, then go through Changrabhanda 
[far to the North of the Tin Bigha].” 
Three census officials entered Dahagram by that round-about way. We, 
however, were instructed by the Bangladesh authorities to do our fieldwork 
earlier, going through the Tin Bigha in the night as we used to when going to 
and coming from Patgram. However, after the census, Indians [who were 
maintaining the blockade] only allowed the officials to return. We fieldworkers 
had no way to come back. They were on guard on all corners of Dahagram 
with bows and arrows. They imposed a total blockade which lasted for a long 
22 days. These days were the most sad and helpless days of my life. None was 
able to get out of Dahagram. During these 22 days, 26 of our people died from 
a scarcity of medicines and other essentials. We had to bury them without any 
cloth or with old clothes. 
As Foucault (1991) has argued, modernity is characterized by a political paradigm 
primarily concerned with the management of populations through technologies of 
governance. The census is one strategy through which governments make populations 
“legible” and “manageable” (Scott 1998). As such, it is both a technology of 
governance and a tool of inclusion and incorporation (Markowitz 2007). In Dahagram, 
the very process of conducting the census became a battleground of belonging. To 
mark residents of Dahagram as members of Bangladesh through enumeration would 
be to solidify their claims of national inclusion. Bashar’s narrative emphasizes this. 
The purpose of the census was to officially claim that, “Dahagram is ours, and we are 
controlling it.” In this same sense, the protests and attempts to block the census 
offered a counter-narrative. As the Bangladesh Observer reported at the time, “What 
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happened on July 6 when Bangladesh officials in their third bid went to conduct 
census inside these enclaves was a naked attempt by India to foil the census and show 
the world that people of these enclaves no more want to remain with Bangladesh” 
(quoted in Whyte 2002: 134). 
Following the census, the group of students who were trained as enumerators 
decided that direct political action was needed if the enclaves were to be claimed for 
Bangladesh. To this end, they formed what came to be known as the Dahagram 
Shangram Shomiti (Dahagram Movement Committee, or DSS). All of these students 
were from elite and powerful families within Dahagram—families that had been 
involved in the enclave’s politics for a long time. The link between the census and the 
Movement Committee is striking. Cohn (1987) points out that the census in British 
India was perhaps most significant for politicizing its enumerators. Though the politics 
were different in Dahagram than they were in 19th century colonial India, the stakes in 
classification and inclusion and the political significance of the census were no less 
apparent to the enumerators who formed the DSS. Indeed, for this group of students, 
the census and the blockade following it offered a clear message that spurred them to 
find other ways to forcefully assert their inclusion in Bangladesh. As Bashar recalls it, 
“We proceeded with the demand that we should be given back our territory, the 
territory which belonged to us according to the ’74 treaty. After the formation of the 
Committee, Bangladeshi administration began to evaluate us. Prior to that, we were 
just like dogs and foxes.” In other words, through the actions of the Committee, 
residents of Dahagram would not only reclaim their territory, but also achieve the 
status of belonging within Bangladesh and its residents would be recognized as rights 
bearing citizens as opposed to marginal people beyond the bounds of the state. 
The DSS began to raise public awareness of the situation in Dahagram. 
Mohammad Yusuf, another member of the DSS, described their activities to me as 
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claims not just for membership in Bangladesh, but also for the dignity of the residents 
of Dahagram. The DSS, as such, did not simply argue for implementing the Indira-
Mujib Pact, but also that residents were deserving members of the nation. In Yusuf’s 
words: 
We didn’t take any subscription or monetary help from anybody outside the 
committee. We did it on our own [ja korsi, nijera korci]. One day, three of us 
were on our way to Ishwardi Junction to stick handbills over a train there that 
was headed to Chittagong. We only had three taka with us and no tickets. It 
was our decision that we wouldn’t extend our hand, as no movement can be 
run with money earned by begging. What a movement needs is self-
confidence. While returning, the ticket collector found me. I began showing 
our handbills and saying, “You see, we are from Dahagram, we are running 
our movement.” He was convinced. He fed us pao rutti [toast]. I realized that 
whoever fights for his country gets respect. Those were good days. A kid like 
me, who was just in his 10th grade, would go before the DC [District 
Commissioner] and say, “Sir, I am from Dahagram Shangram Shomitti. We 
are fighting to realize the ’74 Treaty.” And the DC would pay attention to me, 
extend his hand to shake with me, and say, “Sit down my son.” 
Yusuf’s description tells a story of both inclusion through struggle and the recognition 
by other Bangladeshis of the righteousness of their cause. Moreover, it narrates a 
decidedly local negotiation with institutions of government’s interactions with the 
enclave. As this local history illustrates, renderings of populations and territory 
engendered dynamics within Dahagram that would prove integral to the shaping of 
belonging and life both within it and, more broadly, within the nation-state. As 
Chatterjee argues, a central strategy in the negotiation between marginal populations 
and the institutions that seek to govern them is to “give to the empirical form of a 
population group the moral attributes of a community” (2004: 57, emphasis in 
original). Yusuf’s emphasis on the dignity of the movement’s activities, made through 
earnest appeal as opposed to through begging, makes the claim of such a moral 
community for Dahagram. He emphasizes the enclave’s residents not as downtrodden 
burdens on the state, but rather as active political citizens, ready to struggle for their 
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territory and their belonging. In other words, he asserts their belonging in the nation as 
a means of making a claim for administrative inclusion in the state. 
The DSS began to draw the notice of authorities in both Bangladesh and India. 
In Mekhliganj, the police mounted an active effort to locate and arrest members of the 
Committee, while the already existing Kuchlibari Shangram Shamiti (KSS) in India, 
which opposed the opening of the Corridor, and its companion organization, the Tin 
Bigha Shangram Shamiti (TBSS), began to increase their own protests and activities. 
Tensions rose and blockades and arrests became more frequent. As the DSS’s 
activities became more and more visible, their Indian counterparts in the KSS 
expanded their campaign by reaching out to the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Jananta 
Party (BJP) to help re-nationalize the question of the Corridor. In response, the DSS 
contacted the Jatiya Ganotantri Party [JAGPA] in Bangladesh, an ardently nationalist 
party led by Shaiful Alam Prodhan.212 
In 1984, with JAGPA’s support, the DSS organized its most dramatic and 
visible protest, which they called “The Long March.” Riaz, another member of the 
Movement Committee, described the march to me. 
Twenty-two youths from Dahagram joined JAGPA members in a procession 
wearing funeral robes [kafoner kapor]. First, we performed a Janozah [funeral 
rights] prayer in Dhaka. Then we began the Long March. We said that by any 
means necessary we would march through the Tin Bigha, as it should have 
been Bangladeshi land according to the treaty. Our march got huge attention 
because of JAGPA’s participation. At Lalmonirhat, more than 100,000 
people213 got out of their homes to join us. It was a huge procession, looking 
like it was just waiting to explode. 
India also maneuvered thousands of military forces. They even brought 
cannons. They thought we would really cross Tin Bigha. . . . In the end, it was 
the Bangladeshi forces who prevented us from crossing. There was no bridge 
over the river in Panbari [shortly before the Tin Bigha on the way from 
Patgram] then. It was the rainy season and we saw soldiers waiting to catch us. 
                                                 
212 JAGPA regularly participated in and organized protests in relation to a range of border controversies 
throughout the 1980s. See documentation in Bhasin (1996). 
213 Such numbers seem likely exaggerated. 
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We jumped into the river and began swimming. There were BDR on the other 
bank of the river also. When we arrived there, they tied us and detained us. 
Riaz’s description highlights the symbolic import of the march. Cut off from the 
Bangladeshi mainland, Dahagram residents were slowly dying. By formally 
conducting funeral rights and marching with the intent to pass through the Tin Bigha, 
DSS members were intent to force both an international event that would highlight the 
debate over the Corridor and emphasize their willingness to confront death in defense 
of territory, rather than a slow starvation at the hands of the BSF and residents of 
Mekhliganj. In other words, the Long March drew attention to Dahagram not simply 
as a moral community in Chatterjee’s sense of the term, but also as a moral obligation 
to the Bangladeshi state and nation. 
Opening the Corridor 
The DSS’s activities coincided with Ershad’s controversial tenure in 
Bangladesh and the BJP’s reassertion of a range of Hindu nationalist debates in 
national politics within India (see Chapter 2). The communal, internal, and territorial 
politics that these national shifts further engendered heightened debate over the 
Corridor’s opening and continued to uncomfortably raise the stakes of belonging 
within Dahagram itself. In 1982, in a conference to resolve border issues, technical 
experts and security forces from both India and Bangladesh reached an agreement on 
lease terms for the Tin Bigha. Contrary to the agreement reached in the Indira-Mujib 
Pact, this agreement stated that sovereignty over the Corridor would remain in the 
hands of Indian officials. Despite this clarification, no direct action to open the 
Corridor was taken, though an active debate reemerged in India over the legality of the 
creation of Tin Bigha.214 
                                                 
214 For details of this lease, see Whyte (2002: Appendix 1-42) 
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Ershad, originally from Rangpur himself and a notorious supporter of Uttor 
Bongo [North Bengal] championed the cause of Dahagram and the Tin Bigha Corridor 
as a nationalist issue around the securing of territory, using the 1982 lease as a basis to 
pressure the Indian administration over Dahagram. As the DSS’s activities gained 
increased attention, Ershad began to bring the debate over the Corridor to a head. In 
1986, and again in 1988, Ershad made personal visits to the enclave (see Chapter 2). 
These visits remain among the most celebrated and fondly remembered moments in 
Dahagram’s history. Sharif Udin Talukdar, who was a member of the DSS, a 
prominent political player in the enclave, and future Union Parishad Chairman, 
remembers the visit as a moment of extreme emotions. “He was the first high-profile 
leader to step into Dahagram. He came here by helicopter. After Ershad’s arrival, we 
were quite speechless. It was as though we helpless folks got our father. We began 
weeping before him.” 
Ershad’s visit did indeed mark a turning point in enclave politics. During his 
visit, he distributed over 25,000tk worth of goods to needy households. He also made 
Angorpota and Dahagram into an official Union Parishad within Patgram Upazilla, 
giving it formal political standing within the Bangladesh administrative system, 
despite its territorial dislocation from the Bangladeshi mainland. He further allocated 
funds for the development of both schools and medical facilities in Dahagram. What is 
more, Ershad began actively advocating for a solution to the Corridor problem, 
proposing, among other things, the construction of a fly-over bridge for the Tin Bigha, 
so that residents could effectively pass from Dahagram to Panbari without ever having 
to touch Indian soil. Yet his visits also increased the tensions over belonging within 
the enclave. As Riaz explained it to me, 
Seeing the emotional outburst on our part at Ershad’s visit, Indians understood 
our true desires and where our commitments lay. After realizing that we were 
truly Bangladeshi, Indians escalated their tortures. Earlier, they believed that 
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some day we may be India-minded. They hoped that there would be a new 
generation in Dahagram that was pro-India. After Ershad came, those hopes 
were gone. 
As such, while Ershad’s visit brought renewed hope to residents, it also 
marked an increase in tensions with Mekhliganj. Residents spoke of numerous 
blockades from the mid-1980s on. Indeed, many echoed Bashar’s comment on the 
impossibility of even acquiring kafan cloth to shroud dead bodies in accordance with 
Islamic funerary rights. We had nothing to bury our dead in and were forced to cover 
them in banana leaves. Along with an increase in violence between Muslim residents 
and surrounding areas, Hindus living within the enclave began an active campaign to 
demonstrate that Dahagram residents “desired” to be part of India. Muslim residents 
recall that they were often forced or extorted to sign petitions and documents claiming 
allegiance to India by Hindus living within the enclave, themselves formulating their 
own claims of belonging to India. 
Tensions between the DSS and the KSS, as well as the regular blockades and 
increases in arrests, continued throughout Ershad’s presidency. Yet in 1991, the 
relationship between India and Bangladesh again briefly thawed with the collapse of 
the Ershad regime under joint pressure and activism from a coalition of parties and 
public protests within Bangladesh.215 As the BNP assumed power and a series of court 
cases blocking the Corridor in India were resolved, the possibility of opening the 
Corridor became real. On June 26th, 1992, amidst protest by both the KSS and the 
BJP, the Corridor finally opened.216 While seen, almost uniformly within the enclave, 
as a major and important victory, the Corridor has also created new and complicated 
                                                 
215 Though this did represent a return to democratic rule, it did not necessarily mean a move back 
towards a secular pan-Bengali political stance. For more on the opening of the Corridor, see Whyte 
(2002). For more on Bangladesh’s emergence from Ershad’s rule, see Van Schendel (2009). 
216 A report collected in Bhasin (1996) claims that more than 3,000 anto Corridor activists were arrested 
in Cooch Behar and adjoining districts and that at least one death resulted from skirmishes between 
Indian activists marching to stop the opening of the Corridor and members of the local police and the 
BSF. 
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configurations of sovereignty, sensitivity, and belonging within the enclave. Further, 
the opening of the Corridor has served to ossify the borders of Dahagram. Traveling to 
Mekhliganj in India is now unambiguously illegal and to get there one must negotiate 
frequent border patrols and the panoptic BSF watchtowers that now surround the 
enclave. Access to Bangladesh is now similarly restricted except through the Tin 
Bigha Corridor, which remains open only during daylight. 
Many members of the DSS feel that the partial and contingent fulfillment of 
the Indira-Mujib Pact is a betrayal to those who fought and struggled for the Corridor. 
As Riaz told me, 
The government that was in power then, the Khalida Zia government, did it 
wrong to receive the Indian suggestion [that the BSF would control the 
Corridor]. What could we people of Dahagram do? We had no options. We 
were helpless. We have no political representation at the national level. We 
have no strong lobby. We have no strong voice to raise the issue at some 
international level. In 1982, President Ershad said to India, “Give me my 
territory.” What Khalida Zia217 did in 1992 was cheap politics [shasta 
rajniti].218 
Riaz’s claim marks both a frustration at the partial fulfillment of the Indira-Mujib Pact 
but also another statement of inclusion within Bangladesh. Riaz speaks of heads of 
state claiming “their” territory. A failure to defend the rights of enclave residents is a 
lack of commitment to “national” interest. At the same time, the “cheap politics” of 
the BNP administration highlight that despite long struggle, belonging in Dahagram 
remains partial, contingent, and contested. 
Local Heroes 
Though the history of belonging in Dahagram is remembered largely as a 
narrative of injustices and expropriations, it would be wrong to imagine that these 
                                                 
217 Then Prime Minister of Bangladesh and head of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). 
218 Then Bangladesh National Party (BNP) Prime Minister of Bangladesh. 
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were purely inflicted upon passive Muslim residents. Indeed, just as Hindus worked to 
establish their own claims of belonging to India, Muslim residents of Dahagram 
worked to shape their peculiar belonging to Bangladesh often through violent acts of 
possession. Residents remember those who dared to assert such belongings as folk 
heroes who resisted the oppressions of the BSF and Indians from Mekhliganj. Most 
residents who remember his deeds suggest some form of kinship with him, thereby 
actively linking themselves to the enclave’s historic defense. On one of my first visits 
to the enclave, a frail old man named Abdul Manan who I met in Kuddus Ali’s tea 
stall began to talk to me about his experiences being arrested in the Mekhliganj haat. 
His narrative wandered into a long list of abuses by the BSF. In the midst of this, he 
began to explain Jamal Shadhu to me. 
He was my bhai [brother, but also friend]. He was my maternal cousin 
[mamato bhai]. He was very brave. The Indian government wanted him to side 
with them. They asked him to shift his allegiance, and in return, they would 
give him anything, money, land. He refused, saying, “I can’t leave my country 
for a better life elsewhere.” He would continue to defend the enclave, attacking 
those who made our life difficult, stealing our crops and livestock back from 
Indians. Later, near the Tin Bigha, a flag meeting was being held. A BSF 
officer shouted to the crowd, “Who is that bloody Jamal Shadhu, who attacks 
our people?” Jamal Shadhu sprang up and snatched that BSF officer’s revolver 
and pointed it at his head. 
Shadhu represented a spirit of violent resistance to Indian oppression, an unruly and 
untamable force that demanded, and received, respect. His brazen (and likely 
embellished) defiance of the BSF’s authority and his willingness to use violence in the 
defense of territory marked him not just as a hero, but as a symbol of repressed anger 
within the enclave. What others, and what the state, dared not do, Jamal Shadhu 
would. Where others suffered for territory, Shadhu seized it. 
It is difficult to gauge the voracity of such stories. Indeed, residents suggest 
that the BSF regularly entered the enclave during the Pakistan period and it seems 
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improbable that a larger than life character like Shadhu could have avoided capture for 
such a long period of time. Regardless, Shadhu fit into folk narratives of banditry as 
popular resistance to despotic authority. He was, at least in popular memory, ruthless, 
unpredictable, brave, loyal, and violent.219 His acts did more than simply counter 
Indian aggression: they exceeded them. As Manan told me, 
Jamal Shadhu and Mota Izer [Shadhu’s constant companion and co-
conspirator] responded to this well. If Indians attacked one Muslim house, they 
would have replied by destroying four or five Indian houses. If they abducted 
[churi] one Muslim woman, they would have brought four or five Indian 
women. When the Indians noticed that here is some sort of competition, they 
stopped. 
Shadhu personified the fantasy of escalating violence and retaliation, a fantasy that 
stood in stark relation to the victimhood of enclave residents. 
Further, Shadhu embodied a dangerous masculinity that defied the 
emasculating insults inflicted on men as they traveled into and out of the enclave in 
the Pakistan period.220 This masculinity was marked by a voracious sexuality that 
employed rape and kidnapping as a logical strategy of defending the community and 
making counterclaims of belonging. Men who described Shadhu to me almost always 
discussed him in the context of sexual violence. Shadhu simultaneously cast-off unjust 
rule and offered a liberation through sexual assault. Indeed, Shadhu’s very presence 
seemed to sanction such actions. More than a mere perpetrator of such acts, he also 
provided license to others to articulate similar claims to belonging on the bodies of 
Indian Hindu women. 
                                                 
219 Though Shadhu appears not to have made a living through banditry, there are marked similarities 
between his story and those of other folk bandits in South Asia, such as Veerapan in Tamil Nadu. For 
the classic study of social banditry, see Hobsbawm (2000).  
220 Katharyne Mitchell (2006) argues that those living within spaces of exception are feminized by 
differentiation from the universal construction of the modern [male] individual. “Modern homo sacer’s 
essentially feminized constitution is absolutely fundamental to realize in order to understand the 
contemporary practices and widespread acceptance of exceptionalism today” (103). 
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As Riaz once told me, “Some drunken Indians abducted Lothibor Munshi’s 
wife, and released her after molesting and assaulting her. We also with the aid of 
Jamal Shadhu, kidnapped an Indian girl and took her here. She was released after a 
nightlong torture.” Riaz’s menacing account highlights not just Shadhu’s defense of 
the enclave and his propensity to meet sexual assault with sexual assault, but also his 
aiding of others in transgressing both political and sexual boundaries. Through such 
acts, men who had been regularly humiliated by BSF tolls on movement, insults in 
Mekhliganj haats that could not be responded to, and neighbors who accentuated such 
insults through the very freedom of their own movement, violently reclaimed their 
right to belong. As such, the Shadhu narrative defined the gendered spatial politics of 
safety, belonging, and violence within the enclave. It also played a central role in 
locating women within a political economic calculus of belongings, where the capture 
of “possessions” by Indians was met by the capture and damage of even more 
“possessions” by enclave residents. The folklore of Shadhu formed a counterpoint to 
narratives of stoicism and suffering that characterized tellings of Dahagram’s history. 
Without compromising these narratives, Shadhu’s presence offers a counterpoint of 
gendered resistance and a claiming of the right to political violence, arguing that men 
within the enclave were capable of reversing the “tortures” they faced onto their 
torturers. 
Belonging in Crazy Town 
If Shadhu’s violent sexual excess represented a mode of popular resistance to 
Indian rule, it was also seen as confined—outbursts of violence in response to direct 
injustices. Such acts did little to deeply contradict narratives of belonging that position 
residents as suffering for territory. More dangerous and threatening to these claims 
were stories of organized violence enacted by Dahagram’s leaders and political elites. 
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Sometimes, such acts directly opposed the BSF and Indians in surrounding areas, 
others were acts of complicity with them. More than simply acts of resistance to an 
oppressive regime of control, these acts were particular kinds of negotiations for 
power within the enclave and with those who sought to govern it. While hosting me at 
his house with several other village elders, Monir Patwari, a former enclave leader 
who had retired from village politics, told me one such story from the early days of his 
political life. 
It was maybe in ’74 or ’75. . . . There was a man who was an older member [of 
the local Union Parishad] named Manudin Mia who was very shrewd. . . . At 
that time, there was tremendous pressure from India. In retaliation, Manudin 
Mia began sheltering a band of robbers [dakat bahini] based here who used to 
loot Indian households. They would provide him with some share of their 
spoils. It was very natural that India and the neighboring Indian population 
would respond. Indian authorities pressed us, saying, “if you don’t punish 
these robbers, we will not allow any Muslim to live in Dahagram.” Then we 
held a meeting in Bongerbari field. Manudin Mia and Humer Ali Prodhan, two 
senior members, prepared the list of robbers. It was decided that no robber and 
their family member would be allowed to live anymore in Dahagram. 
By that time, some of the robbers had already fled, because they knew 
that something would happen. Even if we don’t punish them, the BSF would 
come and take them away. One particular day, we surrounded the house of the 
ring-leader [dolo neta]. We took him out of the house and we sat in a place 
near Noyarhaat. I and another member, Mr. Lolit Babu, wanted to listen to 
him. Why did he loot other people’s households? We knew him and this was 
not the kind of thing he was apt to do. But Manudin Mia, that shrewd man, 
anticipated that if this man was allowed to speak, his position would become 
complicated. Perhaps it would be Manudin Mia who would be punished by the 
villagers. So, he struck the ring-leader with a big stick on the head. The man 
died instantly. We dug a ditch and buried him. In those days, there was no 
administration here. So we managed it ourselves [She shomoy ekhani kono 
proshashon chhilo na. Tai, oneke kichui amra nijera korsi]. 
There were a number of strains in Patwari’s story that complicated the 
narrative of oppression often shared by those reflecting on Dahagram’s past and 
making claims for its present and future belonging. First, there is a suggestion that not 
only Dahagram’s residents but, indeed and perhaps especially, its political elite were 
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involved in criminal and retaliatory acts of claiming space through theft, looting, and 
other forms of violence. Such stories reframed the politics of belonging within 
Dahagram as not simply about being taken from, but also about taking. Moreover, 
these leaders were ready to administer their own forms of justice and self-preservation 
in the absence of more formal modes and institutions of rule from the Bangladeshi 
state. In Patwari’s words, local leaders “managed it themselves.” Such management 
was more linked to opportunity than to abstract formulations of law and order. These 
kinds of narratives complicated the past and ongoing constructions of Dahagram as a 
moral community worthy and deserving of inclusion in the Bangladeshi state 
articulated by members of the DSS. It further emphasized that the project of framing 
Dahagram as part of Bangladesh was exactly that—a project that involved elisions, 
framings, and selective narrations of suffering for territory in the absence of 
administrative protection. 
The role played by men like Patwari in determining the fate of Dahagram 
should not be understated. Throughout my work, it was apparent that a small number 
of families, all of relative wealth and power within the enclave, played a central role in 
governing both those within the enclave and the enclave’s relationship with both India 
and East Pakistan/Bangladesh. These families formed not just local political 
administrations, but also made up the DSS, served as envoys to various state officials, 
and became the enclave’s elected leaders following Ershad’s declaration of Dahagram 
as an official Union Parishad. As such, these men were central in, on the one hand, 
negotiating the narratives of belonging that would constitute the central claims of 
residents vis-à-vis the Bangladeshi political administration. Yet their own political 
machinations often constituted starkly different claims. If the public narrative of the 
enclaves spoke of exclusion and disenfranchisement, this private one spoke of a much 
more active and violent negotiation of the politics of belonging. These counter-
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histories were also about establishing claims, yet they more often spoke of ethnic and 
class differentiation and the consolidation of power and privilege.221 Through the 
narratives, enclave leaders articulated justifications for their continued rule of the 
enclave, for the marginalization and exclusion of those who could threaten their 
positions, and for a version of history that positioned them as central players in the 
long struggle for belonging in and to Bangladesh. 
The divergence between these narratives was an ongoing source of discomfort 
for the political leaders within the enclave. As Patwari relayed his story, the other 
guests in his household shifted nervously and grumbled. One finally scolded Patwari, 
arguing that these kinds of stories should not be shared with an outsider. Patwari 
dismissed the objection, saying, “He has come to write our history, what danger is 
there in telling him these things.” Yet there was indeed a perceived danger in sharing 
such stories that extended beyond a desire not to offend my sensibilities or a 
perception that sharing such tales would color my view of residents or even bring 
long-delayed justice home to perpetrators of violence. Rather, the danger of sharing 
these stories was itself linked to Dahagram’s ongoing tenuous belonging within 
Bangladesh and the particular claims it hinged on. Residents, particularly long-time 
residents who had been involved in Dahagram’s tumultuous political history were 
aware of the contingent nature of the BSF’s control over the Corridor. Indeed, many 
are openly skeptical that the Corridor will remain open, both because they say that the 
BSF wants it closed and the Bangladeshi state will not fight to keep it open. As such, 
the darkest secrets in Dahagram were moments of organized political violence that 
contradicted the framings of Dahagram’s moral community through the narrative of 
suffering for territory and belonging. 
                                                 
221 It is important to note that these were not necessarily contradictory positions. Enclave “leaders,” in 
Tsing’s sense of the word, stood to—and later did—gain enormously from both a financial and political 
perspective with the opening of the Corridor.  
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Perhaps the most ever-present, but also the most secret of these was an incident 
that may, or may not, have occurred in a small hamlet called Pagaltari on the banks of 
the Tista. I heard of this incident first from Riaz. Riaz was one of the first informants 
to volunteer their own detailed histories of Dahagram. Even so, Riaz was reluctant to 
meet within the enclave itself, and instead made a series of visits to the guest house 
where I stayed in Patgram over the course of a week, frequently telling his stories by 
candlelight as the region suffered under load-shedding schedules that made power 
intermittent at best. On Riaz’s third visit, he first brought up Pagaltari. 
Riaz was correcting a misconception that the residents of the enclave had all 
settled there before Partition. In fact, Riaz told us, there had long been a small, but 
growing, population of a group locally known as Bhatiyas222 in the enclave. Bhatiya, 
as a term, meant “outsider,” but in practice, it reduced to a particular kind of classed 
and ethnocized identification. Bhatiyas were impoverished Bengalis, who had 
migrated from river communities and chars along the banks of Bangladesh’s major 
rivers. The term was used locally to refer to those who had moved following the loss 
of their ancestral homes to river erosion. But it also had derogatory overtones, 
intimating a background of poverty and criminality, tinged by the fact that most of the 
bhatiyas were darker in complexion. Bhatiyas were thus inferior to the Bangals, the 
original residents who had (supposedly) lived in Dahagram before their arrival. They 
were seen as both more “tough” and less “law-abiding” then Bangal residents. Riaz 
claimed that he and his family had originally encouraged several Muslim bhatiya 
families to move to Dahagram to aid in its defense.223 It was in the context of 
explaining all of this to me that Riaz told me about Pagaltari. 
                                                 
222 For more on the role of Bhatiyas in the politics of North Bengal, see Ghosh, (1993) and Das Gupta 
(1992). 
223 A suspect claim, as there were Bhatiya families that had lived in the enclave area since at least, and 
possibly before, after Partition. 
181 
According to Riaz, in the late 1980s, when the tension over the opening of the 
Corridor was reaching its height, the BSF gathered a group of Hindu Bhatiyas from 
India and, during the night, moved them and their livestock across the Tista into an 
uninhabited area known as Pagaltari.224 The Bhatiyas established a small settlement 
and began to till soil to plant crops. This, according to Riaz, was seen by many as the 
first move in a land-grab by the BSF to reclaim Dahagram as Indian territory and settle 
the issue of the Corridor themselves. Local leaders in Dahagram met and decided that 
the Hindu Bhatiyas needed to be removed. As Riaz told us, “We decided that this new 
settlement should be abolished. So we collected some of our own Bhatiyas, armed the 
with bows and sticks, and told them, you march forward, we are covering you, we will 
come.” Muslim Bhatiyas were sent into the camp as a vanguard and began attacking 
the Hindus with these “primitive” weapons. Other residents followed wielding the 
“civil” guns provided by the Zia administration. “Within a few hours, we destroyed 
the settlement. A Hindu inhabitant who had been shot by an arrow died from his 
injury. We confiscated forty-one of their cows.” After violently expelling the settlers 
and confiscating their livestock, Dahagram residents began a vigil awaiting retaliation 
from the BSF. After several days, a flag meeting was held between the BSF and the 
BDR stationed outside of the enclave in Panbari to discuss the situation. According to 
Riaz, the BSF was forced to concede the point because the settlement had clearly and 
deliberately been made on Bangladeshi territory. As Riaz proudly told me, “This 
Dahagram would not be here as a part of Bangladesh were it not for our patriotic 
feelings [Amader deshprem na thakle, ajke Dahagram Bangladesher ongsho thakto 
na].” 
This story surprised me, and I asked Riaz to tell us more about the incident, but 
in contrast to his usual talkative self, Riaz was quiet on the subject and redirected our 
                                                 
224 There is a brief discussion in a 1986 Lok Sabha debate collected in Bhasin (1996) to a dispute over 
the occuption of several chars by the BSF in Dahagram which may be a reference to this event. 
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questions to talk more about the migration of Bhatiyas into the enclave. For several 
weeks after this interview, Riaz would avoid me when he saw me in Dahagram, or 
would make plans to meet later in Patgram and then repeatedly miss the meetings. 
This puzzled me, but noting a number of inconsistencies in the story, I began to 
suspect that it said more about Riaz’s own prejudices than about Dahagram’s history. I 
began to ask other informants about the Pagaltari incident. Most would stiffly deny 
that such a thing had ever happened, or become evasive and quite upon being asked 
about it. Some who were closest to me would say, oh, yes something happened there 
in Pagaltari, but it was not such a big deal. A leader of the Muslim Bhatiya 
community in the enclave said, Yes, the BSF did settle Hindus in a place called 
Pagaltari. We responded by tilling our fields right next to theirs and after some time 
they left of their own accord. 
The silence of friends and informants made me wonder. The closest I ever got 
to a direct answer, came from two informants, both Bangals from families active in 
Dahagram’s political history. One was Patwari, who was not averse to sharing more 
complicated versions of Dahagram’s history. He told us: 
Yes, they moved some people on the bank of the Tista. They were Shantals. 
People of that tribe don’t shave or cut hair. They were claiming that they were 
inside Indian territory, and one day, they abducted two villagers who were 
tilling their own land. Shantals claimed that those were their lands. So a fight 
broke out, which forced them to retreat. It happened in the late 1970s.” 
Another, Yahiya, told yet another version of the story: 
There was a neighborhood named Pagaltari on the other side of the river. This 
was a settlement of Hindu Bhatiyas. These were fierce looking people with 
long hair carrying knives and spades. There were regular disputes between 
these people and Dahagram Bhatiyas, as both shared the char. In most of the 
cases, our Bhatiyas would prepare land for tilling and then these men would 
come, claiming that the land belonged to them. So fist-fights were a regular 
affair. In most cases, our people had to suffer, because they never dared to hit 
back, as they had to go to Dhapra or Mekhliganj hats [in India]. In one 
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incident, a large group of Pagaltari men attacked a few villagers, our Bhatiyas 
rushed there to join the fight. Then the Pagletara Bhatiyas were forced to 
retreat, following a fight.” 
Pagaltari, which literally translates as “crazy neighborhood,” sat 
uncomfortably within the narratives of belonging that long-time Dahagram residents 
had constructed for themselves. This “official” narrative was well rehearsed and easily 
communicated to the rare outsiders who visited the enclave, mostly state officials. 
When I first visited Dahagram, there was a marked uniformity not just in the 
description of experiences, but even in the specific phrases residents would use to 
describe their situation. The narratives had an almost practiced feel with a clear 
message: “We residents continue to suffer under the only partial freedom afforded by 
the Corridor. If Bangladesh is to secure Dahagram as part of its territory, more direct 
action is necessary.” The message was conveyed not just by leaders and village elites, 
but also by almost all residents that I spoke to in the early days of my research. 
Pagaltari, though it could be interpreted as a moment of heroic, even patriotic, action, 
sat poorly with this narrative of victimhood. 
Despite this contradiction and whether or not the routing at Pagaltari happened, 
there are several interesting points that stand out in the narratives. The first is the clear 
ethnic and class differentiation central to the story. Riaz’s telling of the event was 
explicitly positioned to explain the cultural inferiority of Bhatiyas, who now are such a 
prominent part of Dahagram’s demographic make-up, political-economy, and cultural 
politics (see below). In a sense, the Pagaltari story positions the original residents of 
Dahagram, who see themselves strongly as “proper” Bangladeshi Muslims, in 
hierarchical relation to another group. Bhatiyas are culturally inferior in this vision—
wild and unruly, not without their uses in asserting territorial belonging, but clearly of 
a lower class. More important within the context of Dahagram’s unstable claims to 
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belonging, they are positioned as itinerant,225 homeless (as their ancestral homes have 
been washed away), less firmly rooted to the land that Bangals (apparently using 
Bhatiyas as proxies) have fought for.226 
This hierarchy of belonging was reiterated in the other tellings of Pagaltari. 
Both Patwari and Yahiya characterize the Pagaltari residents as Adavasis. Patwari 
directly classifies them as Shantals, while Yahiya’s description of them as “long-
haired” and “fierce” seamlessly fits into hierarchies of colonial ethnotyping and 
notions of the primitive and the civilized. The argument plays against Bangladesh’s 
identification as a Muslim Bengali state, where others’ rights of citizenship are 
contingent at best.227 While this expropriation certainly encompasses class 
differentiation, it is even more starkly drawn in the context of Adavasis who both 
socially and legally exist as outsiders, if not enemies, of the nation (Van Schendel 
2001a). Riaz made this clear to me in his description of the Bhatiyas: 
An Indian security personnel told me, “Whether Hindu or Muslim, these 
people are very unruly [abhadho]. If you ask one, ‘where is your house,’ you 
will get an answer: ‘Assam.’ If you go to the address given to you, you will see 
that no person of that name or identity is there. If we enquire there, you will 
hear that, ‘yes, he has shifted to Char 72.’ If you unfold the map, you will see 
                                                 
225 To be clear, my argument here is that they are seen as such, not that Bhatiyas are lacking in 
attachments to territory, space, or nation. 
226 Indeed, Bhatiyas are particularly “homeless,” lacking belonging, as they come from char-lands. 
Chars are silt islands or banks that build up in and along Bangladesh’s riverine network. Chars are 
fertile, as they are entirely comprised of rich silt deposits, but are also temporary, often appearing and 
washing away over the course of several Monsoon cycles. Life for those living on chars is uncertain. 
Not only are char lands temporary and their residents marginal, they are often the focus of violent land 
disputes (Baqee 1998) and, indeed, inter-state conflicts (Chatterji 1999). The chars bear many 
similarities to the chhits in terms of ambiguity. Yet for chhit Bangals, whose belonging is clearly 
contingent, their land exists in at least a quasi-permanent fashion. If the ownership of the chhit is 
questionable, its physical existence is not. As land holding Bangals, they are “deserving” members of 
the Bangladesh nation. 
227 Indeed, the tension between the identification of citizens in Bangladesh as “Bangladeshi” versus 
“Bengali” frame this tension between national identification as a country born out of a Bengali language 
movement that acknowledged linguistic and cultural identification with a greater Bengal, and religious 
identification as a Muslim “Bangladeshi” state. This tension undergirds much politics in Bangladesh 
today. One of the primary, some would say few, differences between the Awami League and the 
Bangladesh National Party (BNP) is this disagreement, which grew alongside of increasing religious 
party participation in politics during both the Zia and Ershad regimes.  
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that no Char 72 is visible, that it has never been in demarcation. So these 
people are everywhere. 
Bhatiyas are positioned as itinerant, and untrustworthy in the very contingent nature of 
their belongings. Dahagram’s “original” residents, “Bangalis,” belong more than they. 
They have remained on their land and are patriots, deserving of a rightful place in 
Bangladesh. 
There is, further, a relegation of the kind of violent act committed, or not 
committed, at Pagaltari to a “primitive” violence. Riaz characterizes the “civilized” 
inhabitants of Dahagram as following behind their “own’ Bhatiyas in the attack, 
supporting the wild immigrants with “civil” guns, while Muslim Bhatiyas are confined 
to using “bows and arrows.” Such a characterization bespeaks a disdain for Bhatiya 
life at the same time that it reasserts racial hierarchies and a violent possession of land. 
This was not the only time that the curious reference to ‘bows and arrows’ cropped up 
in my research. Residents frequently described Indian protesters opposing the opening 
of the Corridor as brandishing ‘bows and arrows.’ The use of such “primitive” 
weapons seems another indicator of Dahagram residents’ belonging to Bangladesh. If 
the Pagaltari incident sat uncomfortably within the public narrative articulated by and 
through Dahagram’s leaders, its various retellings also articulated and reasserted a 
claim to inclusion through exclusion. Dahagram’s Bangal residents were more 
appropriately part of the Bangladeshi nation than those who they proposed to use for 
their own defense. 
Moving to Sensitive Places 
The Corridor and the politics of movement into and out of the enclave appear 
to be the focal points of political tensions inside of Dahagram. Yet, as the Pagaltari 
incident suggests, the tensions between Bangals, who see themselves as the original 
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and rightful residents of the enclaves and the Bhatiyas, who Bangals see as outsiders 
are as central to the political workings of the enclave. Riaz and other political 
influentials shared numerous stories of “inviting” small groups of Bhatiyas to move to 
the enclave in the years before the Corridor opened as a means of providing additional 
“protection.”228 Such stories also simultaneously position Bhatiyas as “temporary 
guests” and as “objects” useful in the defense of the enclave. Before the opening of the 
Corridor, only a few families moved into the enclave. In contemporary Dahagram, 
Bhatiyas make up almost 50% of the population. 
The majority of the Bhatiya families moved into Dahagram shortly after the 
opening of the Corridor in 1992. Throughout the late 1980s and in the period leading 
up to the Corridor there had been increasing pressure from Hindu residents for 
Muslims to side with them in pushing for India’s absorption of Dahagram. With the 
opening of the Corridor, there was a mass exodus of Hindus from the enclave. This 
movement created a glut of land. However, few residents were able to capitalize on 
low prices after decades of economic marginalization. This opened the way for a large 
in-migration of Bhatiya families, who purchased the land at exceptionally low costs.229 
Elites in Dahagram often told me that, through intermarriage, there was no longer a 
divide between groups. Yet, stories such as Riaz’s, the internal politics of the enclave, 
and the political economy of land continually served to ossify what otherwise might 
have emerged as a more fluid category of identity within Dahagram. 
The divide ran deeper than the length of time each had suffered before the 
opening of the Corridor. There was an economic basis in the prejudice that emerged in 
Dahagram over these newer migrants. While there were Bhatiya families spread 
                                                 
228 No Bhatiya family that I spoke with ever indicated that they had been “invited.” Rather, they usually 
spoke of the availability of cheap land as the reason for the migration into Dahagram. 
229 While it is difficult to assess the value of land before and after the opening of the Corridor 
(informants reported widely divergent prices), one Bhatiya told me that when he first moved to the 
Corridor in 1994, 2.5 decimal (a decimal is one hundreth of an acre), cost four to five thousand taka, 
while current prices had the cost at much closer to forty thousand taka.  
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throughout the enclave, the majority of Bhatiyas lived in the South, closer to the 
Corridor, clustered near an area known as Guchogram, while the majority of Bangals 
lived near the center of Dahagram, in Bangerbari and in the North in Angorpota. The 
soil in Dahagram become more and more alkaline towards the north, which meant that 
many Bhatiyas owned land that could grow and support a greater variety of crops. 
Tobacco and vegetable production (particularly the growth of potol, a squash-like 
vegetable which is a staple in much Bengali cooking) was higher in the South. Many 
Bhatiya families also were beginning to introduce peanuts and maize. The soil in the 
Northern parts of the enclave was far from “infertile.” Most small-holders were multi-
cropping as well as producing three harvests of rice. There was, however, a greater 
need for urea fertilizer. While this made farming in the North more expensive at the 
best of times, in both 2006 and 2007, Bangladesh encountered urea shortages, putting 
additional pressures on many Bangal farms.230 As such, while I was conducting 
fieldwork, there was a dramatic difference in both crop kind and yield between the 
largely Bhatiya South and the more Bangal North. 
This divide between North and South was further complicated by an 
intensification of border security around Dahagram with the opening of the Corridor. 
Since 1992, the BSF had erected ten panoptic watchtowers around the enclave and six 
troop camps. This made moving into and out of the enclave except through the 
Corridor, more difficult and dangerous. While extremely cautious about suggesting 
that there was anything negative about the opening of the Corridor, residents of 
Angarpota at the Northern tip of Dahagram now had to travel a long distance to get to 
market (22 km from Angorpota’s “Zero-Point” at the Northern tip of Dahagram as 
opposed to 1 km to the Mekhliganj haat in India). This imposed additional costs, as 
                                                 
230 See The Daily Star, 2006 (September 6), “Farmers Bear the Brunt as Dealers Stop Lifting Urea;” 
The Daily Star, 2007 (March 4), “Fertiliser Crisis: Farmers Block Roads, Besiege Agri Offices;” and 
The Daily Star, 2007 (March 18), “Bogra Farmers Cry for Urea.” 
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well as time, for many Bangals, while many Bhatiyas enjoyed greater prosperity 
associated with both better soil and relative proximity to the haat in Patgram. The split 
between increasingly prosperous Bhatiyas and Bangals was speeded by the 
consolidation of land amongst many Bhatiya farmers, who continued to purchase land 
as it became available. 
The divergent histories of belonging between Bhatiyas and Bangals also led to 
a different relationship to the Corridor itself. While Bhatiyas lived within the same 
culture of sensitivity and uncertainty that the rest of Dahagram did, they tended to 
phrase their complaints with the Corridor in different terms than Bangals. Many view 
the enclave favorably, suggesting that in Dahagram they have found a stability and 
belonging that they had not had before. While the Corridor remains a looming issue, 
many of my Bhatiya informants highlighted economic development as an equally 
central concern of the enclave residents. As my friend Tariq, whose family had moved 
into the enclave in the late 1960s, but was still considered a Bhatiya by Bangals, told 
me, “As the Corridor problem is partially solved now, I believe that the major concern 
of the public representatives should be the development of the locality, the uplift of 
people’s lot.” Others assured me that the opening of the Corridor had made Dahagram 
an acceptably safe place to live. Salma, who had married into a Bhatiya family from 
the nearby district of Dimla observed, “when the marriage was first discussed, my 
family was concerned, but living here now, things are fine. People are much better off 
than the were ten or twelve years ago.” If the concerns expressed by Bhatiyas about 
Dahagram can be characterized as practical issues with living within the sensitive 
space of the enclave, Bangals’ relationship to the Corridor were haunted by the ghosts 
of the past. When asking newer residents to describe life in the enclave, they often 
begin by describing farming and agriculture, whereas most older residents 
immediately describe their relationship to the Corridor and their histories of 
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dispossession. As Riaz told us when we first met him, we live in terror that the BSF 
will close the Corridor for good. We know that they can do this. Bangladesh has 
reached an arrangement with India, but this is temporary. 
Yet more immediate than differing views of the Corridor were the political 
divides that the Bhatiya migration had caused within the enclave. This rift centered on 
discrimination against Bhatiyas in local politics. When I first spoke with Tariq he told 
us: 
Here there is a division among the villagers. Those who are the decedents of 
the early inhabitants of the village, they look at us in some different ways. 
They always try to discriminate against us [tara shobshomoy amader shather 
obichar kore], as we have come from other districts of Bangladesh, as I did 
from Sirajganj. There are people from Bogra, Nodia, Pabna, Nilphamaria. My 
family came here in ’66. I grew up here, attended school here, and always I felt 
that this discrimination and rift [bhagabhagi] should not be allowed to exist 
anymore. 
Despite observing this, Tariq, who runs a tailoring shop and had stood for Union 
Council Chairman in several previous elections, assured me first that this rift did not 
play a major factor in politics in Dahagram and that unity was essential in order to 
secure further support from the Bangladesh government. Yet as he got to know me 
better, Tariq shared more and more of his bitterness about the discrimination, which 
was both political and social. Once Tariq accompanied me on an interview to a former 
Union Council Chair’s home. While there, we were all treated as honored guests, 
being served tea and muri, a puffed rice snack mixed with chillies and salt. But as we 
left, we noticed a scowl on Tariq’s usually jovial face. When we asked him what was 
wrong, he told us. When I first met you, I did not want to tell you such things, to show 
you rifts in our community. He paused a moment, then heatedly continued, but these 
people, these Bangals, still they face us differently. The scars on my heart from the last 
election will take quite a long time to go. Even this man, [whose house we were 
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leaving], stood against me. When I was a candidate for the chairman post, this man 
gave me a lot of trouble. I am quite sure that I won the election, though the result was 
hi-jacked. 
Many Bhatiyas shared this sense that they were viewed as politically and 
socially inferiors within the community. But the central concern for most Bhatiyas was 
that Bangals dominated the political landscape of Dahagram. While many Bhatiyas 
were more successful farmers than their neighbors, most of the powerful families in 
Dahagram were still Bangals. These few families continued to dominate in Union 
Council elections. Most Bhatiyas charged that, subsequently, the Union Council meted 
out favors, programs, and initiatives to Bangals. In many ways, while Bhatiyas who 
migrated into the enclave after 1992 may have found more economic belonging, they 
are still marked as marginal outsiders within the social fabric of the enclaves 
themselves. 
While political favoritism marginalizes Bhatiyas within Dahagram, stereotypes 
of Bhatiyas as inferior further marks them as outside of the community of “true” 
enclave residents. One day, while we were drinking tea in a tea-stall in Guchogram, a 
local farmer told us, These Bhatiya folks who shifted here after 1992, they tend to be 
quarrelsome [jhograitta]. Before ’92, most Dahagram folks didn’t know what a court 
or a lawsuit was. Now there are plenty of cases in the Lalmonirhat court involving 
Bhatiya parties. Another told me, You will see such people in the char areas 
throughout Bangladesh. If there is a char on the bed of the Tista, they will be there, 
certainly. They don’t do any constructive thinking [bhalo chinta]. They go to a char, 
settle there, plant and eat, and if someday, the char vanishes because of erosion, they 
will simply move elsewhere. While there appeared to be little evidence for such claims, 
and much to the contrary, such stereotypes clearly articulated a politics of belonging 
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that located Bhatiyas as inferior, not deserving of inclusion within the struggle for 
belonging to Bangladesh, and as temporal and impermanent residents of the enclave. 
Yet Bhatiyas also appropriated and reconstructed their own narratives of 
belonging to both the enclave and to Bangladesh. One day, while at a tea-stall in 
Guchogram, we overheard an interesting debate about whether the Bangal residents 
were “true” Muslims. The debate party was arguing that the original residents, who 
had lived amongst Hindus within India for so long, were made better Muslims by the 
presence of Bhatiyas. One commented on the Bangal lack of modesty, saying, I have 
seen people here wearing nothing but a sheet of a cloth over their genitals. I saw these 
guys taking baths as their wives, daughters, and sons were all around. How can you 
term these people Muslims. Another, questioning the Bangal association with Hindus 
said, I have even seen marriage ceremonies dominated by sindur.231 Another said, No, 
we have seen nothing like that. But yet another chimed in, saying, no, he is correct. 
These things happened. Then another began to relate a story from the midst of the 
Liberation War. 
Once there was a raid by Khan [Pakistani] soldiers. They encountered some 
locals and asked about their religion. When the men said, ‘I am a Muslim,’ the 
soldier asked, ‘then who are those people, living in those huts?’ He said, 
‘those are Bhatiyas.’ The Khan soldier took Bhatiyas to be people of some 
other religion,232 and ordered all the villagers to stand in lines, Bhatiyas on 
one side and Muslims on the other. Then they charged one after one, ‘what is 
your religion?’ The answer was always Muslim. Then they were ordered to 
recite some verses from the Koran. Most of the Bhatiya elders did so. But when 
the Bangals were asked, they failed, though they had introduced themselves as 
Muslims. Then the Pakistani soldiers beat those Bangal folks mercilessly. 
Though the story was certainly apocryphal—Patgram was a “liberated” area during the 
war and saw no direct military activity—the point of the story was quite plain. As we 
                                                 
231 Sindur is the vermillion paste that is both central in Hindu wedding ceremonies and is worn on the 
forehead at the parting of the hair by many Hindu women to signify that they are married. 
232 During the Liberation War, the Pakistani army killed and tortured many Bengalis, but they 
frequently singled out non-Muslim (especially Hindu) villagers for “special” treatment. 
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listened, a bearded man that we had never met but had been quiet up to that point, 
turned and with a smile clarified the intent of discussion. Whenever you come here, he 
said, we gather around and have the most interesting conversations. The Bhatiyas in 
Guchogram had made an express counter-argument to what they saw as slanders from 
the Bangal neighbors. This argument was targeted at me as a researcher, undermining 
the stated and unstated claims of the Bangals within the enclave. The implicit 
argument was that the Bhatiyas, as good and faithful Muslims, rightfully belonged to 
Bangladesh, whereas the Bangals’ claims to belonging were tainted by their exposure 
to India and Hindus. As such, they could not be “true” Bangladeshis. While the debate 
was held in jest, and there was little intent for us to take the discussion seriously, the 
point that Bhatiyas themselves stake particular claims to belonging, both within 
Dahagram and Bangladesh, was clear. 
Conclusion: Understanding the Politics of Belonging 
Both before and after 1992, residents’ ability to make claims upon their 
“home” state to enforce their rights were, indeed, limited by local and national projects 
to mark Dahagram as belonging to India, by a partial and intermittent commitment to 
possessing Dahagram within the Bangladeshi nation and state, and by networks of 
power within and around the enclave seeking to articulate alternative claims to power 
and belonging. Against this backdrop it is no surprise that the enclaves’ history is 
remembered and narrated as a series of claims to both membership and to the right 
possess belongings. The ways that Dahagram’s pre-Corridor past is remembered and 
talked about constitute both stories of possession and dispossession and ongoing 
claims that the partial belonging afforded by the Corridor is inadequate and 
insufficient for those who have struggled, persevered, and suffered for Bangladeshi 
territory. At the same time, narratives such as Pagaltari suggest ways that this history 
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is equally about shaping the contours of Dahagram as a community in and of itself. 
The history of Dahagram, as it is told by its residents, is thus an ongoing and 
unfinished project of transforming and redefining Dahagram’s ambiguous and liminal 
position within Bengali state and nation—of asserting Dahagram as a moral 
community worthy and deserving of inclusion within Bangladesh. Chhitmahal 
residents are frequently referred to as “stateless.”233 Yet their history has also been an 
ongoing negotiation with what such a term might mean. If residents are “stateless,” 
their lives are also overdetermined by the Indian and East Pakistani/Bangladeshi state 
and the tension between symbolic and more grounded forms of belonging within and 
to them. The histories that I have recounted in this chapter are both narrations of 
Dahagram’s past and projects to claim a national belonging as a means to actualize 
political membership within the Bangladeshi state. These claims and negotiation go 
beyond, as they partially encompass, liberal normative notions of “rights” and 
“citizenship.” At the same time, they cannot be understood solely from the perspective 
of statelessness or bare life. 
In sensitive, unstable, and contentious zones such as border regions, upland 
areas, and enclaves, such histories of belonging(s) are more than simple narrations of 
the past. They also form the basis of ongoing struggles over how such spaces, and 
their residents, fit or do not fit into constructions of nation and state and the various 
claims that they make to governance and regulation (Chatterjee 2004). Attending to 
such histories, and taking seriously the ways that residents of these zones frame them, 
provides critical insights into the terrain of negotiation between states and groups and 
spaces who only imperfectly fit into categories of “citizen” and “national territory.” 
These emic understandings of the past are thus critical in rethinking the politics of 
inclusion and exclusion and broad networks of power within which they are inscribed. 
                                                 
233 C.f. Van Schendel (2002), Sen (2002), and Jones (2009c). 
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Seen in this light, discontent over the inability to celebrate such anniversaries 
as “Corridor Open Day” in Dahagram acquires a different meaning. Residents rarely 
have the opportunity to publically articulate their histories of suffering for territory 
(Moore 2005) or their ongoing demands for full inclusion in Bangladesh. Belonging 
for residents of Dahagram determines their ability to move into and out of the enclave, 
the ability to go to market to sell and purchase goods, and the constant spectre of 
violence and fear that haunts those who lived through the long struggle to gain 
substantive, as well as formal, membership in the territory of Bangladesh. The stakes 
of articulating claims to belonging are thus more than symbolic. They are about the 
ongoing negotiation of life in a sensitive, contingent, and unstable space. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
SPATIAL CORRUPTIONS: HAZY DEMARCATIONS, SYMBOLIC 
DEVELOPMENTS, AND OVERLAPPING SOVEREIGNTIES IN DAHAGRAM 
One day as Sayeed and I made our way to the northern end of Dahagram, we 
ran into a troubling sight. Members of the India-Bangladesh Joint Border Survey 
Team, in the process of re-demarcating the boundaries of Dahagram, were gathered in 
force in a small field of perhaps three or four decimals in size. They had determined 
that a border post on a mound at the very corner of this field was incorrectly placed. 
The post had to be moved into the center of the field, directly in the midst of the field 
owner’s crops, effectively making it illegal for the farmer to access a significant 
portion of the field. The border post was a granite pillar approximately three feet in 
height, and dislodging it required a considerable effort. As we arrived, the laborers on 
the Survey Team, along with the plot’s owner, were struggling with this task as the 
heads of the Survey Team, along with several members of the BSF, looked on. 
The process, carried out under a hot winter sun, continued for some time. As 
we watched, more and more of the field, and the freshly planted potato crop in it, were 
trampled underfoot as the laborers wrestled the marker free. The farmer looked 
increasingly distressed as his crops were destroyed and his land cordoned off in the 
service of “correct” and “scientific” border definition. Yet under the eye of the Survey 
Team and the armed border security forces loitering about to watch, he continued to 
assist. As the laborers sweated, a supervisor from the Indian Survey Team stood to the 
side, coolly dressed in trousers, pants, scarf, hat, sunglasses, and a vaguely bored look. 
“Push,” he advised. “Push.” 
It would, perhaps, be unfair to say that this event characterized the relationship 
between Dahagram residents and the surveyors that sought to define its borders. 
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However, it did raise a number of questions about the interaction between residents of 
this contentious space and projects seeking to regulate and define it. How do residents 
understand and experience different projects of control within the enclave? What are 
the terrains of negotiation upon which they struggle to carve out spaces and 
livelihoods for themselves? And how do the myriad projects that seek to control, 
define, and shape space and rule overlap with one another on sensitive terrain? This 
chapter explores these questions. 
Sensitive space, I suggest, constitutes and emerges out of such encounters as 
much as it does out of the anxious ambiguities of rule discussed in Chapter 1. The 
enclaves, and Dahagram in particular, are nexuses of different interests, national 
symbolics, and claims to sovereign control. To understand the way rule is 
accomplished in sensitive space, it is necessary to attend not just to how these projects 
contend with, contribute to, elide, and are embedded within one another, but also to 
explore the ways that they are experienced, talked about, and reworked by people 
facing often enormously ambiguous, uncertain, and violent situations on a daily basis. 
Such an exploration allows us to simultaneously examine the mutual constitution of 
experiences, practices, and perceptions of various forms of expropriation. At the same 
time, it unsettles the relationships between security, spatial definition, criminality, and 
corruption that are often taken for granted in official, popular, and academic 
discussion of borders.234 
This chapter, then, re-imagines the sensitive space of the enclaves as a 
contingent terrain, where multiple projects and experiences of defining rule overlap 
with each other to produce new realities that are at once surprising in shape and 
predictable in outcome. Dahagram is what Donald Moore (2005) calls an “entangled 
landscape,” where “multiple spatialities [and one might add, multiple sovereignties] 
                                                 
234 See, for example, Rushd (2008) and Thottam-Panidhar (2009), and Bangladesh Institute of Peace 
and Security Studies (2010). 
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mingle. Neither serial nor successive, they are copresent, sometimes as hauntings, 
other times as invocations, shaping a plural terrain where no single space prevails” 
(22). Dahagram, in other words, is shot through with multiple histories; nationalist 
imaginings of territory; and state projects of control and regulation. 
Critically, all of these competing spatialities emerge out of idealized 
imaginings of Dahagram, its history, and its “place” at the periphery of the 
Bangladeshi state. In essence, projects of rule, and, indeed, resistance to such projects, 
are attempts to map these idealized visions back onto space. As others have argued,235 
all such representations are imperfect, imprecise, and opportunistic. Plots of land do 
not always correspond to the neat and precisely defined lines of the survey. Yet these 
idealized visions—whether of history, territory, development, or moral economy—do 
not exist independent of reality “on the ground.” Rather, as Timothy Mitchell (2002) 
argues, the gap between “reality” and its “representations” are negotiated spaces that 
produce new terrains of engagement, experience, expropriation, and rule. To 
understand the spatial forms of power in Dahagram, then, it is necessary to explore 
such negotiations—to examine what emerges from attempts to bring the potato field in 
line with the map. 
I refer to the outcomes of such encounters as “spatial corruptions” for several 
reasons. First, the space between reality and representation, between plan and 
implementation, and between idealized vision and concrete practice create tremendous 
opportunities for personal and political gain within the enclave. Petty corruption, 
clientalism, and exploitation are as much a part of rule within Dahagram as the rigid 
control of movement through the Tin Bigha Corridor and around the enclave’s 
borders. Second, the discourse around the notion of corruption is, itself, one central 
way through which residents make sense of and reorder these negotiated spaces. As 
                                                 
235 C.f., Edney, (1997), Bayly (1999), and Cons (2005). 
198 
Akhil Gupta (1995; 2005) argues, narratives of corruption in South Asia are a central 
means through which residents make sense of “the state.” In Dahagram, these 
narratives are, further, an often-cynical commentary on projects that seek to remake 
the space of the enclave in various competing images. At the same time, they are re-
articulations of moral orders and the limits of acceptable political practice. Third, what 
emerges out of negotiated space is a corruption of the idealized visions of nation and 
state that undergird projects of definition, rule, and development in Dahagram. It is not 
surprising, for example, that a small-holder farmer’s crops are less important to border 
surveyors than establishing a well-defined and, ultimately, secure border. Yet in 
Dahagram, arguably, the implementation of projects like the Survey—which disregard 
and devalue the needs, claims, and wishes of residents in the service of concepts such 
as security—produce neither “security” for those living in Dahagram, in the sense of 
safety and protection, nor “security” for representatives of the state at the border, in 
the sense of reduced illicit cross-border movement. Which is not to say that the 
outcomes of such projects do not benefit particular groups and interests within the 
enclave, but rather that they rarely do so in the ways in which their planners intended. 
I build my argument about spatial corruptions through an exploration of two 
broadly conceived phenomena in Dahagram. First, I dig further into the process of 
defining Dahagram’s boundaries. By looking at the range of debates and negotiations 
involved in the Joint Survey of the enclave, I raise questions about what is at stake in 
demarcation and explore the uncomfortable tensions between the claimed “scientific” 
and inimically social facets of defining territory in the enclaves. The techniques of 
observation and control are central aspects in constructing the “everyday” in 
Dahagram, yet claims to precision mask a series of relations that emerge out of, as 
they undermine, such techniques. Second, I explore the vagaries of development in 
Dahagram. I outline a set of empirical riddles around what I call “symbolic 
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developments.” I argue that the act of intervening in sensitive space is significantly 
more important than the material outcomes of such an intervention. I develop the 
paradoxical relationship between projects that are concerned with marking and 
defining the enclave in particular ways and the realities of a range of corruptions that 
emerge out of and go under the radar of, these projects. In both of these sections, I am 
concerned with the ways observation and development map onto both local politics 
and contentious histories within the enclave. Finally, I bring the concerns of these two 
investigations together in a reading of an attempt by the BSF to stem cattle smuggling 
in Dahagram in 2006. By examining the outcomes and intents of this project, I show 
how the nexuses and disconnects of rule, territory, and idealized visions create the 
possibilities for political corruptions, political practice, and expropriations within the 
enclave. 
Experiencing Demarcation 
The Joint Border Survey Team was a regular feature and presence within 
Dahagram for the first several months of my fieldwork.236 On any given day, the Team 
was composed of five to ten or sometimes more day labourers, two to three junior and 
mid-level supervisors from each country, and, intermittently one senior surveyor each 
from the Survey of India and the Survey of Bangladesh (see Figure 12). Such teams 
have two primary jobs: determining the correct placement of the border through 
                                                 
236 The process for assembling and determining what parts of the border are to be surveyed in any given 
season (the season runs through the dry winter months) is a complicated one. As the director of the 
Bangladesh part of the team described it to me, the Survey of India and Bangladesh each bid on areas 
that they would like to prioritize in each annual survey. It is not clear how arrangements are reached or 
how the decisions on where to expend border-surveying resources articulate with broader political 
interests or areas of acute crisis along the border. Teams are always comprised of equal numbers of 
representatives from each country and all of the team members that I spoke with describe the 
relationships as amicable. Indeed, many told me that they regretted not being able to spend evenings 
together (the teams each break up at sundown to spend the night in their respective countries). I was 
also told that Indian Survey team member occasionally supplied Bangladeshi team members with 
brandy or other kinds of alcohol unavailable in Bangladesh.  
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trigonometric measurement (identifying the correspondence between points on a map 
and points on the ground) and placing permanent border posts made, most often, of 
concrete at regular intervals to mark its exact location in space. The Dahagram Team’s 
job was implementing and rechecking a series of proposed demarcations from the 
1991-1992 survey and a 2005 supplemental survey.237 Many of the pillars marking 
these demarcations had never been placed, several had been placed but now needed 
“correcting,” and several old pillars had fallen into disrepair and needed to be remade 
(see Figure 12). The quotidian process of marking territory was slow, laborious, and 
for the most part, undramatic. The team meticulously made their way around the edge 
of the enclave, checking the position of old border pillars and sub-pillars with various 
trigonometric tools and pouring new concrete markers to more clearly and visually 
mark the limits of Bangladeshi territory. 
This Joint Survey Team was the third to work in Dahagram in the past twenty 
years. This comparatively high level of attention seemingly reflected Dahagram’s 
tenuous and sensitive status, or perhaps a hope this could be rectified by simply 
clarifing the enclave’s boundaries. Broadly, there was little disagreement as to the 
enclave’s physical boundaries. Indeed, Dahagram is the only enclave to regularly 
appear on maps of the Indo-Bangla border. The very presence of the team reflected 
this political agreement on space. Before Joint Teams begin their work, there must be 
bilateral consensus over where the border lies. The Teams can then determine the 
border’s exact location to the meter “on the ground.” This technical demarcation might 
precede other kinds of border definition such as the fence that now surrounds much of 
Bangladesh.238 A failure to come to an agreement on where the border falls, as is the 
                                                 
237 The 91-92 Survey was conducted in preparation of opening the Tin Bigha Corridor. There were also 
periodic surveys of the areas in the 1980s (Bhasin 1996). 
238 International law dictates that the fence be no closer than 150 yards from the border, a law that 
paradoxically prevents Dahagram from being fenced. The fence, which falls in Indian territory, and is a 
project of the Indian Government and the BSF, would have to enclose the entire Tin Bigha Corridor 
within Bangladesh, thus effectively ceding the territory to the Bangladesh state and enclaving 
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“science” in demarcation, the Survey Team, at least those who I spoke with, refused to 
acknowledge that the production of space was in any way a “social” process or even 
one that unfolded in inexorably social contexts. Whenever I asked a team member 
about demarcation and its impact on border communities, they would patiently begin 
describing triangulation and measurement procedures. One day, the Bangladesh team 
director spent a careful 45 minutes walking me through the technical process of border 
demarcation, its mathematical roots, and its precision. During this discussion, he drew 
numerous diagrams in my notebook explaining how triangulation, and the exacting 
tools that modern border survey teams use to measure it, worked. “So you see,” he 
concluded at the end of the lecture, “there can be no mistake.” 
Many authors have argued that the colonial making and marking of territory 
both concealed and embodied a range of different violent relations of rule within a 
techno-rationale of measurement (c.f., Carter 1984; Edney 1997; Harley 2001). This 
was no less the case in the contemporary survey of Dahagram. The project was carried 
out under the watchful eye of the BSF and as they worked the main survey team 
almost always had an informal armed escort of BSF jawans and officers. The 
militarized presence was a constant reminder of both the force that backed up this 
quotidian marking of land and what was at stake in the placement of the border posts. 
It also served to mark the differences between enclave residents and those who worked 
with the Survey team. Though the Survey team appeared to have a number of day 
laborers employed in making and placing the pillars, they also regularly enlisted the 
unpaid assistance of enclave residents, many of whom, as in the vignette described at 
the beginning of this chapter, were directly effected by the new placement of posts.240 
Residents were not compensated for this work, but under the watchful and armed eye 
                                                 
240 The outcomes of these demarcations did not always involve the loss of territory, as in the potato field 
discussed above, but could also simply involve the ossification of boundaries that may previously have 
been treated as plastic (particularly in relation to livestock grazing). 
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of the BSF, they seemed unwilling to refuse. The team moved back and forth across 
the border, at least during working hours, with ease. Indeed, team members frequently 
encouraged me to go with them, boasting that as long as I was in their presence, there 
would be no problem. This was in stark contrast to many residents of Dahagram, who 
carefully avoided the border area and repeatedly warned me to avoid even 
approaching it.241 Many told me that that whenever we were in full view of a BSF 
watchtower, we were being watched through a rifle-scope.242 
Not surprisingly, there was a mutual, though unstated, antipathy between the 
survey teams and Dahagram residents. The teams were perpetually followed by groups 
of residents who seemingly monitored their actions. Every time I sat down to talk with 
surveyors, this group gathered around to listen, vet, and often hotly contest what the 
surveyors had to say, contradicting perceived imbalances or slights in the Team’s 
discussions. Within Dahagram, rumours abounded about the Survey teams’ corrupt 
sensibilities. Many insisted that the Survey team was in direct collusion with the BSF 
to subtly and gradually erode the enclave borders. “These teams are just corrupt,” my 
friend Tariq Anam told me, echoing a common sentiment in Dahagram’s tea-stalls and 
gathering areas. “You know the road that runs in India near the Zero-Point [at the 
North-Eastern side of the enclave]? That road was in Dahagram before the 1992 
survey. Indians wanted it because it connects two BSF camps, so they could more 
easily move back and forth.” 
                                                 
241 Indeed, several residents told me that they had abandoned land on the corner because they were too 
afraid of BSF violence and intimidation to farm it. This was far from a universal concern, and many 
landholders at the boundary continue to use, and occasionally transgress the boundaries of, their fields. 
242 In his ethnography of political violence in Northern Ireland, Alan Feldman reflects on political 
meaning of Foucault’s panopticon in contexts in which observation is as likely to take place through the 
scope of a rifle as it is through binoculars or a camera. As he argues, “compulsory visibility is the 
rationality of state counterinsurgency, and of neostatist paramilitary violence—this is evident in the 
visual staging and technological penetration of the body by cameras, high-velocity bullets, or digitized 
bombs, which unite both seeing and killing, surveillance and violence in a unified scopic regime” 
(Feldman 2000: 47). While Feldman is primarily concerned with questions of vision in his analysis, it 
might be pointed out that in Dahagram, the technologies of triangulation and measurement were equally 
bound up in regimes of scopic control.  
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I asked Hassan, the head of the Bangladesh Survey team, about Anam’s claim. 
He told me, “He knows very well that that is not the case. . . . I always feel bad for 
these people living here. They frequently come when we are working and say, ‘no you 
are placing it wrong, the pillar is not here it should be over there.’ I am always very 
careful in such cases, checking the measurement at least three times to be sure.” 
Hassan then told me a story related to his survey in the north of the enclave to 
illustrate his point. The gist of the story was that a farmer had claimed that the border 
pillar was in the wrong place, but when checked, Hassan found that it was not. 
Yet, that was not the whole of the story. He went on to say that at the same 
time, the farmer asked him to kick another pillar. When he did, the pillar, which 
should have been firmly lodged in the ground, fell over. “The farmer claimed that the 
BSF had moved the pillar into Bangladeshi land, uprooting it from its concrete base so 
it could be easily shifted. We consulted and demolished the pillar altogether.” This 
story embodied a number of different suggestions about the experiences of 
demarcation: that the Survey Team was fair, unbiased, and just; that local residents 
make claims to national territory in the same ways that they make claims to their own 
land, that is, in ways that best suit their interests; and that border residents did, in fact, 
have something to fear from the spatial encroachments of border security forces. 
Indeed, the implication that border security forces might move a border pillar—at no 
immediately apparent benefit to themselves—seems to fall somewhere between overt 
antagonism and a not so subtle threat about the contingency of landholding in sensitive 
areas. However, it also suggests ways in which spatial regulation is experienced as 
spatial corruption at the border. The claims to accuracy and “fairness” embodied in the 
moves between the border on the map and border on the ground appear especially 
unstable when border security forces can simply move these posts, creating de facto 
border reconfigurations grounded more in the threat of force than in scientific 
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authority of trigonometric measurement. Such actions, stories, and rumours both 
emphasize and critique the notion of technical expertise, highlighting that what is 
significant in border demarcations is not the technical skill involved in completing 
them, but the force that makes border lines into lived realities. While I never saw any 
evidence of wrongdoing on the part of the Surveyors—indeed, they appeared to be 
exceptionally conscientious and exacting about their work—the bitterness and distrust 
towards them was directly linked to the unavoidable conclusion that in more rigidly 
defining the borders of the enclave, the Survey team was complicit in supporting what 
most saw as a territorial tyranny by the BSF, and by extension, the Indian state. 
Hassan told me one day, “I know what these people are saying about us, and 
they have an interest in the outcome of our work. But I try to make them understand 
that we are simply here to do a job, that we have no bias and no choice in these 
matters.” Despite this gesture of understanding, there also remained a reciprocal 
feeling of distrust and suspicion towards residents of Dahagram amongst the 
surveyors. Several whispered to me that there had been incidences within Dahagram 
of disgruntled land-owners on the border digging-up inconveniently placed border 
pillars and moving them during the night. Many of these stories, which paralleled the 
ones that enclave residents were telling about the BSF, dwelt on the cunningness of 
Dahagram residents in their manipulation of spatial boundaries. One junior surveyor 
from the Indian part of the team told me a story from the 1992 Survey that involved a 
disgruntled farmer digging around the base of a concrete pillar, carefully sawing 
through it, and “replanting” it in the ground in a more favourable position. “They 
would have missed this,” said the Surveyor, “if it wasn’t noticed that the new pillar 
appeared to be in a strange place. They went and investigated and found the old 
concrete base of the pillar carefully covered with fresh soil.” If such stories 
highlighted the contingency of the demarcation project and the high-stakes in its 
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completion, they also emphasized the conditions of mutual distrust in which this 
“exacting” process was carried out. Far from clarifying the location of the border, the 
presence of the Survey Team and their work seemed to create a space for calling its 
very materiality into question.243 
Interestingly, when the Surveyors shared these stories of local corruptions of 
their work with me, they were always positioned as rumours, stories, and tales from 
previous Survey projects. At times, transgressions were even blamed on non-human 
agents. One day as I walked the enclave’s new perimeter, I noticed that several of the 
freshly poured border posts appeared to have been vandalized, with chips knocked out 
of their still freshly poured and moulded concrete bases and the text on the posts 
disfigured and defaced. I pointed this out to one of the Survey team, interested in his 
response. He glanced at the damage and blandly said, “Cows” (see Figure 13). The 
bovine explanation spoke to the Surveyors’ steadfast denial that their current 
meticulous measurements were being undermined in any way. Such claims may have 
bolstered the pretentions towards accuracy and permanence of the Survey Work. But 
they seemingly belied quite visible evidence of frustration and anger at the 
codification of the enclave’s boundaries. At issue was the inexorably human affront to 
the ostensibly “scientific” work of demarcating territory. 
                                                 
243 Similar resistances to surveying during attempts to demarcate the Tin Bigha area were debated in the 
Lok Sabha in 1986. In response to a question about a press report of survey tampering, the Minister of 
State in the Ministry of External Affairs responded: “Boundary demarcation work along the Indo-
Bangladesh border near Tin Bigha, but excluding it, started on January 28, 1986. On that day, the joint 
survey team demarcated part of the boundary between India and Bangladesh at Dahagram-Angarpota. 
The next morning when the joint survey team arrived at the work site, they found that the marker fixed 
on the ground after measurement the previous day, had been uprooted during the night and a large 
number of agitators had gathered inside the Bangladesh enclave of Angarpota, who were shouting 
slogans against the demarcation. Our security personnel on duty could not provide protection for the 
Bangladesh survey team within their enclave and so at their request the work had to be suspended” 
(quoted in Bhasin 1996: 910). 
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Erased, or at least concealed, by this bifurcation between “reality” and 
“representation” are a range of relations of power and control, as well as a series of 
debates over and contestations of such power. The demarcation of Dahagram, a 
remapping of technical and representational measurements back onto territory, 
appeared to be a project of bringing reality in line with the map, rather than the other 
way around. The process denied the sociality of border demarcation and the long and 
contingent processes through which the enclaves and the border itself came into 
existence.244 It further operated independently even of the geographical realities on the 
ground, such as the non-correspondence of plots of land to border posts claiming to be 
accurate to within feet of the “real” border. The technical claims of the Survey Team 
also tended to obviate recognition that the team’s decisions had dire consequences for 
people living in border regions, whether this meant the carving of a field into two 
pieces or the destruction of newly planted cash-crops during the “proper” placement of 
pillars. In Mitchell’s terms, the move between representation and reality displaced the 
accountability in such actions by reframing the social and political process of 
demarcation as a technical one. 
Yet, border measurements were always taken in dialogue with local 
understandings of both what was “right” and what was “advantageous.” These 
processes were constantly imbued with the spectre of violence and expropriation both 
implicit in boundary-making projects and central to Dahagram’s post-Partition history. 
Such interactions unquestionably shape both the interpretation of corruption by 
residents of sensitive border zones and the ways representatives of state bureaucracy 
interact with them. The mutual discourse of distrust had the effect of producing 
relations and conditions that lent themselves to tensions, resentments, rumour, 
instability, and insecurity. These tensions are further fraught in Dahagram because of 
                                                 
244 For more on the articulation between the technical and social aspects of mapping territory, see Edney 
(1997), Craib (2000), Harley (2001), Orlove (1991), and Scott (1998). 
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the general restriction of information in sensitive border zones and the complications 
such restrictions places on daily life and “legal” practice, particularly the lack of 
access to official documents such as maps, the limitations on land registration within 
the enclaves, and the vagaries of settling land disputes through local arbitration (see 
chapter 1). The bitter irony of having teams of surveyors working within the enclave 
to make maps that were officially unavailable to residents into “reality” was not lost 
on those living in Dahagram. Indeed, such asymmetrical access to information 
contributed to perceptions that residents had little to gain and much to lose in official 
projects of measuring land, marking space, and designating ownership and authority. 
These various different forms of spatial expropriation are not experienced 
singly by enclave residents, but rather as a set of intertwined processes that gradually 
or rapidly erode rights and access to land. These experiences are situated within the 
broader history of the Communal politics that have characterized the relationship 
between India and East Pakistan/Bangladesh since before Partition (Chatterji 1995; 
2007); the slow and uneven definition of the border since the drawing of the Radcliffe 
line in 1947 (Van Schendel 2005); the particular histories of Dahagram’s emergence 
as a sensitive space; and the complicated politics of belonging that continue to 
structure daily life for its residents. The various legacies of violence from Dahagram’s 
pre-Corridor past, fears around the contingency of the Corridor, the still unstable 
politics of belonging within Bangladesh, and the various uncertainties of access to 
goods and representation within the enclave all resonate with projects of “objective” 
demarcation. If the relationship between “reality” and “the map” is, as Mitchell 
suggests, an unstable one, the instabilities and bleeds across this bifurcation are as 
bound up in the histories of particular places as they are in the technical practices of 
marking and dividing space. The map is indeed an instrument of the sovereign state 
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(or states) (Scott 1998). Yet it is also, as Elyachar suggests, “another ground on which 
competing visions of reality, and contests for power are played out” (2003: 594). 
Symbolic Developments 
Boundary definition is only one arena within which spatial corruption is 
produced through the uneven resonation between Dahagram’s histories and projects 
seeking to mark it in particular ways. If border marking is a project of negotiating the 
concrete location of Dahagram between India and Bangladesh, various kinds of 
development projects negotiate Dahagram’s space within national symbolics of 
territory and belonging. Such projects are grounded in and rely on various 
imaginations of what Dahagram “is,” who its residents “are,” and what they “need.” 
At the same time, Dahagram’s ambiguous status means that such projects are 
exceptionally susceptible to transformation and opportunistic cooption within the 
enclave’s boundaries. 
While I was conducting my fieldwork, a local BT Maize company called 
Doyel was in the process of launching a seed/microcredit scheme in partnership with 
National Credit and Commerce (NCC) Bank (see Figure 14). To facilitate adoption, 
Doyel guaranteed loans issued by NCC Bank to farmers for the purchase of Doyel’s 
seeds. The project served farmers throughout Patgram Thana, but there was a special 
attention to Dahagram where, over the course of my fieldwork, much of the farmland 
in the south, nearer to the Corridor, was transformed into maize fields. The partnership 
with NCC was pioneered by Doyel’s co-founder, a local political leader named Sijule 
Islam. Sijule, like many political players in Uttor Bongo [North Bengal], had begun 
his career as a supporter of Mohommad Ershad’s Jatiyo Party, but more recently, had 
become an important candidate for the Islamist Jamaat Party. Sijule’s face adorned 
posters throughout the Patgram region, and he planned to stand as a Member of 
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the “likelihood” that enclave residents would not repay their loans.245 If these NGO 
views echoed popular understandings of the enclaves as lawless zones, Sijule had a 
different take. 
Sijule saw his role in bringing BT maize to the enclave as a humanitarian act. 
As he explained to me, “These people in the enclave get nothing. No bank will give 
them loans. No one extends a hand. Until we came they had no support.” This 
statement was neither accurate from the perspective of loans—at least two national 
level microcredit providers, Asa and Podokkhep, were active in the enclave—nor from 
the perspective of services, as discussed below. However, Sijule’s explanation, 
coupled with his own political ambition, highlighted the ways that the politics of aid 
within Dahagram hinge as much on its peculiar location within national debates as on 
need. While Sijule may have seen Dahagram residents as potential constituents, there 
was no Jamaat Party infrastructure within the enclave. Sijule himself felt that enclave 
residents were likely to vote for the Awami League in every instance, since the Party 
had a more amicable relationship with India.246 This, it was said, translated to less 
tension along the border when they were in power.247 Rather, it seemed that the 
political capital of being involved with Dahagram was more important than the 
outcomes of such involvement. As Ferguson (1994) has famously argued, the framing 
of a space as a zone in which particular kinds of development interventions are needed 
                                                 
245 On the overwhelming centrality of repayment to microcredit, see Fernando (1997) and Cons and 
Paprocki (2010). 
246 A relationship stemming back to the Liberation War when the Congress Party of Indira Gandhi 
entered the Liberation War led by the Awami League. This relationship has a political, as well as 
historical, dimension linked to the Awami League’s secular platform and the BNP’s more anti-secular 
stance. It might be argued that in contemporary Bangladeshi politics, both of these positions fluctuate 
between nominal and substantive based on the political climate at any given moment. For more on this 
history, see Van Schendel (2009).  
247 This was an often-repeated belief of residents of Patgram Thana. Many people told me that enclave 
residents all just “vote for the boat” (the Awami League’s symbol). This was largely untrue within the 
enclave where local politics had much more to do with ethnicity and belonging. Within Dahagram, the 
Bhatiya/Bangal divide was significantly more important than national party affiliation. Indeed, the 
current administration was, at least nominally, part of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) (see 
Chapter 3). 
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and likely to succeed—the production of an “object” of development—precedes 
development interventions of various kinds.248 Sijule’s framing of the enclave was as a 
space of both national historical import and as a neglected zone within which residents 
received no support of any kind. If the enclave was an object of development, this 
object had as much to do with national import as it did with intervention. 
Sijule was not the only player in the Doyel scheme to recognize the symbolic 
import of working in Dahagram. The program was formally launched in the winter of 
2007 with a celebration at Dahagram’s Union Council Office. This celebration was 
attended by an official from NCC who had traveled all the way from Dhaka for the 
event. The official distributed a number of educational materials to the local 
government school and gave a short speech. In the rest of Bangladesh, he began, we 
have heard of the plight of people here in Dahagram. I myself have read of the Tin 
Bigha Corridor in books, and learned of your long struggle to keep this land as part of 
Bangladesh. I often imagined Dahagram as a land far away. But only in coming here 
and seeing with my own eyes your plight was I able to understand how truly this place 
is part of Bangladesh. Having laid the ground with these heartfelt statements, the 
official went on to explain how proud NCC was to be able to support farmers in 
Dahagram through loans for agricultural development. Such platitudes are, of course, 
common-fare in such events. However, the NCC official’s emphasis on national 
inclusion and struggle underscored the political stakes in Dahagram’s development 
and the links between symbolic territory and concrete plans on the ground. 
The outcomes of Doyel’s project were unclear during my fieldwork. However, 
it certainly stood to significantly alter Dahagram’s political economy in ways that may 
not have been intended by the nationalist gestures of its makers. The early adopters of 
the maize scheme were largely Bhatiya farmers living in the south of the enclave who 
                                                 
248 On objects of development, see also Mitchell (1991a; 2002). 
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had purchased or consolidated large plots of land for cultivation since moving into 
Dahagram after the opening of the Corridor. Bhatiya farmers, with their larger 
holdings and superior soil conditions (see Chapter 3), were better poised to take 
advantage of such support, nominally provided in recognition of residents’ long-
struggles for belonging in Bangladesh. That such realities are often of little 
consequence in the implementation of development projects is of little surprise. 
However, what I wish to emphasize here is that the stakes of development in 
Dahagram had little to do with establishing voting-blocks or establishing profitable 
market relations.249 These were symbolic developments, focused on the import of 
Dahagram as a sensitive and tenuous space in an ambiguous border zone.250 Such 
initiatives made two simultaneous claims. One the one hand, they were gestures of 
inclusion that sought to bring Dahagram into the nation through development 
assistance. On the other, they were also nationalist gestures that proclaimed support of 
the fraught space of Dahagram as a form of compassionate patriotism, a form of care 
for the nation. This is not to deny that such projects had political economic ends or 
were not, effectively, strategies of reconfiguring power within and in relation to 
Dahagram. The Doyel project was certainly a mechanism through which Dahagram 
was further integrated into the broader agricultural economy of North Bengal. Yet it 
was also one of a number of projects that responded to Dahagram’s symbolic location 
within broader national narratives of territory, regional politics, and border-disputes. 
                                                 
249 Literature on corruption in South Asia and the exchange of development assistance for votes (and 
other clientelist arrangements) is, of course, huge. See, for example and overview, Bardhan (1997). 
250 For another account of development in a frontier zone, see Tsing (2005). Tsing’s account of 
Kalimantan is much more directly concerned with the political economy of resource extraction. 
However, she too points out the ironies and reversals of development projects that seek to frame 
marginal space in particular ways. As she writes, “Such twists are more than irony: They predict and 
perform their own reversals, forming productive confusions and becoming models for other frontiers. In 
Kalimantan, related paradoxes produce frontier degradation and salvage. The frontier is made in the 
shifting terrain between legality and illegality, public and private ownershp, brutal rape and passionate 
charisma, ethnic collaboration and hostility, violence and law, restoration and extermination” (33). 
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Such symbolic acts account for a seemingly disproportionate level of 
development assistance in Dahagram, discussed in more detail below. Yet, 
Dahagram’s simultaneous and linked status as a sensitive place—with attendant 
overtones of danger and criminality—make it a space that also receives a 
disproportionately small amount of monitoring of such development projects. Visits 
by state officials, NGOs, and others who might evaluate the impact of development 
programming are rare. If development programs are thus means to inclusion—given as 
both celebrations and markings of Dahagram’s import to the nation—they also 
highlight the material insignificance and difficult status of Dahagram as a marginal 
space and assumptions about the danger of the space and of its inhabitants.251 Indeed, 
there is a precarious linkage in the question of monitoring between the overlapping 
schemas of control, development, sovereignty, and nationalism at work within the 
enclave. On the one hand, Dahagram is a space that is under an exceptional amount of 
surveillance— as often, as residents have it, through the scope of a rifle as not. The 
contentiousness of the space, its uncomfortable history within broader national debates 
over the border and over territory, and its ongoing “unresolvable” status as sensitive 
space (see chapter 2) heightens the symbolic import of Dahagram as a space in need of 
both “securing” and development. Indeed, from competing perspectives, both are 
viewed as critical to the rationalization of Dahagram’s ambiguous space. Yet, in 
practice development projects themselves operate under the cover of such “obvious 
surveillances” by border security forces and others.252 The act of intervention itself, as 
                                                 
251 The literature on development as a nationalist project is expansive. Of particular relevance to the 
politics of national development in Bangladesh is Gupta’s (1998) discussion of agrarian populism in 
India. “’Development,’” he writes, “has served as the chief legitimating function of ruling regimes and 
as the most important ‘reason of state’ in independent India. This is quite ironic, for developmentalism, 
in its evolutionary assumptions, in its essentialization of difference, in its presumption of homogeneity 
within areas considered essentially different, and in its narratives of progress, shares a great deal with 
colonial and specifically Orientalist, discourses” (33, emphasis in original). See also Li (2007). 
252 My thanks to Townsend Middleton for helping me to understand this paradox. 
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a gesture of national inclusion, presumes, and effectively dismisses, the outcomes that 
it nominally seek to achieve. 
This paradoxical relationship has numerous consequences within the enclave, 
many of which are inscribed in Dahagram’s very landscape. Paved roads run the 
length and circumference of the enclave, providing smooth transportation for 
motorized vehicles despite the fact that, while I was conducting fieldwork, only two 
families within the enclave owned any motorized transport (a motorcycle). Indeed, 
even rickshaws are a rarity in the enclave, and most local transportation is by foot or 
bicycle, with rickshaw vans (flatbed bicycle wagons) used for transporting agricultural 
goods to market on haat days. Beyond roads, Dahagram also receives a significant 
amount of Vulnerable Group Development/Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGD-VGF) 
support from the central government.253 The Dutch-Bangla Bank, in the late-1990s 
underwrote the development of a number of tube-wells in Dahagram. Numerous food 
for work (FFW) projects building bridges and new roads have been implemented in 
Dahagram with the support of organizations such as CARE and USAID. Indeed, while 
I was conducting fieldwork a USAID supported FFW project was underway to 
construct a wide road in the north of the enclave. Though I visited the project 
numerous times, I never met anyone from outside of the enclave involved in 
supervising, directing, or planning the project. This is not to say that such projects 
were not conceived of with or by outside organizations, rather that their day-to-day 
operation was managed locally. 
                                                 
253 VGD-VGF programs are one of the largest central government sponsored support programs in 
Bangladesh. The programs target those living in extreme poverty and are central and critical tools to 
combat seasonal shortfalls associated with the Monga season—a period between the boro and aman 
rice harvests when there is a scarcity of agricultural related employment. I was unable to obtain any 
exact figures on the amount of VGD/VGF funding available in Dahagram. 
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commitment to a particular area is common throughout Bangladesh. Such projects for 
the “public good” are often abandoned or transformed when political power shifts 
within the country.255 The use of development assistance as a political, rather than 
“public” good, is thus unsurprising in the context of Dahagram. Yet the irony of 
having excellent access to unusable services is acutely felt in a space where the 
regulation of movement makes accessing health-care difficult, if not impossible, at 
night. 
Ambiguous Significations 
Projects such as the hospital, which boldly claimed Dahagram’s inclusion into 
the modern Bangladeshi nation and state while seemingly denying residents the 
concrete benefits of such inclusion, were all the more puzzling because they seemed to 
be projects with no audience. They neither existed as services for residents, nor as 
markers for visitors. Yet, there were numerous examples of projects throughout the 
enclave that seemed largely to serve the purpose of declaring their own existence and 
success to an imagined or anticipated audience. For example, in the center of 
Bongerbari field near the Union Council office, at the administrative and social center 
of the enclave, there was a sign that proclaimed Dahagram’s numerous development 
achievements (see Figure 16). The sign nominally listed the accomplishments of the 
Swanirvar Dahagram Angarpota Development Project, a program supported with 
funds from the Rotary Club of Dhaka and the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA). However, the sign was also a broader demographic statement of 
                                                 
255 Many of these projects are sites where struggles over Bangladesh’s contested history are waged. 
Such works are regularly named after Sheik Mujib, if begun under the auspices of the Awami League, 
or Zia Rahman if begun under the ausipices of the BNP. The Awami League claims that the BNP uses 
such renaming as an attempt to “disgrace the father of the nation” (Awami League 2004), though the 
party also regularly engages in the politics of renaming. After coming to power in 2009, the Party 
quickly renamed “Zia International Airport” in Dhaka to “Hazrat Jalal International Airport.” See The 
Daily Star, 2010 (February 15), “Zia International Airport Renamed.” 
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for a short period of time to launch projects of their own, many of which were 
premised on the enclave as a space within which, as Sijule put it, “no one would 
extend a hand.” Representatives of the border security forces, district commissioners, 
and other government officials also periodically visited the enclave. Yet, these visits 
were largely focused on resolving questions related to the enclave’s borders and the 
Tin Bigha Corridor. Rarely were such visits more than nominally concerned with the 
“social welfare” of enclave residents. Further, such security-minded visitors rarely 
ventured into the interior of the enclave, focusing their concerns instead on its 
perimeters and, particularly, the Tin Bigha Corridor. 
What are the implications of a sign with no audience? The sign itself seemed to 
serve as a kind of shorthand for anyone who might be looking. Its statement about 
Dahagram’s development statistics—whether or not such numbers would bear close 
scrutiny—made a series of implicit claims. First, it presented Dahagram as a 
development success, reinforcing both the claim that residents were deserving 
members of Bangladesh—as they had, supposedly successfully utilized resources to 
accomplish a range of development goals such as reducing illiteracy—and that the 
state was invested in bringing them into the national fold. Second, it also marked 
Dahagram spatially, as a part of Bangladesh within which international development 
agencies, such as Rotary and CIDA, could legitimately intervene. Third, it claimed an 
ongoing investment in the region, announcing progress to those who might come to 
the enclave to continue the work. At the same time, the sign reinforced the gap 
between the symbolic and material import of the enclave. Its bold pronouncements 
were gestures for an absent, if potential, audience who might further be able to 
celebrate Dahagram and its residents’ achievement of development milestones, rather 
than a celebration for the residents themselves. 
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If the sign did little more than proclaim a set of questionable figures in a 
language that no one in the enclave could read, there were more visible markers of the 
vagaries of symbolic development in the enclave. One of the most glaring of these was 
Dahagram’s recent “model village” project. I first heard about the model village from 
a local journalist. We had been working in Dahagram for months and had never heard 
any suggestion that there was a model village in the enclave. Indeed, it seemed like an 
incongruous place to construct such an “example” of development, given the 
infrequency of visitors to the enclave. The next day, in Dahagram, I asked Mohammed 
Yousuf, a former member of the DSS and a visible figure in Dahagram’s political 
landscape, about the village. Yousuf, on hearing my question, gave a cynical laugh 
and gestured towards the north. “It’s over there, on the bank of the Tista. Go see for 
yourself.” 
Intrigued, I made my way to the model village following the vague directions 
that I had been given. I was surprised to find that this “model” village was not on one 
of Dahagram’s paved roads. To get there, I turned off of the main track that ran past 
Notunhaat along the west side of the enclave and made my way along a slow dusty 
and very sandy track in the direction of the Tista river. Soon, the rickshaw I was on 
could go no further and I got out and walked. As I went, the land quickly became arid 
char land that characterized much of the north side of the enclave. After some time, I 
arrived at the banks of the Tista, where I had been told the village lay. There was, 
indeed, a small cluster of huts, more dilapidated than many dwellings elsewhere in 
Dahagram, on the bank. There were no adults around, but a group of children were 
there who assured me that I was in the right place. I began to explore. The only 
evidence of any “development” project seemed to be a single water pump (see Figure 
17). 
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the service of demonstrating the technology’s and/or the planners’ success. Yet, the 
model village in Dahagram seemed to be doing neither of these things. The existence 
of the village seemed, if not an open secret, at least something that few people were 
willing to bring up. It was positioned in a place within Dahagram that seemed to 
guarantee that it would be seen by almost no visitors to the enclave (possibly, even if 
they came looking for it). What is more, the village appeared to feature none of the 
services for improving the lives and livelihoods of the landless laborers who were 
supposed to live there. Like the sign in Bongerbari field, the model village seemed to 
signify for no one. 
More so than the sign, the model village helped to illustrate both the 
implications and the frustrations of symbolic developments for residents of the 
enclave. Later that day, I ran into Mohammed Yousuf again in a tea stall. “Did you see 
the model village,” he asked. I told him about my experience there and probed him for 
more information. Yousuf was reluctant to say more about it. “It certainly doesn’t look 
like much is going on there,” I prompted. Yousuf raised his eyebrows and sipped his 
tea. Others also had little to say about the model village when I asked them, and I was 
never able to identify and interview any of its residents. However, when I did ask, 
many people would change the topic by raising of a number of complaints against Arif 
Ul Rahaman, the current Union Council Chairman.258 
It was certainly hard not to notice the contrast between the state of the model 
village and the Chairman’s own home. Rahaman’s bari was already one of the best 
maintained in Dahagram. One day I ran into him in Bongerbari and asked if I could 
set-up an interview. He told me to come to his home the next day, as he would not be 
out and about because he was having some work done. The work turned out to be a 
                                                 
258 Union Parishads (councils) are the basic unit of local political organization in Bangladesh. Similar in 
form to Panchayats in India, they are comprised of a series of twelve elected representatives from a 
village unit (or sometimes several villages) within a particular Thana or Upazilla.  
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new brick and mortar house that he was building behind his current bari. As Rahaman 
explained to us, the house itself was inexorably linked to his own commitment to the 
social welfare of the enclave. According to him, this charity work, and more 
specifically, the ability to provide assistance to enclave residents, thanks to his 
successful business interests, were what allowed him to win the last election and 
become chairman. “Thank God that, regarding social welfare, none can match my 
record,” he said. The house, itself, was a necessary symbol of both his commitment 
and his ability to continue providing for the downcast enclave residents. “I was never 
occupied with the thought of building my own house. The problem is that it brings a 
sort of shame [laja], living in kachcha [traditional, with implications of inferior and 
impoverished] houses. That is why lately, I began to build my own house. You see, for 
my own need, I do not think that a new house is necessary. The problem is, as this 
brother [referring to a representative of the BNP from Patgram who had come to visit 
Rahaman and was observing our conversation] has come, but I don’t have a well-
furnished house to offer him to sit in. I don’t have a set of sofas. That is why.” 
Rahaman’s old house was far from what others in the enclave would have called 
kachcha. Indeed, it had a concrete floor, plaster walls, and a tin roof. But his new 
house would truly set him apart as both one of the enclave’s wealthiest residents, and 
more importantly, in his analysis, as their protector. Such a display of wealth also 
raised questions about Rahaman’s own ability to exploit the various symbolic 
developments within Dahagram. When I mentioned the house to Mohammad Yussuf, 
he snorted, and quipped with sarcasm, “There is the model village.” 
Corrupting Narratives 
Rahaman’s commentary on his new house highlighted the opportunities that 
emerge in the gaps between the symbolic intent of development projects in Dahagram 
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and their concrete implementation (or lack thereof). But it also highlighted the uneven 
and overlapping idealized visions of Dahagram that contribute to the production of 
spatial corruptions. Whether the funds for Rahaman’s new bari did or did not come 
from funding for Dahagram’s model village, he almost certainly was able to use his 
position to take advantage of others’ idealized visions of Dahagram to reconstruct and 
produce his own, albeit somewhat altered, vision of the enclave. This vision may have 
run counter to the symbolic intents of development in the enclave. It also, clearly, ran 
counter to many enclave residents’ own visions of just political practice. Akhil Gupta, 
in his ethnography of corruption in rural India, argues that “the phenomena of 
corruption cannot be grasped apart from, or in isolation from, narratives of corruption” 
(2005: 6). The ways people narrate corruption, Gupta suggests, offer critical views on 
the ways through which individuals understand the experience and workings of the 
state. Yet, such narratives are also commentary on local politics and its interface with 
broader political practices—from demarcations to developments. In Dahagram, then, 
they are ways that people interpret, articulate, and critique the links between “the 
state” and the micropolitcs of daily life. 
The broad array of development projects in Dahagram, unsurprisingly, did 
little to improve the social welfare of Dahagram’s residents. Indeed, the distribution of 
various forms of government aid was funneled largely through the Union Parishad and 
was accompanied by a marked lack of accounting and monitoring. Residents 
repeatedly told me that to become a member of a VGD-VGF program, one had to pay 
a large bribe to a Union Parishad council member. This practice had been common for 
quite some time, but most believed that the size of these bribes had sharply increased 
with Rahaman’s administration. Many of Dahagram’s more politically influential 
residents complained assiduously about the corruption of the current enclave 
administration. The irony of this complaint was that these political figures, most of 
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them Bangals and many of them former members of the DSS, had worked collectively 
to place Rahaman in office over Tariq Anam, a Bhatiya candidate with a reputation for 
honesty and hard work. Indeed, many of these elites that I spoke with made it quite 
clear that even at the time of the election it was known that Rahaman, the Bangal 
candidate, had been involved in smuggling through his ambiguously defined “stone 
trade.” As such, Dahagram’s political elites had made a conscious choice to vote—
and, as many members of the Bhatiya community had it, to rig the election—along 
ethnic lines. 
Mohammad Yusuf, himself a former DSS member, was particularly bitter 
about Rahaman, who he had helped to elect. Yusuf was one of the wealthiest residents 
of the enclave with a large house with concrete floors and a high, tin-roof. His wife, 
Nasrine, had been elected to one of the two seats reserved on the Union Parishad for 
women.259 He and his wife, who unlike Yusuf was extremely reluctant to discuss the 
Chairman with us, had been in a bitter feud with Rahaman over what they saw as his 
abusive nature, his refusal to distribute development projects to members of the 
council for administration in their paras, and his corruption. One day, in an extended 
critique of the chairman, he explained to me, “A chairman is like a messenger. As the 
head of the Council, he makes contacts and brings letters and instructions from the 
administration. He is supposed to bring these before the whole Council in the Council 
meetings. But here, if there is something in these plans and instructions which can 
benefit him, he would keep that in his pocket so that it never comes out.” 
I took Yusuf’s complaints about the Chairman with a grain of salt, as they were 
almost always peppered with moralizing statements that positioned him and his family 
as wealthy enough to not need to engage in corrupt activities. Such wealth and 
position, Yusuf seemed to believe, meant that he and his family could truly attend to 
                                                 
259 Reservations are held for two women members in Union Parishads throughout Bangladesh. 
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the welfare of enclave residents. Such proclamations bore a marked similarity to 
Rahaman’s own justification of himself as an ideal UP Chair because of his financial 
ability to help Dahagram’s downtrodden and poor. In other words, both sought to 
deploy their own visions of a downtrodden population within the enclave who were in 
dire need of paternal guidance from a political figure of means. 
Still, it certainly seemed as though much of the development money that had 
been flowing into Dahagram failed to make its way into livelihood improving projects. 
There seemed little concern to even conceal this fact by Rahaman. One day, as I was 
meeting with him in his offices, I asked if I could see the UP records. He shrugged and 
handed me several ledger books within which detailed minutes from Dahagram’s UP 
meetings were noted. These comprised a record that could be shown to any 
government official wishing to inquire into the doings of local government within the 
enclave. Many of the decisions taken by the Council concerned the allocation of 
various funds for either relief or development projects within Dahagram. A quick 
survey of the ledger showed that the actual amounts of money discussed by the 
Council and duly recorded in the minutes by the Council’s scribe had been erased and 
rewritten by a different hand and with a different pen. Such actions might or might not 
conceal discrepancies between the amount of development money flowing into the 
enclave for distribution through the Parishad and the amount of that money reported to 
the council by the Chairman. 
My point here is not to express shock or moral outrage at practices of 
misappropriation in Dahagram. Such corruptions were different in Dahagram from 
many other places more in degree than in kind. What is more, most residents, when 
asked, agreed that corruption, expropriation, and clientelism had been common 
features of all of the enclave’s various local governments since before Ershad 
designated Dahagram as an independent Union Parishad in 1990. Much of the 
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frustration with the current administration had more to do with the fact that, on the one 
hand, expropriation had reached a level that was “overly” exploitative for Dahagram’s 
residents and, on the other, that the Chairman was failing to spread the rewards of such 
expropriations around. Another woman who was a member of Dahagram’s Union 
Parishad expressed this frustration to me in a bitter tirade against the Chairman and his 
corruption one day as I took tea in her house. The house was large by Dahagram 
standards but had a packed dirt floor and a thatched roof, as opposed to the poured 
concrete floors and tin roofing of “pukka” or proper [modern] homes. “Look at me,” 
she said. “I have been a council member for three years and still I live in a kachcha 
home.” Her complaint was framed as an accusation of corruption, but more directly 
carried the suggestion that the Chairman had violated the moral economy of 
appropriation by not allowing his fellow Council members to also benefit from 
development kick-backs. 
Gupta argues that narratives about corruption provide a lens onto local 
understandings of the workings of complex bureaucratic practices. As he writes, 
“When considering modern bureaucracies, thus, even when an unambiguous legal 
mechanism exists to determine corruption, if there is no widespread social agreement 
about which scale is to be used to judge ‘correct’ ethical behavior, the social judgment 
of corruption can often be contentious and fractured” (8). In Dahagram, however, it 
might be more correct to say that narratives of corruption, and practices of corruption 
themselves, constitute navigations of the discontinuities inherent in overlapping 
processes of politically organized subjection. An analog to Gupta’s point, then, might 
be that narratives of corruption also attempt to codify a moral order that separates 
“acceptable” navigations of these discontinuities from unacceptable ones. They are 
also narratives through which particular grievances and expectations are expressed and 
articulated. They are thus projects of, on the one hand, (re)constructing a vision of 
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space and rule in Dahagram and, on the other, expressing often cynical frustration with 
the failures and corruptions of competing visions of the enclave. 
Overlapping Sovereignties 
Spatial corruptions in Dahagram emerge out of various projects seeking to 
regulate, control, and appropriate the enclave’s landscape, history, and inhabitants. 
This is no less true with formal projects seeking to secure and assert various forms of 
sovereign control over the contentious space of the enclave than it is with projects that 
seek to define its boundaries or incorporate it into the nation through development aid. 
Indeed, projects of surveillance and control are often particularly susceptible to re-
appropriation and reconfiguration within Dahagram and assertions of sovereignty are 
as likely to expose gaps and overlaps and corruptions of control as to accomplish rule 
“as planned.” Such projects and their breakdowns expose how various dimensions of 
control, rule, and observation create a space for corruption and politics within the 
enclave, which are in turn constitutive of everyday life and struggle for enclave 
residents. 
Security and surveillance are omnipresent features of life in the enclave. The 
sense of surveillance is palpable even from the centre of the enclave, and the patrolling 
and regulation of space is a constant topic of discussion, rumour, and complaint. 
Rather than routinising and normalizing life for Dahagram residents, this surveillance 
produces new sets of ambiguities at the same time that it allows various forms of 
spatial exploitation and corruption. This paradox was particularly apparent in an 
attempt by the BSF to stem cattle smuggling in Dahagram that was ongoing 
throughout the period that I conducted fieldwork. 
During the summer of 2006, the BSF announced that they were placing a ten-
cow ceiling on the number of cattle that could be taken out of the enclave on haat 
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days.260 In a Union Parishad of approximately 16,000 people, many of whom possess 
few assets beyond their cattle, this placed a severe imposition on enclave residents’ 
ability to raise cash to cover land purchases, dowries, production shortfalls, or various 
other forms of asset shocks. The ceiling continued through the summer and in the 
monga season, a period of seasonal food insecurity and anxiety throughout the North. 
During this period, the sale of cattle is often a necessary strategy for households 
struggling to get by. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Smuggling is a constant topic of tension along the 
India-Bangladesh border and is a central trope on debates over and concern about the 
“porousness” of the border in general. Much border smuggling is of petty goods, such 
as paddy, jute, fertilizer, and livestock. However, concerns over crime at the border 
are equally central to discussions of security as are terrorism and the movement of 
militant groups.261 Tension around cattle smuggling, in particular, is high because of 
social and legal prohibitions on the slaughter of cattle inside India.262 As such, 
smuggling cattle across the border into Bangladeshi markets is a profitable and 
common practice. The BSF maintains that Dahagram, in part because of its peculiar 
territorial situation in India, is an epicentre of such smuggling and the ceiling was their 
latest attempt to stem it.263 By drastically limiting the passage of cattle through the 
enclave, the BSF was thus both stemming the slaughter of sacred cows by Muslim 
Bangladeshis and also asserting control over a criminal and unruly space where 
smugglers regularly violated the territorial integrity of India. 
                                                 
260 See The Daily Star, 2006 (September 3), “BSF Closes Tin Bigha Corridor;” The New Age, 2006, 
(September 4), “BSF Restriction on Cattle Movement Thru’ Tin Bigha: Dahagram Angorpota Enclave 
Dwellers Stage Demo;” The New Nation, 2006 (September 7), “BSF Troops Intrude into Angorpota;” 
The New Age, 2006 (December 12), “Farmers Face Ruin as BSF Restricts Cattle Movement.” 
261 See, for example, Datta (2010), Jamwal (2004), and Nandy (2005). 
262 On cattle smuggling in particular, see Hussain (2009). 
263 The completion of the border fence, which does not go around Dahagram, stands to focus more 
attention on the enclave as a site of smuggling activity. 
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There is some truth to the claim that Dahagram served as a conduit for cattle. 
Many residents told me that it was (or had been) common practice for Indians from 
surrounding areas to enter Dahagram with their cattle, strike an arrangement with a 
local broker, and wait for the broker to return from market with proceeds from sales. 
Such petty smuggling was a common and critical livelihood strategy for enclave 
residents. This profitable cattle trade also became a key method for local elites to 
acquire wealth and raise money for political campaigns. One of the more egregious 
cases of this was Rahaman, the current Union Parishad Chairman whose family was 
rumoured to run a smuggling operation that transported cattle, drugs, and other goods 
across the border and through the Tin Bigha Corridor, thereby avoiding the dangerous 
negotiation of border fences and official border crossings. 
The BSF’s ten-cow ceiling was in direct response to a sharp increase in 
observed cattle passages. During the previous Union Parishad Administration, from 
1997-2002, I was told, BSF records showed between seven and eight thousand cows 
passing through the Corridor, a rate that would suggest at least a modest cross-border 
trade in illegally sold cattle. During the first three years of the new administration, 
however, as many as 18,000 cattle were recorded passing through the Corridor, an 
average of more than 60 cattle per haat. If the BSF’s strategy was to cut down on 
smuggling, their ceiling also served to consolidate Rahaman’s power within the 
enclave. Indeed, this particular exercise of sovereignty served not only to prevent 
residents from accessing markets to sell critical goods, it also placed the responsibility 
for deciding who could take cattle to market in the hands of Rahaman himself, who 
most accused of causing the ceiling in the first place. 
The Chairman was charged with issuing chits to enclave residents that they 
could then present to the BSF as they passed through the Corridor. Without a chit, the 
BSF would block passage of cattle. Indeed, the BSF had instituted a policy of 
232 
searching goods that passed through the Corridor to make sure that enclave residents 
had not slaughtered the cattle inside of the enclave in order to transport just the meat 
to market. I heard numerous stories throughout my fieldwork of demands and pleas for 
the Chairman to issue one of these chits for reasons as various as acquiring land, 
medical emergencies, and purchasing food and goods. Yet the system of distributing 
such chits appeared to have little to do with need. Rather, they were awarded based on 
political favouritism, bribes, and commissions on the sale price of cattle in the market. 
As one resident described it, “the ceiling has been a great misery for us. We’ve had to 
survive it in any way we can.” For this and other residents unable to gain a cattle chit, 
those strategies ranged from selling other durable goods to going without. The cattle 
ceiling, nominally a project of regulation, had created another layer of corruption, 
nepotism and favouritism, and afforded new powers to individuals who both create 
and exploit Dahagram’s ‘exceptional’ status. 
If the cattle ceiling provided a means for Rahaman to consolidate power and 
privilage within the enclave, it also provided a platform for him to further his claim to 
benefit Dahagram’s voiceless. Shortly after the ceiling was put in place, and shortly 
before I began my fieldwork, Rahaman had reformed the DSS to advocate for the 
rights of Dahagram residents. Rahaman gathered a group of political elites from within 
the enclave, including former members of the original DSS and several previous 
Chairmen, and organized a trip to Dhaka, where the group formed a human chain in 
front of the Parliament building and sat with the Lalmonirhat District Commissioner to 
voice the enclave’s needs and concerns.264 Among these were 24-hour opening of the 
Tin Bigha Corridor, the routing of electric lines through the Corridor to provide power 
to the enclave, and the lifting of the cattle ceiling. The revived DSS, to my knowledge, 
never engaged in any other activities beyond the trip to Dhaka and no direct action or 
                                                 
264 See The Daily Star, 2006 (September 14), “Keep Tin Bigha Open Round the Clock.”  
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change emerged from their protest. Yet, by using the cattle ceiling as a way to 
resurrect the DSS, Rahaman, in effect, tied himself to histories of struggle over 
Dahagram and, in doing so, strengthened his own claims to rule, power, and sovereign 
control. Moreover, he strengthened his own position to speak for enclave residents’ 
interests against other voices within the enclave who might have presented a different 
picture of Dahagram’s politics than Rahaman. The revival of the DSS pointed to ways 
that various exercises of control were open to both exploitation by those with political 
power in the enclave and to multiple interpretations and appropriations within 
Dahagram’s histories of belonging. 
This is not to say that Rahaman’s claim was always effective or that the 
enclave residents were passive victims of his scheme. The ceiling was a point on 
which many attempted to press their own claims against the Chairman for corruption. 
While I was conducting fieldwork, there were several cases of Rahaman being 
accosted in tea stalls by angry residents attempting to force him issue a chit or to 
account for his inequitable distribution.265 Further, several residents, organized by 
Mohommad Yusuf, lodged formal complaints against the Chairman with authorities in 
Patgram. Yusuf, on several occasions, spoke with me at length about evidence he was 
amassing to support his case. Such complaints were particularly threatening in 2007. 
In January, the Emergency Administration had come into power in Bangladesh in the 
wake of the collapse of general elections (see Introduction). One of the 
Administration’s projects of restoring “democratic order” was a massive corruption 
crackdown against government officials both in Dhaka and elsewhere. Many in the 
enclave began to assure me that the Chairman was due to be arrested at any moment. 
Indeed, by the summer of 2007, Rahaman was regularly sleeping outside of the 
enclave in Patgram, as I was told, to more easily evade the authorities. Whether or not 
                                                 
265 I never witnessed one of these confrontations, but I was told that they happened on at least three 
different occasions. 
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this was true, Rahaman did appear to spend less time within the enclave and began to 
always travel from place to place by motor-bike. He was never, at least while I was 
conducting fieldwork, picked up by the anti-corruption authorities. 
The corruptions, appropriations, and shortcomings of schemes such as the 
cattle ceiling were apparent even to those responsible for putting them in place. 
Shortly after we began work in Dahagram, Sayeed and I stopped to take tea with two 
jawans in the BSF. One, a Sikh from Delhi, we had met before. The other, a tall, 
muscular and moustached man from Kerala, clearly disliked and distrusted us. 
Masking his suspicion with a thin veneer of goodwill, he formally offered us first 
water and then tea. Sensing the tension, I suggested to Sayeed that we proceed through 
the Corridor and begin our day’s work. As we rose, Sayeed casually said, “We have 
heard that there is a cattle-ceiling in effect now in Dahagram.” The Keralan sprang to 
his feet, furious, and began shouting. “So that’s it! That is the reason you are here. Is 
this what you have come to know about?” The tension around the cattle-ceiling issue 
might have suggested an acknowledgement on the part of the BSF that their own 
projects of policing, securing, and enforcing sovereignty in a sensitive space were 
complicit in reinforcing conflicting modes of sovereign power and corruption within 
the enclave. More than that, our interest in cattle-smuggling itself raised challenges to 
the legitimacy and completeness of BSF authority in the Corridor, thus undermining 
particular imaginaries of sovereignty, control, and regulation at the border. In raising 
questions about this particular spatial corruption, we had stumbled on a “sensitive” 
topic. 
The politics of the cattle ceiling were unsettling, in some sense, for all 
involved. The realities of implementing a project that had the straightforward goal of 
reducing cattle smuggling in Dahagram exposed the instabilities of attempts to 
establish observation and control—to define and subsequently regulate the space of 
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the enclave. It also suggested ways that simplistic visions of the enclave’s political 
space—as a zone of criminality, nationalist import, or administrative ambiguity—were 
open to reappropriations within different registers of the enclave’s history and 
opportunities for those in a position to exploit Dahagram’s precarious location at the 
margins of state and nation. The cattle ceiling, as it brought together many of the 
questions raised in other spatial corruptions within Dahagram, also highlighted what 
was at stake in such attempts to map visions of space back onto the enclave itself. 
While the overlaps and elisions of such projects certainly created opportunity for 
some, for most residents they contributed to insecurity, instability, and exposure to a 
range of threats to their livelihoods. 
Conclusion 
Sensitivity, as I argue elsewhere in this dissertation, produces spaces in 
particular ways. This process is as much about ambiguity and uncertainty as it is about 
the conditioning of responses to places and topics that are considered “sensitive.” 
Reflecting on the various spatial corruptions in Dahagram, one might push this 
definition one step further. Sensitive spaces appear to be areas that are open to a 
number of different interpolations—into idealized understandings of security, crime, 
nation, state, development, and territory. Yet, such interpolations are uncomfortable, 
incomplete, and, if not dialogic, at least open to negotiation and transformation.266 
These interpolations are not as simple as the hailing of an individual on the street by a 
police officer. They are imperfect visions, clear, perhaps (though not always), in 
intent, but hazy at the edges. The imperfections of these idealized visions are of 
critical consequence for residents of Dahagram. Indeed, the various imaginings of 
                                                 
266 Unlike, for example, Althusser’s (1971) description of the interpolation of the subject into ideology. 
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Dahagram as a space open for and in need of a range of interventions have as much 
consequence for residents of the enclave as the interventions themselves. 
My suggestion here is more than the oft-repeated maxim that there is a gap 
between theory and practice. Rather, I am arguing that there is an inexorable link 
between the two, that Dahagram emerges out of idealized imaginings as much as it 
does out of concrete practice. As Mitchell writes, “Saussure . . . describes the 
difference between an idea or representation and the material that represents it as no 
more than the difference between two sides of the same sheet of paper. For the 
mapmaker, the difference is even less. . . . He cannot keep reality out of his 
representation” (2002: 116). For Dahagram residents, this process is reversed. They 
cannot keep representation out of their lived realities. Spatial corruptions, as such, are 
best understood as both the unsatisfactory outcomes and negotiated terrains of 
“representation” and “reality” in Dahagram. 
Yet, equally as formative of life in Dahagram, are the ways that such spatial 
corruptions are negotiations of experiences and practices of politically organized 
subjection at and in specific historical conjunctures (Abrams 1988). In this sense, an 
attention to spatial corruptions offers windows onto the micro-politics of rule within 
Dahagram and how such practices articulate and are mutually constituted with broader 
histories, understandings of, and concerns over history, territory, and nation. From this 
vantage point, Dahagram appears as one particularly complex node in the mutual 
constitution of local and broader patterns of rule. The relationship in Dahagram 
between national and local politics, development, and official projects of defining and 
controlling space are always already formed in dynamic tension with Dahagram’s 
ambiguous and marginal status and its simultaneous importance in national symbolics 
of territory. 
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As such, projects that seek to bring potato fields in line with the map, signs 
that signify to no one, and attempts to halt the passage of cows through Dahagram 
share particular sets of resonances. They are all moments in and through which spatial 
forms of power are worked out, transformed, and interpreted against the backdrop of 
Dahagram’s multiple and contentious pasts. Indeed, they are all projects that seek to 
bring Dahagram “in line,” even if they share little agreement on what that line is. What 
is more, they are all bound up in particular kinds of corruptions and failures to realize 
their own visions. Which is not to say that we should understand these projects as 
“failures.” To do so would be to misunderstand both the experiences of spatial 
corruptions for residents of spaces such as Dahagram and to ignore the specific new 
kinds of opportunities and relations of rule such projects create. The relations between 
the different visions of history, rule, knowledge, technical expertise, and nation in 
Dahagram interact with, undermine, enable, and compound one another. For residents, 
the lived space of the enclave is categorically shot-through with contending modes of 
control, intervention, and power. If these outcomes are “unintended consequences,” in 
the Foucauldian (2003 [1997]) sense of the term, they also produce the uncomfortable 
and contested terrain on which residents continue to work out their own relations to 
overlapping forms of expropriation, exploitation, and regulation. 
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CONCLUSION 
On January 15th, 2010, Indian Home Secretary GK Pillai announced that India 
had, “in principle” agreed to address its outstanding border issues with Bangladesh. 
Central among these outstanding issues were the exchange of the enclaves. The 
announcement, made in advance of Awami League chief and current Prime Minister 
of Bangladesh Sheik Hassina’s visit to Delhi to discuss regional cooperation between 
India and Bangladesh, noted that the agreement had been reached even though, 
through such an exchange, there would be a net territorial gain in Bangladesh’s favor 
of almost 10,000 acres. The agreement, as reported in the Business Standard, was thus 
imagined as a new resolution to the enclave issue—“in keeping with Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh’s view that small disagreements cannot be allowed to come in the 
way of a dynamic relationship with Delhi’s eastern neighbour”—as opposed to the 
latest iteration of a series of resolutions first officially agreed upon in 1958.267 As 
such, this announcement, echoed many of the similar “in principle” agreements that 
preceded it. It claimed a new historical juncture in the relationship between the two 
countries (this time the return to power of both the Awami League in Bangladesh and 
the Congress Party in India for the first time since the 1974 Indira-Mujib Pact) and 
subsequent “new bonhomie between the two nations which would allow all remaining 
issues to quickly be solved.”268 As with many of these previous agreements, the 
announcement resulted in a flurry of administrative visits to the enclaves, brief 
discussions about the practicalities of such exchanges, and an agreement to survey the 
remaining notoriously un-demarcated 6 kilometers of the border. The January 
agreement was not only reminiscent of previous agreements on exchange in language. 
It was also similar in outcome, resulting in no concrete transformations, movements, 
                                                 
267 Business Standard, 2010 (January 15), “India Agrees to Cede 17,000 Acres to Bangladesh.” 
268 Business Standard, 2010 (January 15), “India Agrees to Cede 17,000 Acres to Bangladesh.” 
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or resolutions to address the enclaves’ precarious status. In other words, it reaffirmed 
that the question of the enclaves could not be reduced to one of regional cooperation to 
address a set of “minor” problems with simple and straight forward administrative 
solutions. 
If the agreements served as a reminder of the administrative holding pattern 
that has characterized bureaucratic debates over the enclaves since the opening of the 
Tin Bigha Corridor in 1992, a more recent event highlighted the stakes involved in 
such an exchange and the violence and instability of life within the chhits. On October 
15th, 2010, a Bangladeshi man was killed by residents of the Indian enclave of Garati 
in the Bangladeshi district of Panchagarh. The killing was, reportedly, the result of a 
property dispute between an enclave resident, Shah Alam, and his neighbor in 
Bangladesh, Javed Ali. Javed had hired a number of men to invade the enclave and 
attack Alam. Yet, when the attack was carried out, enclave residents were prepared. 
They fought off the attackers and beat one of them, Ramjan Ali, to death.269 The 
enclave residents refused to return the body. Over the next 24 hours, a number of 
Garati residents fled the enclave, anticipating a reprisal attack from their surrounding 
neighbors. On the morning of the October 17th, as many as 2000 Bangladeshi residents 
of surrounding districts entered the enclave and burned between 200 and 300 
homes.270 The Bangladesh Police arrested three Indian residents of the enclave for the 
killing of Ramjan Ali, and 11 Bangladeshis for the arson. The following day, residents 
began to return to their homes, surveying the damage and fearing additional attacks 
(see Figure 18).271 
                                                 
269 The Independent BD, 2010 (October 16), “Cross Border Murder, Arson Over Property.” 
270 Most reports quoted the figure of 200 houses, the Independent BD quoted 300. See The Independent 
BD, 2010 (October 16), “Cross Border Murder, Arson Over Property;” BDnews24.com, 2010 (October 
16), “Angry Enclave Residents Set Ablaze 200 Houses;” UNBconnect, 2010 (October 16), “200 Houses 
in Garati Enclave Looted, Torched.”  
271 See BDnews24.com, 2010 (October 17), “Uneasy Calm Returns to Enclave;” and BBC, 2010 
(October 18), “Arrests in Bangladesh After Village Arson Attack.” 
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many live their lives as though they were residents of Bangladesh. In other words, 
violent conflicts emerge out of the territorial ambiguity of the enclaves themselves. 
While contestation over land is not uncommon in rural Bangladesh, the evacuation of 
the enclave followed by the burning of an entire village speaks to a different kind of 
instability and insecurity that sees such violence as immanent in questions related to 
land, space, and ownership. 
These events—the January agreement and the October conflict in Garati—
appear to occupy different ends of a spectrum of possibilities for the enclaves and their 
futures. On the one hand, the chhits remain as set of complications, waiting to be 
resolved by bureaucrats and diplomats who are perpetually in agreement about what 
should happen though repeatedly unable or unwilling to effect exchange. On the other 
hand, they persist as spaces of territorial ambiguity and tension, zones within which 
contested meanings of territory, property, and belonging periodically transform into 
open conflict, violence, and expropriation. Yet, as I have argued in this dissertation, 
there is an intimate link between the symbolic appropriations of the enclaves within 
debates over the meanings of nation and state and more local articulations and 
assertions of the enclaves’ “place” within them. These mutual imbrications are part 
and parcel of what constitutes the enclaves’ sensitivity. The ways that the enclaves are 
marked as sites of ambiguity, anxiety, and national struggle articulate with and 
through the chhits, their internal politics, and the range of relations between then and 
the areas that bound them. In other words, my suggestion has been that the failures of 
bureaucratic attempts to remedy the enclaves’ precarious status and the periodic 
violence in spaces such as Garati should not be understood as cause and effect, but 
rather as similar outcomes of the production of the enclaves as sensitive space. 
                                                                                                                                            
enclaves appears to be mixed. While there are numerous references to Indian enclaves that had been 
abandoned by Hindu residents at Partition and subsequently occupied by Muslims from East Pakistan, I 
also met a number of Muslim landholders within the enclaves who had original titles to their land 
bearing their family name and the Raja of Cooch Behar’s seal dating to the late 19th century.  
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The enclaves have been marked similarly through such processes. Yet, they do 
not share a uniform history and politics of sensitivity. As the recent events in Garati 
show, the anxieties and uncertainties of territory are both similar and different to those 
in Dahagram. If both spaces share a violent instability of territory and space, Garati 
appear marked by an exclusion from services in both states, whereas Dahagram’s 
predicament is shaped through a constant engagement with the politics of exclusion 
and regulation in India and the vagaries of belonging to Bangladesh. As such, the 
politics of sensitivity in the enclaves are at once structured through a range of similar 
ambiguities and anxieties of territory and through deeply contextual negotiations and 
experiences of particular spaces. Moreover, while the histories, politics, and debates 
over the Tin Bigha Corridor resonate and structure discourses around and in relation to 
other enclaves in both India and Bangladesh, they do not determine them. The 
production of sensitive space is at once a deeply particular and mutually constitutive 
process. It maps the politics of place onto national (and nationalist) debates over 
territory and, conversely, maps nationalist notions of territory onto place. 
In this dissertation, I have endeavored to understand the ongoing making of the 
enclaves, and especially Dahagram, as sensitive spaces. My argument neither seeks to 
posit a formal model of sensitive space, nor to articulate a general theory of sensitivity 
that can easily cut across time or space. Rather, I have attempted to engage with a 
particular set of productions of sensitivity in an extremely particular place. I chart a 
narrative of sensitivity that emerges out of a specific historical and spatial context and 
articulates with the nationalist politics of state formation in postcolonial India and East 
Pakistan/Bangladesh. This specificity is central to my story. I do not, then, claim to 
offer a general account of either the making of sensitive space or of complexity and 
tenuousness of the India-Bangladesh border. My account, though useful in 
understanding these broader questions, is more limited in scope. To quote Corrigan 
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and Sayer (1985), in their own qualifications of the generalizability of their study of 
state formation in England, “What [I] offer here is not, then, claimed as definitive: this 
is an essay—an attempt—in historical sociology, rather than a history [or sociology] in 
the conventional sense” (11). 
So what might we learn from the enclaves’ sensitivity? The point in engaging 
sensitive space is to explore the relational ways in which spaces come to embody a 
range of contradictory anxieties that emerge out of historical tensions around them. It 
is to understand the ways in which these anxieties occlude and preclude clear visions 
of these spaces, subsuming them in a range of broader symbolics of nation and state. 
And it is to take seriously the range of complications of belonging and rule that these 
symbolic appropriations are complicit in producing for residents of such zones. If 
sensitivity might serve as an analytic for understanding and exploring spaces like 
Dahagram, I would argue that it must attend to such problematics while avoiding 
narrowly defined indicators and/or empirical referents. Thinking through gray areas of 
state and nation such as the enclaves as “sensitive space,”274 opens ways to 
understand, think through, and expose manifestations of cartographic and other 
anxieties of state formation, not to presume what those anxieties are. 
As such, the themes that I have examined in this dissertation in relation to the 
enclaves, generally, and Dahagram specifically, may provide useful starting points in 
thinking through other sensitive spaces, imagining them comparatively with or in 
                                                 
274 My argument here resonates with Yiftachel’s (2009a; 2009b) articulations of “gray spaces” as 
elements of contemporary urban zones. Yiftachel, particularly concerned with urban areas in 
Israel/Palestine argues that, “The concept of ‘gray space’ refers to developments, enclaves, populations 
and transactions positioned between the ‘lightness’ of legality/approval/safety and the ‘darkness’ of 
eviction/destruction/death. Gray spaces are neither integrated nor eliminated, forming pseudo-
permanent margins of today’s urban regions, which exist partially outside the gaze of state authorities 
and city plans” (2009a: 250). However, where Yiftachel primarily sees gray spacing as a form of spatial 
control with shifting boundaries that might accommodate a range of interests of opportunities, I would 
argue that engaging with the anxiety and ambiguity of sensitive spaces (many of which might also be 
termed “gray spaces” in Yiftachel’s sense) are critical to understanding the unstable terrains of rule and 
opportunity that emerge from and through them.  
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relation to the chhits, or examining the ways they are mutually historically constituted 
with state and nation. As I hope I have shown in this dissertation, what is important 
about sensitive space is engaging methodologically with the ambiguity and anxiety as 
a set of clues towards reconstructing both broader points of tension and the 
complexities of rule within such zones.275 
In summary then, this dissertation has examined four linked processes that are 
central to the construction of the enclaves, and Dahagram in particular, as sensitive 
space. First, it explored articulations between a range of ambiguous concerns over the 
enclaves and life within them. By examining the regulation and policing of the space 
of enclaves and, as importantly, of information within and related to them, I argued 
that sensitivity emerges as a form of moral regulation (Corrigan and Sayer 1985)—a 
set of vaguely defined fears and discourses around citizenship, security, and secrecy 
that structures actions and possibilities for those who seek to regulate spaces like the 
enclaves and those who live within them. Such moral regulations shape behaviors and 
possibilities differently in different contexts. They necessitate particular kinds of 
performances of power and particular strategies of decision and protection. Yet, they 
are also complicit in shaping the instabilities of life and livelihood of enclave 
residents. The lack of access to official information such as maps, the regulation of 
movement through the Tin Bigha Corridor, and the constant administrative association 
of the enclaves’ residents as suspect populations in need of particular forms of 
policing, creates enormous uncertainties for enclave residents. In essence, the 
treatment of spaces as sensitive, in and of itself, is central to the production of 
sensitive space. 
Second, if sensitivity is remade on a daily basis and through both periodic and 
quotidian performances, it is also historically constructed. It emerges out of and 
                                                 
275 I use the word “clues” in Ginzburg’s (1989) sense of the term, as fragmentary pieces of evidence that 
offer critical insights into the construction of the whole. 
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through broader debates within and around the concepts of national survival and 
national belonging. The enclaves’ sensitivity was constructed through, as it in turn 
partially constructed, the long Partition of Bengal (Zamindar 2007), an ongoing 
process of defining territory and space through which the enclaves and their residents 
were gradually transformed from one of a set of complications and issues to be 
worked out in the period immediately following Partition to a series of more 
complicated problems that embodied and reflected at once the dilemmas of belonging 
in discourses around postcolonial citizenship and the threat of various forms of 
territorial incursion. Through this history of sensitivity, I argue, the enclaves “as such” 
were subsumed within broader discourses over the border, emerging not as a concrete 
set of problems associated with a given set of spaces and people, but rather as symbols 
of a set of intractable issues between India and East Pakistan/Bangladesh. This 
produced the enclaves as symbolic spaces that are often redeployed in broader 
narratives over the changing relations of postcolonial citizenship, belonging, and 
rights in relation to the border, and narratives of fear and incursion across it. 
Third, I explored the ways in which residents of Dahagram shape their own 
histories of belonging in sensitive space. In particular, I examined how the question of 
belonging in Dahagram was often indexed to belongings. Through this exploration, I 
argued that the question of national and community belonging was always linked to an 
ongoing set of questions about residents’ ability to acquire, hold, and dispose of 
belongings. I explored the ways that these claims were framed against Dahagram’s 
tenuous postcolonial history and the way arguments about its history were translated 
into claims for membership with the Bangladeshi nation. Residents of Dahagram often 
frame their history as a narrative of suffering for territory (Moore 2005), of resolutely 
holding on to tenuous Bangladeshi land in the face of near constant oppression and 
expropriation from Hindu residents of both the enclave and of surrounding areas. 
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Residents have, historically, deployed this suffering as a means of claiming a moral 
community (Chatterjee 2004) deserving of inclusion within Bangladeshi nation and 
state. Yet, such particular claims towards belonging in Bangladesh often occluded or 
erased more violent and contestatory pasts. Picking up on these tensions between 
visions of Dahagram as a community united in its suffering and one deeply divided 
over who does and does not belong, I explored Dahagam’s post-1992 politics, 
examining the ways in which the question of belonging was reshaped in the context of 
an ethnicized and classed demographic shift in the enclave’s population. 
Finally, I explored the experience of living in sensitive space through an 
examination of spatial corruptions in Dahagram. I argued that it is critical to examine 
the often-similar outcomes of nominally contradictory processes within Dahagram that 
shape the political landscape and lead to reconfigurations of power and opportunity 
within it. Namely, I argued that processes of defining space, processes of 
incorporation through symbolic development, and processes of regulation all rely on 
particular kinds of representations or enframings of Dahagram (Mitchell 2002). I 
further argued that the tensions between “reality” and these “representations” in 
Dahagram should not be understood as gaps between theory and practice, but rather as 
dynamic tensions between the imaginations of Dahagram and its lived realities. As 
such, many projects that seek to bring Dahagram in line with particular visions of 
space produce new, though often unsurprising, configurations of power and 
opportunity within the enclave. I explore these as spatial corruptions not to conjure an 
ethical and normative understanding of the notion of corruption, but rather to highlight 
that all of these practices of defining the enclave often tend to be experienced by 
residents similarly, as a set of corruptions of space and expropriations of land and 
belongings. My point in this chapter was not that sensitive spaces are the zones within 
which such forms of corruption take place, but rather that they are spaces within which 
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a particularly large number of such projects and visions of space overlap and 
complicate one another. As such, they are spaces within which the contradictory 
experiences of “reality” and “representation” are at once particularly visible and 
complex. 
In conclusion, the enclaves are sites within which a range of projects that 
constitute the “challenging interface of democracy and security,” with which I began 
this dissertation, combine, conflict, and come apart. They are places where the 
contradictions and limits of rule are particularly stark. As such, they are useful places 
to begin to unpack the claims of territorial control that are central to the construction 
of the modern state system and places within which changing modes of control and 
regulation that many have argued are part of the contemporary conjuncture might be 
historicized and rethought—their “newness” reexamined as part of unfolding and 
longstanding patterns of rule. These sensitive spaces along the India-Bangladesh 
border are at once places that have been shaped by and problematize nationalist 
histories and projects of spatial control. Seen as such, they rest upon both the front-
lines and fault-lines of state and nation, spaces that are at once marginal and central to 
conceptions of territory, danger, and belonging. They are also, as I hope I have shown, 
productive sites for rethinking the anxieties and ambiguities of statemaking and 
reimagining broader projects of security, sovereignty, and national belonging. 
If the enclaves offer opportunities for re-examining territory in contemporary 
Bengal, they are also lived spaces—zones within which residents negotiate 
complicated and conflicted lives. The experience of being at once central and marginal 
to nation and state produces opportunities for some, but insecurity and instability for 
most. The politics of sensitivity are thus intimately bound to imaginations of the 
possibilities for and ongoing vagaries of struggles for belonging and belongings within 
them. If my analysis of spatial corruptions in Dahagram in chapter 4 suggests a 
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somewhat pessimistic view of the outcomes of various symbolic appropriations of the 
enclave, it is worth remembering that movements such as the DSS were also effective 
at re-mobilizing these symbolic appropriations to assert different claims to 
membership within Bangladesh. Whether such movements are possible in the post-
1992 moment remains an open question, yet one that remains an important and 
ongoing point of discussion within Dahagram. Sensitive spaces, as I have argued, are 
mutually constituted with broader understandings and productions of space. As such, it 
is a mistake to imagine life within these spaces as purely a top-down imposition of 
anxiety and ambiguity. Thus, while the ability of enclave residents to negotiate and 
resist framings of sensitivity space should neither be over emphasized nor 
romanticized, there remain possibilities for reimagining and reframing the 
relationships between these fragments and their nations. 
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